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El tráfico de armas

Cable en el que EE UU muestra a Ucrania las pruebas del tráfico con Sudán

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Cable en el que EE UU muestra a Ucrania las pruebas del tráfico con Sudán. ID:233833 Date:2009-11-09 12:05:00 Origin:09KYIV1942 Source:Embassy Kyiv Classification:SECRET Dunno: Destination:VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHKV #1942/01 3131205 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 091205Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8754 INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T KYIV 001942 SIPDIS NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY DOE FOR ANDREW BIENIAWSKI EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS PARM, PREL, KNUC, UP SUBJECT: U.S.-UKRAINE NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS SEPTEMBER 23-24, 2009 Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary, Reason 1.4 (b, d) 1. (S) Summary: Highlights of this semi-annual U.S.-Ukraine nonproliferation dialogue include: --Ukraine gave an inconsistent answer on the question of transferring HEU spent fuel to Russia. --Ukraine asked for additional security assurances beyond those provided in Budapest in 1994, and was interested in continued missile defense cooperation with the U.S. -- Ukraine noted that the SCUD missile elimination Memorandum of Understanding had been approved by all the Ministries, was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for final approval, and will soon be ready. -- Ukraine requested U.S. support for additional elimination of melange liquid rocket propellant, but the U.S. said it would concentrate first on eliminating the SCUDs and associated melange before discussing any further elimination of melange. -- Ukraine requested additional U.S. funding for SS-24 elimination, which the U.S. undertook to consider and respond to. -- The U.S. made a formal request for more information on Ukraine's planned transfer of MTCR Category I items to Saudi Arabia to allow for robust bilateral consultations on the margins of the MTCR Rio de Janeiro Plenary in November on the Saudi issue as well as the broader issue of Category I transfers. -- Ukraine said it is no longer exporting weapons to Burma, and claimed not to have exported T-72 tanks to South Sudan despite U.S. satellite photos to the contrary. The U.S. noted it would have to consider whether to impose sanctions for the tank transfer, and that a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU was being truthful. -- Ukraine again undertook to look into specialty steel exports to Iran's missile program, while the U.S. warned that if Ukraine could not solve this problem on its own, the U.S. may take action of its own against the entities involved. -- After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a contract September 24 on the removal and storage of radioactive sources. -- The U.S. also pressed Ukraine to agree to destroy more small arms under the NATO Partnership for Peace Small Arms/Light Weapons destruction project. End Summary 2. (S) In a one-on-one meeting prior to the formal meeting, Nykonenko welcomed Van Diepen to Kyiv. Nykonenko said that Ukraine was very familiar with Van Diepen's strong nonproliferation bona fides and took this as more proof that the United States had confidence Ukraine could be a strong nonproliferation partner. The sides previewed the agenda and discussed security assurances, HEU spent fuel repatriation and downblending, NATO Partnership for Peace issues related to small arms and light weapons elimination, SCUD missile elimination, missile defense, Ukrainian specialty steel exports to Iran, and Ukrainian T-72 tank exports to South Sudan. Relevant portions of the one-on-one discussion are included in the following readout of the regular meeting agenda. HEU --- 3. (C) During the one-on-one meeting, Van Diepen said that it was particularly urgent for Ukraine to approve the shipment of the HEU spent fuel from the Kyiv Institute to Russia by the end of September. He explained that if the shipment is not approved by then, it could not take place until 2011 at the earliest, and Ukraine would continue to bear the costs and security risks of storing the material until then; that the spent fuel had no commercial value, but would be valuable to terrorists; and that, since Ukraine had been invited to the Nuclear Security Summit next year, it would be important for Ukraine to report progress in securing its nuclear materials. Nykonenko replied that Ukraine's position of February 2008 had not changed, and thus we had to wait for the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences report in early 2010. 4. (C) In meetings the next day, Vladimir Ryabtsev from Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) explained that all of the technical issues had been resolved, and Ukraine had made the decision to ship the spent fuel. They had not shipped it because it had not been worked out who would pay Russia $800,000 for addressing the waste associated with reprocessing the spent fuel. There was not enough money in Ukraine's budget to pay this expense. Wayne Leach, the DOE officer assigned to Embassy Kyiv, said that the U.S. would send this new information back to Washington and provide an answer to Ukraine soon. (Comment: Other sources have indicated to DOE separately that the decision to repatriate this spent fuel still rests with the President and the NSDC and is still being addressed as a package along with the other Russian-origin HEU in Ukraine; in effect, that Ryabtsev may have been characterizing the debate somewhat inaccurately. The GOU has long been aware that DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative program does not have authority to pay for waste issues associated with such repatriation.) Missile Defense --------------- 5. (U) In the one-on-one meeting before the plenary, Nykonenko told Van Diepen that Ukraine had read with interest the new U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe. Nykonenko pointed out that Ukraine had missile defense expertise and was interested in continued missile defense cooperation, which could help reconfirm Ukraine's role in the new European security architecture. It was "very important" for Ukraine to receive positive signals from the U.S., he said. Van Diepen replied that the U.S. would be looking forward to discussing missile defense with Ukraine the following week during the meetings in Kyiv led by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Vershbow. Security Assurances ------------------- 6. (S) The first item Nykonenko raised during the one-on-meeting was an appeal for additional security assurances for Ukraine, beyond those the U.S. had provided in the 1994 Budapest Declaration. He explained that Ukraine felt threatened, particularly after the Russian invasion of Georgia. Ukraine needed a security anchor to fill the vacuum until it could join NATO. Ukraine had received the August 2009 note from the U.S. reaffirming Budapest, but it wanted to discuss the issue in more detail. Ukraine was hoping that, with U.S. leadership, a new multilateral security assurance could be worked out. The GOU would be grateful to begin expert-level talks on this; the fact of such talks would send a good signal to Ukraine's public*and neighbors. He passed a non-paper that proposed a new security assurance. Legally binding assurances were best, he concluded, but he said he understood this was very difficult. 7. (U) Van Diepen explained that the United States' Budapest commitment endured and was not tied to the expiration of the START Treaty in December. See paragraphs 53-54 below for additional discussions on this topic and issues related to the START Follow-on Treaty. SCUD Missile Elimination ------------------------ 8. (S) Nykonenko introduced the SCUD agenda item by noting that this project is a priority for Ukraine. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense Economic Department Deputy Director Sergiy Novosyolov reiterated that point and stated that we successfully completed the first stage -- the U.S. team inventory of the SCUDs and associated equipment in June-July 2009, the various documents and annexes from each of the sites, and U.S. agreement to eliminate a portion of the melange (liquid propellant for SCUD and other missiles). Novosyolov further explained that the SCUD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had been approved by all the Ministries and was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for final approval and will soon be ready. He also noted that a list of possible Ukrainian contractors had been sent to the U.S. Embassy and stated GOU readiness to discuss costs, timetables, volume of work, transporting the missiles to elimination sites, and other technical and logistical factors associated with implementation of the project. 9. (S) Alexander Dotsenko, from the National Security and Defense Council, added that there are several legal issues for the Cabinet of Ministers to consider before authorizing the MOD to sign the MOU. He stated that we should schedule an experts meeting to discuss the details of the elimination work, including the specific process for selecting the contractor, tax exemption issues, and a system to monitor the work of the contractor to ensure that all of the work is completed on time and in accordance with the other terms of the contract. 10. (S) Van Diepen expressed appreciation for the excellent cooperation received from the Ukraine Ministry of Defense in the conduct of the June-July 2009 site inventories. He noted U.S. interest in moving forward to the elimination phase of the project and hoped that the MOU would be approved soon. Paul Van-Son, from ISN's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) office, expressed agreement in principle to the Ukraine-proposed technical discussions, but emphasized that the MOU must be signed first. He also explained that the U.S. understood the importance of additional melange elimination to Ukraine, but noted that we would concentrate first on eliminating the SCUDs and associated equipment and melange in accordance with the MOU before discussing any further U.S. role in the elimination of additional stocks of melange. Melange Elimination ------------------- 11. (S) Nykonenko noted that Ukraine had a dramatic melange problem, with over 16,000 tons of the rocket fuel and the steady deterioration of the storage containers. While the U.S. had committed to eliminating 1440 tons as part of the SCUD elimination project and the OSCE agreed on September 16 to eliminate 3000 tons, Ukraine was interested in additional bilateral U.S. assistance to dispose of the remaining fuel. Alexander Nilov, a rocket fuel expert from the MOD, explained that the 3000 tons would be transported by rail to Russia, where a Russian contractor hired by the OSCE would eliminate the fuel. The first shipment of melange would leave Ukraine on November 1, and the work would be completed in a year. This export of a military product to Russia was in compliance with Ukraine's export control laws, he added. 