Venezuela y la inteligencia cubana
Cable sobre la eficacia cubana contra disidentes
En 2009, la Sección de Intereses de EEUU en La Habana reconoce la eficacia de la policía persiguiendo a "terroristas", como llama a los disidentes
| ID: | 194480 |
| Date: | 2009-02-27 21:20:00 |
| Origin: | 09HAVANA132 |
| Source: | US Interests Section Havana |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Dunno: | 09STATE13023 |
| Destination: | R 272120Z FEB 09 FM USINT HAVANA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4178 INFO CIA WASHINGTON DC DIA WASHINGTON DC FBI WASHINGTON DC |
S E C R E T HAVANA 000132 DEPARTMENT FOR DS/TIA/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2024 TAGS: ASEC, PTER SUBJECT: USINT HAVANA RESPONSE TO SPRING 2009 SEPQ REF: STATE 013023 Classified By: RSO TEDD ARCHABAL FOR REASONS 1.5 (C, D) 1. (SBU) Post responses are keyed to the Spring 2009 Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (reftel). There has been no significant change to the security or threat environment in Havana since our last submission. ------------------ POLITICAL VIOLENCE ------------------ 2. (U) DEMONSTRATIONS A. (SBU) No. The Government of Cuba (GOC) maintains almost total control over all organizations on the island. The most autonomous large organization is the Catholic Church, which wields limited autonomy. Any group demonstrating against the United States would be doing so at the GOC's behest, or at a minimum with their approval. The U.S. Interests Section (USINT) doubts whether any ethnic or religious groups in Cuba would demonstrate, at their own initiative, against the United States. i. (SBU) Demonstrations have taken place in the last 12 months. The last was held in June / July 2008 at the Jose Marti Anti-Imperialist Plaza (see below) in commemoration of the Cuba Five. The event was peaceful but USINT employees had some trouble arriving at work because the road adjacent to the Interests Section where employees park was closed. ii. (SBU) Periodically, the GOC sponsors rallies at the Jose Marti Anti-Imperialist Plaza adjacent to the Interests Section but they tend to be in commemoration of Cuban revolutionary anniversaries and are not strictly Anti-American in nature. There have been four rallies in the past year - the most recent a celebration of the 50th anniversary of Cuba's revolution on January 3, 2009. iii. (SBU) Between 2,000 and 3,000 persons. iv. (SBU) U.S. foreign policy as it relates to Cuba. B. Demonstrations are generally peaceful i. N/A ii. (SBU) As reported in the Fall 2008 SEPQ, an individual scaled the perimeter fence at USINT's Refugee Processing Annex in April 2008. The incident was not considered a violent demonstration and was handled administratively. In October 2008, an intruder scaled a perimeter gate at the Chief of Mission's Residence and gained access to the home. The individual did not threaten anyone but was later identified as the same man who harassed two female FTE employees outside USINT. The matter was referred to the Ministry of Foreign Relations. C. (C) Unknown. Impromptu protests have been reported through various means yet the GOC actively tries to suppress information that any demonstrations have occurred. It is conceivable but not likely that one of these demonstrations could escalate to violence and spread to other parts of the city and/or country. i. N/A ii. N/A iii. N/A iv. N/A 3. (U) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS A. No B. No C. No D. No 4. (U) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES A. (S) Varies among agencies/units. The regular police patrolling Havana are ubiquitous but appear to have limited training and outdated equipment. Directly outside the USINT perimeter gate, four armed officers from the National Police Force (Policia Nacional Revolucionaria) and between 10-12 unarmed officers from the Specialized Protective Services unit (SEPSA) provide 24-hour guard service. Periodic requests to meet with SEPSA and/or PNR supervisors are denied. In addition, USINT strongly believes that SEPSA is charged with the dual mission of protecting USINT's perimeter and providing counterintelligence information to the Ministry of Interior (MININT). Pursuant to two residential security incidents in the past six months, RSO requested MININT assistance and observed their personnel conducting basic crime scene investigations (photographs, fingerprints, footprints) but little in the way of witness or neighborhood interviews. Cuba does, however, have well-trained, professional paramilitary forces that would be utilized to protect USINT assets should a crisis warrant their deployment. Such a deployment would likely require a high-level political decision by the GOC. B. No