12. (S) Van-Son explained that NDF contractors are evaluating the technical capability/costs of using the Polish mobile plant that is on site at Radekhiv to eliminate the 1440 tons of SCUD oxidizer. He again emphasized that the MOU on SCUD elimination must be concluded before further discussions can take place on elimination of SCUD-associated melange. He concluded that the U.S. would like to evaluate the progress on the OSCE melange elimination project once it commences, as well as progress on the NDF SCUD project, before considering any further funding for any separate melange project in Ukraine. 13. (S) Dotsenko reminded the U.S. of his request to consider eliminating additional melange as part of the SCUD project and stated that Ukraine had met its obligation to eliminate half of its missiles and associated equipment by 2005 as it agreed to do in 1998. (NOTE: While Ukraine currently has 54 SCUD TELs, Dotsenko maintains that Ukraine possessed 117 SCUD TELs when the 1998 U.S.-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding was signed. According to Dotsenko, Ukraine eliminated half of its SCUD force prior to 2005 using its own funds, and the U.S. should therefore consider eliminating more melange based on the 1998 numbers.) Dotsenko asked the U.S. to consider additional melange elimination projects, pointing out that Ukraine would have 13,000 tons remaining even after the OSCE project is completed. He also requested that melange elimination be included on the agenda for the next meeting. Removal of SS-24 Solid Rocket Fuel and Elimination of Motor Cases --------------------------------------------- --- 14. (S) Nykonenko explained that, because of Ukraine's budget crisis, the water wash-out removal of SS-24 rocket fuel from the motor cases had been significantly delayed. Ukraine was continuing to adhere to the "black box" elimination method, under which the USG paid Ukraine a given amount of money for each eliminated motor case, regardless of how Ukraine removed the propellant. As in previous meetings, Ukraine requested additional U.S. funding for SS-24 elimination ($250,000 per rocket motor to remove the fuel in an environmentally safe manner and an additional $15,000 per empty rocket case). Nykonenko highlighted a letter sent to the U.S. Congress from the Ukrainian Rada requesting additional U.S. assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to perform this work. 15. (S) Neil Couch, from the VCI Bureau's START Treaty office, said that the U.S. remains committed to economically feasible, technologically sound propellant removal and motor case elimination as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. He continued that the Department of Defense is committed to the SS-24 elimination program regardless of the end of START in December 2009, but will not pay Ukraine more than it pays Russia for the elimination of the exact same missile system. 16. (S) Sergei Birin, from the National Space Agency of Ukraine, explained that Ukraine had begun this work with 10 rocket motors. It needed $250,000 to remove the fuel from each case plus an additional $15,000 per empty rocket case for expenses related to the operation of the facility where the motors were located. Birin said that Ukraine needed an additional $6 million to complete this work, and Ukraine was waiting for the U.S. answer to its request. Ukraine had allocated $50 million to speed up the implementation of rocket fuel wash-out, but this sum was not sufficient to continue the work*operations at the Pavlohrad missile facility had been suspended. Nykonenko noted that Russia's costs were lower because it used a method that Ukraine did not regard as environmentally safe*burning the fuel out of the motors. Ukraine cannot use this method because it is located in the center of Europe and the rocket facilities where this work is done are near large population centers. He added the U.S.-Ukraine 1993 CTR Agreement stated that elimination would be completed in an environmentally safe manner. 17. (S) Couch recalled that Ukraine had agreed after four years of intensive negotiations in the START Treaty Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to cut four 80-millimeter holes in the motor cases so they could not be used again as rockets, but could be used for other commercial purposes after the fuel was eliminated. Ukraine also could have crushed the motor cases or cut them in two. Birin said that Ukraine had already eliminated the fuel from four of the ten rocket motor cases in the test batch it was using to refine its wash-out technique. In the first motor case there was some residual fuel remaining that Ukraine burned out. This burn-out left big holes in the motor case such that there was no need to cut the smaller holes as agreed in the JCIC. With each successive wash-out, the amount of residual fuel remaining had been less, so Ukraine was confident it would come up with an effective technique to wash out the fuel. 18. (S) Van Diepen noted that Ukraine was having detailed technical discussions on these SS-24 elimination issues with DTRA this week. He said he would get a detailed debriefing from DTRA and forward Ukraine's remarks to the political level, which would consider Ukraine's new requests for assistance. He promised to provide Ukraine a response. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) ------------------------------------ 19. (C) Couch said that for several weeks the NRRC link between the U.S. and Ukraine had been out of service. The U.S. had determined that the link between Washington and Kyiv was ok, and that the problem was between the MOD and the Ukraine ground station. Nykonenko replied that Ukraine appreciated U.S. assistance to upgrade the link, and that Ukraine had completed this work. He said that Ukrainian engineers were working on the current problem and hoped to have the link back in service soon. Wassenaar Arrangement --------------------- 20. (C) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had amended its list of military items subject to export control restrictions. In addition, it had revised the list of dual use items; that list is awaiting interagency approval. Finally, Ukraine is working to enhance the control of lathes and other items, including training, that are not on the Wassenaar or MTCR lists, but are on the EU list. Ukraine is using best practices guides for approval of exports. Van Diepen emphasized it is very important to pass national legislation to implement the export control regimes effectively. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) ---------------------------------------- 21. (S) Tetyana Vidzigovska, State Service of Export Control of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine had implemented the changes to the MTCR Annex agreed to at the 2008 Canberra Plenary, noting that the GOU approved these changes on September 19, 2009. She also explained that the GOU is paying close attention to items not controlled by the MTCR and is considering enhancing controls over training and intangible technologies, and adopting additional controls on items going to Iran in accordance with the European Union list. Van Diepen thanked Ukraine for the update and noted that the U.S. undergoes a similar interagency process in implementing changes to the MTCR Annex. 22. (S) Boris Atamanenko, National Space Agency of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine had transferred MTCR Category I items to the U.S., Russia, Germany, and Saudi Arabia, and Category II items to the U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, China, and India during the past year. In accordance with its MTCR commitments, he noted that Ukraine had informed MTCR Partners in April 2009 (POC Document 86) of the intended Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia, and none of the Partners had objected or made an official request for further information. Van Diepen attempted to confirm that Ukraine had actually transferred Category I items to Saudi Arabia., not just notified its intention to transfer, but Atamanenko's response created confusion on this point. 23. (S) Van Diepen then said that the United States was extremely disappointed by this unwelcome news of an MTCR Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia. By definition, MTCR Category I systems are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and the MTCR Guidelines clearly state that such transfers should only be made on rare occasions. A principal purpose of the MTCR is to prevent the transfer of MTCR Category I items to non-MTCR countries. Van Diepen further noted that he understood that Ukraine had previously notified MTCR Partners of an MTCR Category I transfer to India, to which the U.S. objected but Ukraine transferred the items anyway. He stated that the India case was the first time that an MTCR Partner had gone ahead with a transfer when objections were made by another Partner. If Ukraine were to transfer Category I items to Saudi Arabia, that would be yet another unfortunate precedent. Van Diepen added that the U.S. would object to such a transfer, as it is our right to do as an MTCR Partner, but he said he would reserve further commentary until we get more information on what is actually being contemplated for transfer or has been transferred to Saudi Arabia. 24. (S) Van Diepen said that Ukraine should consider this discussion a formal request for more information on the Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia. He also asked that this information be provided to the U.S. well in advance of the MTCR Rio de Janeiro Plenary in November. This would allow for bilateral consultations on the margins of the MTCR Plenary on the Saudi issue as well as the broader philosophy on MTCR Category I transfers. Given the confusion over whether or not a transfer had already taken place, Van Diepen requested further clarification from Ukraine on Day 2 of the talks. 25. (C) On Day 2, Atamanenko clarified that no MTCR Category I items had yet been transferred to Saudi Arabia, but a project had been started that will result in a Category I transfer. Ukraine will not transfer any technology that would create any missile systems. Atamanenko also noted that the U.S. (ISN Director Durham) and UK had approached the GOU at the MTCR RPOC meeting in Paris in April, that they had requested further information about the sale, and had not raised concerns about the potential transfer. However, Ukraine had not received a formal written request from the U.S. or the UK for this information. Van Diepen then reiterated his "formal" request for further information on the equipment/technology to be transferred in preparation for a robust discussion of this issue on the margins of the upcoming MTCR Plenary. (Embassy Kyiv subsequently followed up with a written request and raised the request in further meetings with MFA.) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) ----------------------- 26. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had participated in the ATT's Open-Ended Working Group meetings in 2009 and was looking forward to the February 2010 meetings. Ukraine supported the development of the ATT as long as it did not restrict self-defense and the legitimate production of military items. Ukraine was optimistic that an ATT could capture countries outside of the export control regimes. He said that Russia did not agree with Ukraine's position, so we needed a common strategy to deal with Russia. Nykonenko added that any Treaty negotiated without the participation of the U.S., Russia, and China would be of limited utility. 27. (S) Van Diepen said that the United States supports greater responsibility in arms transfers, reducing the destabilizing trade in illicit arms, and ensuring that all states have national systems and internal controls that meet the highest standards. In working towards these goals, we will continue to oppose lowering of international standards on the transfer of conventional arms and ensure that there is no infringement on domestic ownership of firearms. He continued that work on the ATT must be done on a consensus basis in order to ensure these objectives are met. The UK needs to get back tQconsensus decision-making; the UK planned to introduce a resolution during the UN First Committee*the U.S. needed Ukraine's help to ensure that consensus decision-making is part of any resolution passed. Nykonenko supported the U.S. position on the feasibility of an ATT and that the two countries (along with Russia and China) needed to develop a common strategy. Transfer Cases -------------- 28. (S) Van Diepen said that there are two types of cases the U.S. wanted to discuss on the second day of the consultations: 1) transfers to Burma and South Sudan in which there were deliberate Ukrainian government actions that are contrary to U.S. philosophy on exports; and 2) other transfers by Ukrainian entities, presumably not authorized by the Ukrainian government. The U.S. wants to work cooperatively with Ukraine to stop this second category of illicit transfers. Burma ----- 29. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had received the U.S. demarche and was no longer exporting weapons to Burma. Ukraine was just wrapping up existing contracts, and had been reducing its exports to Burma since 2005. In 2008 Ukrainian exports to Burma were "as good as zero" in part due to previous U.S. warnings, and Ukraine had not signed any new contracts with Burma in the last two and one half years. Current exports were just spare parts. The remaining business was so small that the company involved had recalled all of its workers from Burma. 30. (S) ISN/CATR Deputy Director Brian Bachman thanked Nykonenko for the information. He said that the U.S. was still concerned about the exports to Burma, but was pleased to hear that Ukraine was now only exporting a small number of spare parts and was no longer exported completed weapons, as reports had indicated. South Sudan ----------- 31. (S) Van Diepen recalled that when the U.S. had raised with Ukraine in July 2008 that an additional shipment of T-72 tanks, BM-1 GRAD armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment planned for a late June or early July shipment to Kenya was being purchased by the Kenyan Ministry of State Defense for South Sudan, Ukraine had assured us the arms were for the Government of Kenya. Ukraine had informed the U.S. that it had received an end-user certificate from the Kenyan government and receipts acknowledging the arrival of the earlier tank shipment in Kenya. Subsequent to our discussions, the M/V Faina, which was carrying another weapons shipment from Ukraine, was hijacked, and it became clear that cargo was also intended for South Sudan. Van Diepen asked if the GOU had investigated. 32. (S) Valeriy Lysenko, from Ukraine's Export Control Service, said that the T-72 tank shipment was intended for Kenya. He said Ukraine had not transferred any military equipment to South Sudan. All of Ukraine's contracts were checked. 33. (S) Van Diepen gave the Ukrainian side a copy of the contract that clearly lists the GOSS, and asked if the GOU side maintained that the export was for Kenya. Lysenko held to this line, questioned the authenticity of the contract, and asked if the U.S. had any better evidence. Van Diepen, regretting that the GOU had forced him to do so, showed the Ukrainians cleared satellite imagery of T-72 tanks unloaded in Kenya, transferred to railyards for onward shipment, and finally in South Sudan. This led to a commotion on the Ukrainian side. 34. (S) Van Diepen continued that he appreciated the sides could have different export control policies, as was their sovereign right. But not being told the truth was something the United States did not expect from a strategic partner. There was nothing for Ukraine to gain from lying and a lot to lose, he cautioned. Since South Sudan is on the U.S. terrorism list, the U.S. would have to consider whether to impose sanctions over the transfer; a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU the truth. 35. (S) Lysenko said that Ukraine would study the U.S. information and he asserted that Ukraine only had a relationship with Kenya, and did not have a relationship with South Sudan. Ukraine could not be held responsible for the actions of a third country. This matter was a common problem for the U.S. and Ukraine to resolve. He said Ukraine's special agencies might need to get involved to find out what had happened. Nykonenko said that Ukraine would study this situation in the light of a partner relationship so hat the U.S. would know that Ukraine is a reliable partner. Ukraine's Exports of Specialty Metals for Iran's Ballistic Missiles --------------------------------------- 36. (S) Van Diepen said that, contrary to Ukraine's export control policy, Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, were engaged in providing the Iranian ballistic missile program with specialty metals and other sensitive items such as ball bearings used in liquid propellant missile systems. It is possible that these activities were taking place without the knowledge of the Ukrainian government. The U.S. remains deeply concerned that, given the high quality of steel that can be purchased from Ukrainian manufacturers, Iran's ballistic missile program continues to seek items from Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX. Van Diepen continued that such steels have long been difficult for Iran to produce indigenously. Van Diepen provided the following points/non-paper: -- The United States and Ukraine have discussed in the past the supply by Ukrainian firms of sensitive materials to Iran's ballistic missile program. -- Specifically, between 2002 and 2007, we repeatedly raised concerns that Ukraine's XXXXXXXXXXXX was engaged in providing the Iranian ballistic missile program with specialty metals and other sensitive items such as ball bearings used in liquid propellant missile systems. -- In September 2004, the United States imposed sanctions against XXXXXXXXXXXX for transferring items controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Iran. -- Subsequently, in May 2006, we advised you of XXXXXXXXXXXX's continued efforts to supply Iran's ballistic missile program with additional materials, including MTCR-controlled 08X22HGT titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel, which is used in the production of Scud and NoDong propellant tanks, as well as CR18NI10TI, a type of stainless steel that is not MTCR-controlled, but is used in the production of a variety of Scud engine parts. -- We remain deeply concerned that, given the high-quality of steel that can be purchased from Ukrainian manufacturers, Iran's ballistic missile program continues to seek items from Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX. -- Such steels have long been difficult for Iran to produce indigenously. As you will recall, in late 2006 we shared with all MTCR Partners information indicating that a key choke point for Iran's missile programs is the ability to acquire advanced materials such as AISI 4340 and AISI 4130 steels. -- Both of these steels are used by Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program in the production of motor cases. -- We therefore urge you to exercise vigilance in your export control processes, and to take all appropriate measures to ensure that Ukrainian firms are not acting as sources of specialty metals to Iranian ballistic missile entities. 37. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine would look into the matter and provide detailed information to the U.S. Van Diepen said that if Ukraine could not solve this problem on its own, the U.S. would consider taking action by sanctioning the entities involved, including the steel companies, and by taking other measures. Iran's missiles threatened U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East, so for self-defense reasons, the U.S. had to act to stop these exports. Ukraine's steel companies have benefited from trade with the West, but they could not have it both ways-- it was not in their interest to risk large profits from the West for small illicit profits from rogue states like Iran. Ukrainian Training to Iran's Malek-Ashtar University of Technology -------------------------------- 38. (S) Van Diepen said that we recently shared with the GOU information indicating that as of early 2009, Iran's Malek-Ashtar University of Technology (MUT), as in years past, was continuing to sponsor international scientists, including from Ukraine, to provide training in Iran. Malek-Ashtar University of Technology is subordinate to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and provides instruction to representatives of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) as well as the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). The U.S. urged Ukraine to ensure that Ukrainian individuals and institutions are not providing sensitive technology, training, and/or other support to Malek-Ashtar University of Technology or other Iranian entities affiliated with Iran's missile program, and asked for the status of Ukraine's actions. Nykonenko said that Ukraine had recently received the U.S. information and was reviewing it. Prohres-Pakistan ---------------- 39. (S) Van Diepen noted that we recently provided information to Ukraine noting the interest in Pakistan's National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) in procuring gyrotheodolites from Ukraine's Prohres. He urged Ukraine to investigate this activity and take actions to prevent any transfer of this missile-related equipment. Nykonenko said that Ukraine had recently received the U.S. information and was reviewing it. XXXXXXXXXXXX ------------- 40. (S) Van Diepen said that there is a long history to this case and requested an update from Ukraine. He also provided additional information on this case: -- We now have new information indicating that in August 2009, XXXXXXXXXXXX was working with representatives of China's Changda Corporation to establish a partnership related to the production of gyrotheodolites with China's Shaanxi Cangsong Machinery Plant. -- The Shannxi Cangsong Machinery Plant is subordinate to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Tenth Academy and manufactures inertial guidance systems for Chinese ballistic missiles. -- Given the possible missile-related end-use of these items, as well as the identity of XXXXXXXXXXXX's potential Chinese partner, we are concerned that this cooperation could be used to support China's MTCR Category I missile programs. -- We therefore strongly urge you to conduct further inquiries into XXXXXXXXXXXX's dealings with Chinese missile-related entities, and take all appropriate measures to ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX is not serving as a source of goods or technologies for China's MTCR Category I programs. 41. Nykonenko said that Ukraine is still reviewing the U.S. information on these matters. (NOTE: Ukraine provide a written update on this case at the end of the talks: "XXXXXXXXXXXX did negotiate with China Great Wall and received licensing approval to repair a previously provided UGT-S gyrotheodolite. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX did not negotiate with the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology to transfer MTCR-controlled DOZ stellar sensors." END NOTE.) G8 Global Partnership/Combating Nuclear Smuggling --------------------------------------------- ---- 42. (U) Viktor Ryazantsev of the State Committee for Nuclear Regulation, Mykola Proskura of the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and Oleksandr Panchenko of the State Border Guard Service provided detailed reports on the progress made on the range of anti-nuclear smuggling assistance projects developed with the GOU by the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) in January 2006. Each reported extensive progress on these projects and expressed deep appreciation for U.S. assistance in facilitating both project implementation and participation by other donors. 43. (U) NSOI Coordinator Mike Stafford agreed with them that the two sides had made remarkable progress on these projects and added that their degree of cooperation provided a model for NSOI's engagement with other governments. Stafford also noted that, in addition to progress on the assistance projects, it was important to monitor progress in implementing the agreed steps in the joint action plan that the sides had also agreed upon in January 2006 and whose implementation the assistance projects were designed to facilitate. Stafford noted that the USG had just received from the Ukrainian Embassy earlier in the week an updated matrix indicating that 27 of the 30 steps in the joint action plan were either complete or in progress. He congratulated the GOU on this progress and secured Nykonenko's agreement to keep the U.S. side updated as implementation proceeds. Stafford also announced that NSOI had allocated $935,000 from its FY09 budget to assist monitoring on Ukraine's green border with Russia, proposed on behalf of the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program a workshop to strengthen Ukraine's ability to respond to nuclear smuggling incidents, and agreed to a Ukrainian request to query the Government of Finland on when a proposed mobile radiation monitoring van might be provided. (The Finnish regulatory authority subsequently reported that they hoped to provide it in December.) 44. (U) On behalf of ISN/CTR, Stafford expressed U.S. appreciation for the provision of a temporary location for the Science and Technology Center Ukraine (STCU) and requested periodic updates on construction of the permanent headquarters. Nykonenko emphasized three additional assistance projects that had been suggested by Ukraine at the most recent Global Partnership (GP) Working Group meeting, and reiterated a request that contributions by GP members to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund not be credited against their commitments to the GP. Stafford said he had investigated the latter matter after the original Ukrainian request and had learned the USG and several other GP members were counting these contributions within their GP commitments. The USG was not inclined to change this practice and thus would not ask others to change, either, especially since how to account for assistance was a sovereign decision. Electron -------- 45. (U) Proskura said that, after two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Ukraine had signed a contract September 24 on the removal and storage of radioactive sources from the Electron Gaz Plant.and the Kavetskiy Institute. Ukraine had selected the contractor, and he saw no reason why Ukraine's nuclear regulatory body would intervene to stop the work. 46. (C) Leach said that this contract demonstrated Ukraine's strong commitment to nonproliferation. The sides would begin be securing the sources at the two facilities and then would work on removing the material beginning with one-of-a-kind sources at the Institute of Physics in Kyiv. The sides would work out a way to deal with the different sources and more difficult conditions at Electron Gaz. The sides would need to work closely and cooperatively to resolve all of the problems as the project moved forward, he concluded. NATO Partnership for Peace Destruction Project --------------------------------------------- - 47. (U) PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner noted that the sides would have detailed technical discussions the next day on this topic, but he wanted to summarize the state of play in front of the larger group. While the original Phase I of the project planned for the destruction of 15,000 tons of munitions and 400,000 small arms/light weapons (SA/LW), revised plans by NATO and the USG (as Lead Nation) was for the project to terminate when current funding ran out (around the end of March 2010), due to the GOU deciding not to destroy all of the SA/LW. This revised plan would cover 6000 tons of munitions. The good news was that munitions destruction finally had commenced, with approximately 600 tons destroyed to date, and that the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency had determined that an extra 2000 tons of munitions could be destroyed (i.e., 8000 tons total) due to interest accrued in the account. The other donors would need to approve the use of the interest for this purpose, but that was expected to be a formality. Additionally, construction on the explosive waste incinerator would begin in October. As for SA/LW destruction, over 134,000 had been destroyed to date, with the GOU recently committing to destroy another 54,000 after over a year and a half suspension of such destruction. This would bring the total destroyed to approximately 190,000 SA/LW, but would leave the project approximately 210,000 weapons short of the original goal. 48. (U) Costner emphasized that the USG had committed to engage the GOU on its proposal to convert the balance of the SA/LW into replicas for sale to see if this could be done in a way that would satisfy USG requirements that the weapons no longer function as such. If agreement was reached, the USG and NATO would commit to continuing the destruction project and destroying the balance of the 15,000 tons of munitions as originally envisioned. However, he emphasized that U.S. laws were stringent in this regard and that experts may not reach agreement the next day. In this case, the sides would be faced with two options: 1) Ukraine would need to destroy the weapons as originally agreed; or 2) the project would be shut down, as noted above. 49. (U) Nykonenko expressed appreciation for the good news that the munitions total would be increased to 8000 tons, and expressed confidence that the experts would find a solution the following day that would allow destruction assistance to continue. (Note: The following day Ukrainian experts stated that they have recommended to the Cabinet of Ministers that the GOU agree to destroy the balance of weapons consistent with their original commitment, instead of converting them to replicas. If Cabinet of Ministers approval is attained, this will allow the project to continue. See septel for details. End Note.) Biological Threat Reduction Initiative -------------------------------------- 50. (U) Ludmilla Muherska from the Ministry of Health gave a detailed presentation on Ukraine's efforts to upgrade 18 regional medical laboratories. The Ministry of Health is also working with the MOD and the other security services to upgrade security at the laboratories. Ukraine would require additional assistance to reduce the biological threat and to complete all of this work 51. (U) Van Diepen urged Ukraine to identify expeditiously a new location for a Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) that meets DoD/CTR's conditions and he emphasized that Ukraine needs to consolidate all especially dangerous pathogens in the CRL, once completed. 