C. (S) Yes. Corruption in Cuba is an accepted means of survival. The average Cuban makes about $18 a month, and low and mid-level police officials earn similar salaries. In short, Cuban law enforcement is confronted with serious and widespread corruption. Some things that are considered corrupt in the United States such as conflict of interest, double dipping and influence peddling are integral parts of Cuba's standard operating procedures. D. (S) Yes. Both the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Counterintelligence of MININT are professional and capable services. They are highly effective at penetrating networks on the island and actively pursuing individuals they believe to be terrorists. One must note that the GOC believes opposition groups in Cuba are terrorists sponsored by the United States. E. (C) No. There is very little cooperation and the GOC generally does not respond to requests for information. F. N/A G. (S) As mentioned above, the GOC posts armed police and unarmed security guards along the perimeter of the Interests Section and Refugee Processing facilities, and outside the COM residence. In September 2008, USINT's Refugee Program Coordinator was threatened, in writing, by one of the "Group of 75" freed political prisoners for delays in processing his refugee case. RSO Havana immediately forwarded a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Relations requesting assistance but did not receive a response until almost one month later. In addition, RSO Havana attempted to meet with SEPSA supervisors to increase security outside the Refugee Processing Annex but was told to send the request to MINREX. Attempts to meet with SEPSA and MINREX liaison officers are routinely ignored. H. Very good I. Effective J. Effective -------------------- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------------- 5. (U) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS A. No B. N/A C. N/A D. N/A E. N/A F. N/A G. N/A 6. (U) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS A. No B. N/A C. N/A D. N/A ----------------------- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM ----------------------- 7. (U) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS A. (C) Yes. We have reliable reporting indicating the presence of ELN, FARC and ETA members here in Havana. That said, they are unlikely to conduct terrorist operations in Cuba. B. (C) The specific activities of these groups are largely unknown but Post was able to corroborate that ETA members assisting the FARC had spent time in Cuba and some even had family members in country. There is little chance of any operational activity given the need for safehaven. C. (C) Yes. The GOC allows these groups to enjoy R&R in Cuba and receive medical care and other services (NFI). Reporting also indicates that the GOC is able to influence the FARC. The Cuban Communist Party International Department (PCC/ID) has close relationships with the Clandestine Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) which serves as the political wing of the FARC, and to some extent the ELN as well. D. (S) Yes. The Al Ma'Sumin (Shia) Islamic Center located in Havana has established ties with, and receives support from, the Government of Iran. E. No F. (C) Very little threat. Although the GOC maintains diplomatic ties with these states and many of these states maintain a diplomatic presence/embassy in Havana, we have seen no evidence that the GOC allows hostile intelligence service to plan terrorist, anti-U.S. operations in Cuba. Conventional wisdom in the diplomatic community is that the GOC is anxious to avoid giving the United States a rationale to conduct counterterrorism operations against it. Moreover, the GOC guards its own prerogatives jealously and would not want a foreign service or organization operating on its soil even if relations between the GOC and that organization or service were excellent. Post gauges the most immediate threat from hostile intelligence services to be from a counterintelligence perspective. G. (C) Very little threat. It has long been assumed that firearms are difficult to procure clandestinely in Cuba but previous reporting (2005) claimed evidence of criminal elements obtaining weapons (NFI). Another potential threat includes AWOL soldiers or deserters who have kept their weapons and used them in criminal acts. Two historic examples bear mention. In one, a group of three hijacked an aircraft and in the other a group hijacked a ferry with both trying to go to the United States. Nevertheless, tight state controls in Cuba make arms smuggling and possession of explosives more difficult that in neighboring countries. FARRAR |
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