52. (U) Muherska said that Ukraine is working on this complex issue and was considering several sites for the CRL. Some of the sites were located on MOD-owned property, so if selected, the site would need to be transferred to the Ministry of Health. Ukraine is hoping that it would be able to select a site soon. Side Conversation -- Security Assurances and START Follow-On --------------------------------------------- --------------- 53. (S) On the margins of the Nonproliferation talks, Nykonenko had three conversations with VCI/SI Deputy Director Neil Couch to clarify Ukraine's desire to participate in the START Follow-on Treaty and Kiev's security concerns. Nykonenko stated that he has been appointed as the Ukrainian Representative to the START Follow-on negotiations and, in that capacity, he wants to consult with the U.S. negotiator. He added that, despite a rocky relationship with Russia, he has met with Ambassador Antonov on four occasions and he doesn't understand why the United States has not offered similar consultations. He is willing to meet with A/S Gottemoeller at any time or place. Nykonenko reiterated his offer for Ukraine to play a mediating role between the United States and Russia in START Follow-on, citing past examples in which Ukraine had played such a role in START. Finally, Nykonenko asked that the START Follow-on Treaty contain a preambular statement that singled-out Ukraine's contribution to START implementation specifically and to nuclear non-proliferation in general. He added that it was unfair to include Ukraine in the same category as Belarus and Kazakhstan since they are members of the CIS and only do what Russia tells them to do. 54. (S) Couch asked Nykonenko to explain why Ukraine needed additional, legally binding security assurances, recalling that the 1994 Budapest security assurances provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation did not expire with the START Treaty in December of 2009; that the 2008 United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership was still in force; and that Vice President Biden's recent speech in Kyiv had confirmed the United States' commitment to Ukrainian security. With all of these assurances, what else did Ukraine need? Nykonenko responded that Ukraine had no doubts about the commitment of the United States; however, Ukraine had serious concerns about Russia's commitment. Citing the Russian-Georgian conflict and the large ethnic Russian population in Ukraine, Nykonenko explained that if the United States would agree to new security assurances with Ukraine, then Russia would likely agree to join in the document. That is Ukraine's real desire; it views an agreement with the United States as a vehicle to bring Russia along. Nykonenko added that such an agreement would also satisfy the two halves of Ukraine society, the westward-leaning half and the Russian-leaning half, and help quell internal tension. He also raised the issue of the Russian Black Sea Navy Base at Sevastopol, stating that Ukraine has no way of knowing how many soldiers Russia had on the base and that he believed Russia has exceeded its number of personnel allowed under the Navy Base lease. This was especially urgent for Ukraine given Russia's suspension of its CFE commitments. Nykonenko was clearly concerned that the Russians could use the Black Sea Base as jumping-off point for military action in Ukraine. (Note: A subsequent initial check with analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency indicates no visible build-up of Russian forces at the Black Sea Navy Base. DIA is currently conducting a more thorough review of available information. End note.) 55. (U) Participants: United States: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Vann Van Diepen XXXXXXXXXXXX 56. ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen cleared this cable. PETTIT

El caso Couso

Otros cables sobre el caso 'Couso'

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Otros cables sobre el caso Couso . ID:16883 Date:2004-05-13 15:10:00 Origin:04MADRID1731 Source:Embassy Madrid Classification:CONFIDENTIAL Dunno:04STATE89241 Destination:This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001731 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2014 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP, Counterterrorism, American - Spanish Relations SUBJECT: DCM'S MEETING WITH MFA STATE SECRETARY BERNARDINO LEON REF: STATE 89241 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR KATHLEEN M. FITZPATRICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) DCM paid an initial call May 10 on MFA State Secretary Bernadino Leon, who said this was his first meeting SIPDIS with a foreign embassy since taking office. Leon made a point of saying that the new government wanted to have excellent relations with the U.S., especially on counter-terrorism in light of March 11. He said Spain likely would increase its Euro corps presence in Afghanistan and he expressed optimism that Spain would agree to a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) (but said the decision was still pending at MOD). DCM mentioned our desire for 500-800 more troops; Leon demurred on numbers, saying likely would not be that high, and the exact count had not yet been determined. 2. (C) Leon also said Spain was considering sending a Guardia Civil/police contingent to Haiti to help train the police and contribute to democratization there. He said MFA felt that would be Spain's most useful contribution, rather than peacekeeping forces. He also offered Spain's help on economic issues in the lead up to the US-EU summit. 3. (C) DCM noted our desire, now that we have expressed our disappointment on the Iraq troop withdrawal decision, to move forward to continue our excellent relations with Spain under the new government. DCM said U.S. would welcome support in the EU on counter-terrorism issues such as Passenger Name recognition and terrorist financing. DCM also noted that he thought that positive steps on Afghanistan, along the lines Leon foreshadowed, would likely be very well received in Washington. 4. (C) Noting that Iran was another area of cooperation between the US and Spain, with Spain chair of the IAEA board of governors, DCM said our experts on Iran were ready and willing to come to Madrid to brief the new government. Leon said Zapatero specifically wanted to maintain the good ties that Aznar had with Khattami, saying that Spain could be useful in this regard. 5. (C) On Iraq/UNSC resolution, Leon reconfirmed that Spain was not pursuing a parallel draft with France and Germany, but noted Spain could be helpful with these two countries as discussion progressed, as well as with the Latin Americans now on the UNSC (Chile and Mexico). He averred that Spain would adopt a "completely cooperative" approach on this issue. 6. (C) Leon noted his personal affinity with the U.S. He said his grandmother was an American citizen (from Baltimore, of a shipping family called Bevan, sent to Malaga on business and remained in Spain). Also present at the meeting was Rafael Descaller who essentially will have the number three post at the MFA. Descaller mentioned his very favorable experience as a Fullbright scholar at Stanford. Descallar also mentioned Latin America as another are of common U.S.-Spanish interest. Leon agreed that he and DCM should maintain a regular dialogue and open lines of communication. 7. (C) DCM also took the opportunity to ask about Spain's plans regarding its Embassy in Iraq after June 30 (reftel). Leon replied that the GOS might consider elevating the Spanish Charge to the rank of Ambassador. Leon said he would take this under consideration. 8. (C) At the close of the meeting, Leon noted that difficult issues like the Couso case (the Spanish cameraman killed during gunfire in the Palestine Hotel incident last year and a major cause celebre here), would have to be dealt with but could wait until an appropriate time. He reiterated his desire for open contacts and said he wanted to invite DCM to lunch in the near future. 9. (C) Comment: Leon's professed desire for good relations with the U.S. echoes sentiments we have heard from many in the new government -- and also parallels the lack of specific details on concrete cooperation. MANZANARES ID:82641 Date:2006-10-20 12:58:00 Origin:06MADRID2657 Source:Embassy Madrid Classification:CONFIDENTIAL Dunno:06MADRID1799 06MADRID1914 06MADRID2374 Destination:VZCZCXRO5703 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #2657/01 2931258 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 201258Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1094 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2166 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 002657 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016 TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PTER, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN: UPDATE ON KEY TERRORISM-RELATED CASES REF: A. MADRID 1914 B. MADRID 1799 C. MADRID 2374 MADRID 00002657 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: A/DCM Kathleen Fitzpatrick for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Summary: In advance of the October 24 visit to Madrid of US Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, Post presents a brief update on several of the most important pending or recently completed terrorism or criminal cases in the Spanish judicial system. Spain has made great strides in disrupting terrorist cells and frustrating would-be terrorist plots and we remain pleased with Spain's counter-terrorism cooperation. However, its national prosecutors continue to have difficulty building cases that can stand up in the courts and recent Spanish Supreme and national court decisions freeing alleged Al-Qaeda suspects are an important factor to consider as we pursue improved judicial cooperation with Spain. End Summary. ------------------------------- High-profile Al-Qaeda Suspects ------------------------------- 2. (SBU) Spain's National Court on October 11 acquitted Lahcen Ikassrien after finding insufficient evidence that he was a member of either Al-Qaeda or of the Abu Dahdah terror cell in Spain, or that he fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ikassrien is a Moroccan national and former Guantanamo detainee transferred to Spanish custody in July 2005. The court refused to admit any prosecution evidence that was obtained during his detention in Guantanamo or any information gleaned from intercepted phone calls in Spain. Post advised in Reftel A that this might occur, due to the unfortunate similarities the Ikassrien case had with that of accused terrorist Hamed Abderrahaman Ahmed, known in the media as the "Spanish Taliban." As reported in Reftel A, the Spanish Supreme Court announced on July 24 that it had annulled the six-year prison sentence handed down to Abderrahaman in September 2005 by Spain's national court. The court found that Spanish prosecutors could not use any evidence collected during their interrogation of Abderrahaman while he was being held at Guantanamo under conditions the court termed, "impossible to explain, much less justify." The Spanish prosecutor in the Ikassrien case had sought an eight-year jail sentence for the accused and tried unsuccessfully to build a case against Ikassrien that excluded evidence obtained in Guantanamo, noting publicly that Spanish authorities had obtained more than enough evidence of Ikassrien's membership in the Abu Dahdah terror cell prior to his stay in Guantanamo. It is unclear whether Ikassrien can be tried on any other terror-related charges. 3. (SBU) In a separate case, Spanish authorities on October 3 released Taysir Alony, who in September 2005 was sentenced to seven years in prison for membership in Al-Qaeda, for humanitarian reasons stemming from a serious heart problem. The Spanish Ministry of Interior is forcing Alony to wear a locator bracelet and monitoring his activities. ------------------------ CIA Flights and Prisons ------------------------ 4. (SBU) Despite President's Bush recent announcement that there are no longer any terrorist suspects held in "secret prisons," this issue continues to dominate press headlines in Spain. On the front page of its October 15 edition, leading Spanish daily El Pais reported that the founder of Al-Qaeda in Spain has been in a "secret CIA prison" for a year. Sensational headlines in the Spanish press continue to claim that Syrian-born Spanish national named Mustafa Setmarian was turned over to the US by Pakistan authorities at the end of 2005. The press reporting claims that Setmarian sowed the seeds of Jihad in Spain during the 1980s, but that the Spanish national court cannot request his extradition because he has not been officially arrested. 5. (SBU) Along similar lines, and as we reported in REFTELS B and C, the CIA flights inquiry remains a hot discussion topic in Spain. On October 9, German national Khaled al-Masri testified for three hours in a Spanish national court and claimed that he was kidnapped and tortured by CIA officers during five months in 2004. He said he was taken from Macedonia to Kabul on a flight that he believed could have stopped in Palma de Mallorca. Al-Masri said he would not be able to identify any members of the crew on board the flight from Macedonia, but he would be able to recognize some of those who interrogated him in Kabul. As noted in Reftel C, post continues to be concerned that Judge Moreno, the MADRID 00002657 002.2 OF 003 Spanish judge involved in this case, as part of Spain's highly independent judiciary, may determine that Spanish law allows him to claim "universal jurisdiction" on cases involving alleged torture and abuse. Such a determination may provide him the authority to adjudicate events that transpired in a third country if it is proven that related events occurred in Spain. Spanish government officials, including President Zapatero, continue to maintain their firm public stance that the flights did not violate any Spanish laws. However, Foreign Minister Moratinos expressed concern in front of the EU Parliament last month that, "our territory could have been used not to commit any offense, but as a stop-over to commit them in other countries." Moratinos has also urged the European Union to more vigorously investigate the presence of secret CIA prisons in other European countries. Spanish press reports that Judge Moreno in the near future will allow the national prosecutor to call other witnesses, including the airport authorities of Palma de Mallorca and the aircraft handling services. ---------------------- Madrid Train Bombings ---------------------- 6. (C) Despite the passage of more than two and a half years since the Madrid train bombings occurred on March 11, 2004, and the near universal acceptance by the Spanish public and terrorism experts that they were perpetrated by Al-Qaeda sympathizers with the goal to punish Spain for its participation in the Iraq War, a segment of the opposition Popular Party (PP) and the newspaper El Mundo continue to allege a Socialist party conspiracy and cover up and claim that the Basque terrorist group ETA had some link with the March 11 attacks. The highly-charged political clash over the Madrid bombing investigation has heightened the climate of bad blood between the opposition PP and the ruling Socialist government and has greatly hindered the pace of the government's prosecution of the attacks. Spain is currently holding 29 individuals for their alleged connection to the bombings and prosecutors plan to charge these individuals with 191 counts of murder and 1,755 counts of attempted murder. The Spanish National Court has recently rejected various appeals from the accused and said that the trials, scheduled to begin in February 2007, may proceed. The National court in late September asked the Spanish Ministry of Justice to send an extradition request to Italy to bring Rabei Osman el-Sayed, known as "Muhammad the Egyptian," temporarily to Spain to face trial in connection with the Madrid bombings. ---------------------- The Detergent Command ---------------------- 7. (SBU) In a separate case pending before Spanish courts, the national prosecutor will seek a total of 142 years in prison for six Islamists arrested in January 2003 in Barcelona and Girona. These individuals are known in the press as "The Detergent Command," due to their possession of large quantities of detergents that police believe were to serve as ingredients for explosive devices. According to the prosecutor, these individuals were preparing a terrorist attack against a military base in the south of Spain, which may have been the base at Rota that the US shares with the Spanish navy and air force. The prosecutor will seek 32 years for Muhammad Tahraoui, alleged leader of the Detergent Command, and 22 years each for his alleged accomplices, Muhammad Amine BenaMoura, Ali Kaouka, Ismail Boudjelthia, Muhammad Nebbar and Sohuil Kouka. --------------- The Couso Case --------------- 8. (SBU) Although not related to terrorism, the case of Jose Couso--the Spanish television cameraman killed in Baghdad in April 2003 during a firefight between US forces and Saddam's army--may return to national prominence after a British inquest earlier this month implicated US soldiers in the death of a British journalist in southern Iraq in March 2003. Couso's death sparked protests in a country that was vehemently against the Iraq invasion and friends and relatives of Couso have tried for years to bring a wrongful death case against the US soldiers of the Third Infantry Division involved in the firefight. The Spanish national court in March 2006 claimed it had no jurisdiction and refused to hear the case, but Couso supporters appealed to the Spanish Supreme Court the following month and we are still awaiting the high court's ruling. Although we have yet to see any Spanish reaction to the findings of the British MADRID 00002657 003.2 OF 003 inquest, there is a possibility that Couso's family and their supporters will increase pressure on the Spanish Supreme Court to allow charges to be brought against the US soldiers. 9. (C) Comment: Spain is a serious and committed partner in our global war on terror and we remain pleased with the efforts of Spanish law enforcement, intelligence and judicial organizations to combat the Islamic extremist threat. However, Spanish police, prosecutors, and magistrates building legal cases against disparate and amorphous terror cells are struggling to develop evidence sufficient enough to meet the high threshold set by the Spanish courts. Spain has a highly independent judiciary that carefully guards this independence (a major achievement of the post-Franco era), and this is an important factor to consider as we pursue increased judicial cooperation with Spain in terrorism cases. Nonetheless, some of the recent Supreme and national court decisions can clearly be seen as a criticism of US detainee policies in Guantanamo that are highly unpopular among the Spanish. Embassy Madrid looks forward to using next week's visit of Attorney General Gonzalez and his delegation to engage Spanish government officials on a range of important legal and judicial issues to encourage them to take an even more active role in the fight against global terrorism. AGUIRRE ID:93036 Date:2007-01-18 17:39:00 Origin:07MADRID101 Source:Embassy Madrid Classification:UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Dunno:05MADRID4308 07MADRID26 07MADRID82 Destination:VZCZCXRO1824 PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #0101 0181739 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 181739Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1666 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0132 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2374 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY RUCAACC/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY UNCLAS MADRID 000101 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE L/LEI FOR KEN PROPP AND MARK KULISH E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, MARR, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/COUSO CASE: MEETING WITH CHIEF PROSECUTOR REF: A. MADRID 82 B. MADRID 26 C. 2005 MADRID 4308 1. (SBU) Embassy officials from Legat, the Consular Section, and the Political Section met with National Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza on 1/18 to review developments in the Spanish court case charging three U.S. servicemen with murder and war crimes in the April 2003 death of Spanish cameraman Jose Couso during the takeover of Baghdad (REFS A and B). Poloff noted that they were not acting under instruction and simply wanted to meet informally with Zaragoza to review a case of great sensitivity to the USG. Emboffs noted the rapid decision of Examining Magistrate Santiago Pedraz to re-issue international detention orders against the three accused servicemen (REF B) and asked whether Spanish authorities intended to submit bilateral extradition requests to the U.S. as well for the three servicemen. 2. (SBU) Zaragoza said that he was not yet in a position to determine whether or not bilateral extradition requests would be filed because he had not reviewed the case himself sufficiently to establish the best course of action (Zaragoza was not working at the National Court at the time the Couso case was reviewed and dismissed). He noted that the Couso case had moved swiftly at a time when he was preoccupied with the recent handover of ETA terrorist suspects to Spain by French authorities, which involved new legal ground for the Spanish authorities. However, Zaragoza said that he was aware of Spanish Attorney General Candido Conde Pumpido's interest and involvement in the case (REF C) and assured Emboffs that his office would carefully study all aspects of the case and would proceed at a deliberate pace. He said that the existence of a U.S. investigation of the incident was understood to be an important consideration, but left open the possibility that the Prosecutor's Office would seek additional information from USG authorities. 3. (SBU) The Consular Section's legal adviser asked Zaragoza whether he could confirm news reports that the Examining Magistrate had requested that his office prepare a report on whether U.S. assets could be embargoed (frozen) as part of a civil component of the Couso family's suit against the U.S. servicemen. Zaragoza scanned the Examining Magistrate's request and said that the magistrate's order merely transmitted this request by the plaintiffs; the National Prosecutor's office had to undertake a careful review of Spanish case law before responding to the request. //COMMENT// 4. (SBU) Our objective in this initial meeting with Zaragoza was to sensitize him to the USG's concerns in this case, since he had no involvement in this case when it first came before the National Court. Zaragoza is a seasoned prosecutor with a clear understanding of the political implications of this case and we anticipate that he will proceed as carefully as he said he would. As soon as Zaragoza informs us how he intends to proceed, we will convey this information to interested Washington agencies. We will also follow up at higher levels in the Spanish Government to reinforce the implications of this case for bilateral relations and on international law. Aguirre ID:99667 Date:2007-03-08 19:33:00 Origin:07MADRID449 Source:Embassy Madrid Classification:CONFIDENTIAL Dunno:07MADRID432 Destination:VZCZCXRO0119 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #0449/01 0671933 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081933Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2048 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 6004 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2516 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000449 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/WE CLEMENTS AND CERVETTI E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017 TAGS: PREL, SP SUBJECT: SPANISH INTERIOR MINISTER RUBALCABA ON DE JUANA CHAOS DECISION; ETA TERRORISM; KEY BILATERAL ISSUES REF: MADRID 432 MADRID 00000449 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (C) Summary: During a March 7 lunch with Spanish Minister of Interior Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, Ambassador Aguirre heard the Spanish government's defense of its recent controversial decision to allow convicted ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos to serve out the rest of his sentence under house arrest (see REFTEL for Embassy analysis on this issue). De Juana was close to death due to a 4-month hunger strike, and Minister Rubalcaba said that the decision was the correct one because it allowed the GOS to prevent De Juana from becoming a "decades-long martyr for radical ETA youth." He said the GOS was solely responsible for the decision, without any discussion with or pressure from ETA. Rubalcaba also said that ETA had the power to put the opposition Partido Popular (PP) "in the driver's seat" by assassinating one or more individuals of consequential PP rank or position, but was unsure if ETA leaders would want to do this. The Interior Minister said, responding to our request, he was closely following developments on the Couso case and the CIA flights issue, and was eager to see a cooling of Spanish emotions in both cases. Finally, Rubalcaba asked the Ambassador for further reasons behind the postponement of the proposed March visit to Madrid by Secretary Rice. The Minister expressed appreciation for his meetings with the Ambassador, as opportunities to exchange ideas and gain perspective. End Summary. //GOS Decision Saved Lives// 2. (C) Rubalcaba told the Ambassador that the decision to allow convicted ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos to serve the remaining 18 months of his sentence at home under house arrest was the correct one. (Embassy Note: On March 1, incarcerated ETA member Inaki De Juana Chaos was released from the Madrid hospital where he was being treated for a hunger strike and was transferred to a hospital in San Sebastian. When he has recovered from the affects of the 4-month hunger strike, he will be allowed to complete his sentence at home under police surveillance. De Juana had almost completed 17 years of a 30-year sentence for the murder of 18 individuals when he became eligible for early release in 2005. A National Court magistrate blocked De Juana's release in 2005 by charging him with writing letters threatening prison officials, and De Juana was later sentenced to an additional 12 years behind bars. The Supreme Court in February 2007 reduced that sentence to 3 years, leaving only 18 months remaining due to time already served, and setting the stage for the government's decision to release him). Minister Rubalcaba said that his government knew the decision would be controversial, but that government officials had not done a good job explaining to the Spanish people that De Juana had already served his time for the murders, and remained in prison only on the lesser charge of making threatening statements. Rubalcaba confided to the Ambassador that as the end of De Juana's murder sentence drew near in 2005, the Minister of Justice at that time did not want to see the convicted assassin go free. He thus sought to slap on an additional charge--albeit an obscure one with flimsy merits--that would continue the ETA member's incarceration. Rubalcaba said that in hindsight, it would have been better to allow De Juana to go free in 2005 and that now the Zapatero Government was "paying the price" for that decision. 3. (C) Rubalcaba said that at the time of De Juana's release, the ETA member was just hours away from suffering medically irreversible damage due to his hunger strike, and would have died in a short time if the GOS had not acted. Rubalcaba's view is that the decision to release De Juana saved Spanish lives by avoiding his transformation into a "decades-long martyr for radical ETA youth." Rubalcaba said the GOS was solely responsible for the decision, without any discussion with or pressure from ETA. The Minister told the Ambassador that despite the De Juana case becoming a rallying cry for ETA members in recent weeks, current ETA leaders have no use for him in the organization and will not want anything to do with him once he is freed. Rubalcaba posited that De Juana will likely retire to Morocco upon his release. //ETA Could Put PP in Driver Seat// 4. (C) Turning to broader ETA issues, the Minister discussed the virulent reaction to the De Juana decision by the main opposition Partido Popular (PP). Rubalcaba told the MADRID 00000449 002.2 OF 003 Ambassador that the GOS knows ETA could "put the PP in the driver's seat" in advance of regional elections in May and national elections in early 2008 by assassinating one or more individuals of important PP rank or position. Rubalcaba quickly said his government is unsure whether current ETA leaders would risk taking this step, but the fear is that any ETA sympathizer would have the power to change the political calculus in Spain with one rash act. In discussing the December 30 ETA bombing at Madrid's Barajas airport that killed two individuals, Rubalcaba said that act proved the ETA hard-liners had won out over those favoring moderation, and derailed the peace process. Rubalcaba said that ETA's political front group Batasuna is still working every angle to try and gain permission to run in Basque municipal elections in May, but the Barajas bombing has made that scenario even more problematic. //Bilateral Issues// 5. (C) The Ambassador expressed his appreciation to Minister Rubalcaba for the strong level of counterterrorism cooperation, specifically the development of the Bilateral Counterterrorism Working Group. He said the working group is an effective vehicle to improve judicial efforts against terrorism in both countries. The Ambassador also reiterated USG support for Spain's efforts in fighting terrorism and said that the ongoing trial of individuals allegedly involved in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings highlights the continued threat facing both of our countries. When the Ambassador conveyed continued Department and National Security Council interest in the possible terrorist designation of Barakat Yarkas, Rubalcaba replied that he was aware that this was still a pending issue between our governments and knows that it needs to be addressed. The Minister told the Ambassador that responding to our request, he was also following developments on the Jose Couso case (the Spanish TV cameraman killed in the Palestine Hotel incident in Iraq) and the CIA flights issue that have been the subject of much sensational press coverage in Spain in recent weeks. Rubalcaba said that although the Spanish judiciary was fiercely independent and would do what it thought was right, Rubalcaba had instructed his staff to avoid any inflammatory rhetorical comments in an attempt to lower the temperature on these issues. //S Visit to Madrid// 6. (C) Minister Rubalcaba pressed the Ambassador for the "real reason" why the Secretary postponed her proposed March visit to Spain. The Ambassador replied that the postponement was purely for scheduling reasons due to the Secretary's planned travel and had nothing to do with any problems in the bilateral relationship. Ambassador Aguirre noted that the Secretary's recent phone call with Foreign Minister SIPDIS Moratinos, informing him that she needed to testify in Congress on March 28, confirmed what the Ambassador had said. Rubalcaba seemed satisfied with the answer. The Ambassador reminded Rubalcaba that if sectors of the Spanish Government continue to insist that there are signs of a deteriorating bilateral relationship when no signs exist, they run the risk of reversing some of the improvements made in the relationship over the past two years. Although the GOS has not confirmed the Secretary's new proposed visit date of June 1, Rubalcaba raised the possibility of the GOS eventually making some kind of statement confirming the visit. The Ambassador suggested to Rubalcaba that for security and logistical reasons, it was probably not wise to confirm the exact date of such a visit three months out, and the Minister agreed with the reasoning. (Note: Embassy is working with Washington, at the request of the Spanish MFA, to develop some kind of public statement indicating that S had planned to visit in March, is committed to coming to Spain, and that dates are being worked out. MFA would like to publicize a precise date for a rescheduled visit, but this issue is under discussion between the Embassy and Washington.) 7. (C) Comment. Rubalcaba said he was weighed down with the issues currently facing him and remarked that he "felt the weight of Spain on his shoulders." He is currently living above the Ministry due to repairs and refurbishment occurring at his house and said that living so close to the office made it hard to "disconnect": that he is having trouble sleeping at night. Although he shows no outward signs of stress, the events since the December 30 ETA bombing have clearly taken a toll. The Minister said that he appreciated opportunities such as these to exchange ideas and gain perspective and hopes they will continue. MADRID 00000449 003.2 OF 003 AGUIRRE ID:101321 Date:2007-03-21 12:35:00 Origin:07MADRID520 Source:Embassy Madrid Classification:CONFIDENTIAL Dunno: Destination:VZCZCXRO1244 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #0520/01 0801235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 211235Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2126 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0157 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2546 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000520 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017 TAGS: PREL, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/IRAQ: SOCIALISTS FIRE UP ANTI-WAR RHETORIC FOR ELECTORAL SEASON MADRID 00000520 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reason 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Summary. In a volatile political climate leading up to regional/municipal elections in late May, the ruling Socialist Party (PSOE) and far left political allies have ramped up criticism of the war in Iraq, in part to counteract opposition Popular Party (PP) attacks on the Zapatero Government's controversial policies on the ETA issue. The Madrid Regional PSOE joined the far left "United Left" (IU), unions, and pacifist groups staged mass demonstrations against the war on March 17 - though the turnout was lower than for the anti-ETA march. On March 20, high profile magistrate Baltasar Garzon published an editorial in the left leaning "El Pais" saying that the time had arrived to investigate "criminal responsibility" for the war in Iraq, to include possible charges against former President Aznar, PM Blair, and President Bush (Spaniards frequently refer to the "Picture of the Azores" in 2003 of the three leaders as the moment in which the decision to go to war was made, thus linking Aznar not just with the Spanish troop deployment, but with full responsibility for the war). PSOE Secretary Jose Blanco said in a March 20 television interview that "someone must pay" for the war in Iraq, and that if someone could demonstrate criminal culpability on the part of political leaders, Blanco said he was "all for it." The Ambassador contacted National Security Adviser Carles Casajuana on March 21 to convey his deep concern regarding the direction and tenor of PSOE statements on Iraq, which could only harm bilateral relations. Casajuana discussed the heated political context of the statements and said he expected them to abate soon, but assured the Ambassador that he would convey the Ambassador's concerns to President Zapatero immediately. The DCM is following up with PSOE Secretary Blanco to insist that the PSOE avoid dragging the SIPDIS USG into its domestic conflict with the PP. End summary. //HEATED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT// 2. (C) In the runup to May 27 regional and municipal elections, the political environment in Spain has become increasingly aggressive. The PP has not gained in most opinion polls, but its criticism of President Zapatero's controversial policies in the Basque Region has steadily eroded electoral support for the PSOE. In a show of strength, the PP led an anti-ETA, anti-Zapatero demonstration on March 10 in Madrid that drew at least 1 million people. The PSOE stormed back the following week, refocusing public attention on former President Aznar's unpopular decision to commit Spanish forces to the war in Iraq. The Madrid Region PSOE, joined by the PSOE Secretary for International Relations Elena Valenciano, organized a smaller mass rally on March 17 against the Iraq war and against the U.S. detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo. 3. (U) The PSOE Parliamentary group joined the fray on March 20, negotiating a non-binding resolution with the far left IU that sharply criticized the "illegal" war in Iraq. The resolution passed with the unanimous support of all parties except the PP. The resolution condemned the "illegal, immoral, and unjust" decision to go to war in Iraq, for having "destabilized the region, and encouraged jihadist terrorism, which most affects the Iraqi people themselves." The resolution further states that the war was launched on false pretenses, "as has been recognized by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair... the (mismanagement) of the conflict has undermined the credibility of fundamental universal values, in the face of brutal realities at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the execution of Saddam Hussein." (NOTE: The PSOE version of the resolution removed IU language calling on the USG to hand over three U.S. servicemen accused of killing Spanish TV cameraman Jose Couso. END NOTE). //GARZON, PSOE LEADER WEIGH IN// 4. (U) Judge Garzon published an editorial in the leading daily "El Pais" on March 20 that lambasted Aznar for declining to "heed UN inspectors... and instead lending himself, along with a few other leaders, to provide cover and support for this illegal action. Garzon went on to suggest that the time had come to study whether "criminal responsibility" should be assigned to Aznar, Prime Minister Blair, and President Bush.Spaniards frequently refer to the "Picture of the Azores" in 2003 of the three leaders as the moment in which the decision to go to war was made, thus linking Aznar not just with the Spanish troop deployment, but with full responsibility for the war. Late on March 20, a television news crew asked PSOE Secretary Jose Blanco (effectively the number two PSOE leader after Zapatero) whether Aznar should be prosecuted for having involved Spain MADRID 00000520 002.2 OF 002 in the war in Iraq. Blanco said that "someone must respond in the face of this horror, and if there are reasons and grounds from the legal point of view, then I would be all for it." //AMBASSADOR CALLS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER// 5. (C) The Ambassador contacted National Security Adviser Carles Casajuana on March 21 to express his concern regarding the increasingly shrill rhetoric on Iraq on the part of the ruling Socialist Party and its allies. The Ambassador said that the PSOE was dragging the USG into Spain's domestic political arena, a fact that could only harm bilateral relations. The Ambassador said that he was aware of the political context, but that he was running out of patience with unfair Government and PSOE statements regarding the U.S. 6. (C) Casajuana said that the political environment was "highly polarized" at the moment and blamed the PP for having stirred the pot on the ETA issue in an inflammatory manner. He acknowledged that the PSOE had judged that it could counter attack by resurfacing the Iraq issue and going after Aznar himself, particularly since the timing coincided with the fourth anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq. Casajuana said he understood that the "spillover" of the debate had impacted USG sensitivities, but said he expected the Iraq issue to run its course in the next couple of days. Casajuana said he would relay the Ambassador's concerns immediately to President Zapatero, emphasizing the Zapatero Government's desire to keep this issue under control. The Ambassador asked that President Zapatero act to tamp down the matter and avoid fueling anti-American sentiment as the political campaign continued. 7. (C) The DCM will follow up with a similar message to other officials and has requested meetings with PSOE Secretary Blanco and PSOE International Relations Secretary Elena Valenciano to ask that they leave the U.S. out of their political campaign. Aguirre ID:109666 Date:2007-05-24 16:30:00 Origin:07MADRID1000 Source:Embassy Madrid Classification:UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Dunno:07MADRID800 07MADRID899 07MADRID910 Destination:VZCZCXRO5789 PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #1000 1441630 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 241630Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2607 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0170 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2740 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY UNCLAS MADRID 001000 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE, CLEMENTS AND CERVETTI L/LEI FOR PROPP, KULISH, AND JOHNSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, SP SUBJECT: SPAIN/COUSO CASE: JUDGE REJECTS CHIEF PROSECUTOR'S APPEAL; CASE MOVES ON TO APPEALS TRIBUNAL REF: A. MADRID 910 B. MADRID 899 C. MADRID 800 AND OTHERS 1. (SBU) On May 24 Spanish investigative magistrate Judge Santiago Pedraz rejected the appeal of National Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza to drop the charges against three U.S. servicemen accused of killing Spanish television cameraman Jose Couso during a firefight in Baghdad in April 2003. Despite the rejection by Judge Pedraz, this case will proceed to the National Court appeals tribunal, which will rule on the merits of the arguments put forth by Pedraz and by the National Court prosecutors. As we reported in REFTEL A, Zaragoza contacted us on May 14 to report that he had appealed the Pedraz decision to file formal charges against the three servicemen, saying that his technical and legal review of the facts led him to conclude that the killing of Couso was not intentional, and therefore the soldiers could not be charged with war crimes or murder. In today's ruling Judge Pedraz claimed to be surprised by Zaragoza's appeal, as the National Prosecutors Office did not oppose his initial ruling to reactivate arrest warrants for the servicemen and therefore tacitly agreed with the case. 2. (SBU) Comment. Today's ruling by Pedraz was not a surprise as judges do not normally change their original ruling after an appeal based on the technical or legal review of the National Court Prosecutors Office. This case, as we expected, will now be forwarded to the Criminal Division of the National Court. Post will continue to report on this case as it develops. LLORENS

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