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Cable sobre el borrador aprobado por la OEA en 2009

La embajada se refiere al documento aprobado por la OEA en junio de 2009 en San Pedro de Sula (Honduras) y que recibió el apoyo de Hugo Chávez y sus aliados

ID: 210866
Date: 2009-06-08 23:11:00
Origin: 09TEGUCIGALPA431
Source: Embassy Tegucigalpa
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno: 09TEGUCIGALPA405
Destination: VZCZCXRO3686
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000431

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN
WHA/FO FOR A/S SHANNON AND PDAS KELLY
WHA/OAS FOR AMB MORALES
NSC FOR DIRECTOR RESTREPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: PREL, OAS, KSUM, CU, HO
SUBJECT: ZELAYA SHARES DETAILS ON OAS CUBA RESOLUTION
NEGOTIATIONS

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 405 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d).

1. (C) President Manuel &Mel8 Zelaya shared details in a
June a 7 meeting with the Ambassador, accompanied by the DCM,
on his negotiations with ALBA members and Cuba over the
negotiations on Cuba at the Organization of American States
General Assembly in San Pedro Sula June 2 and 3. Zelaya said
that his goal on the negotiations was to take everyone's
interest into account; he said that while the negotiations
were difficult, he believed that he had met his goal. Zelaya
praised Secretary Hillary Clinton for her work during the
General Assembly, adding that he thought that in their second
and last meeting she had made a very convincing and powerful
case for the U.S. position, which had impacted greatly on
him. In fact, he said, that while he and many other OAS
members quickly realized the value of the U.S. offer to
support a resolution dropping the Cuba ban as long as it
included a requirement that Cuba apply for membership and
that membership be contingent on Cuba adhering to OAS
principles, convincing fellow ALBA members to accept the text
had been difficult. Zelaya said that the reason he was
unable to provide the U.S. delegation with a text the night
of June 2 was due to ALBA intransience. Zelaya said that he
spoke with President Hugo Chavez, Daniel Ortega and other
ALBA members to press them to accept the compromise draft,
eventually threatening to withdraw Honduras from ALBA if they
did not agree (please protect). He said that he had told
Chavez and Ortega that as hosts of the Assembly the lack of
agreement would be a major disaster for him personally and
for his government. Zelaya also said that he had made one
final call to Fidel Castro, who gave his approval of the
draft. By the morning of June 3, Zelaya said ALBA members
changed their positions and agreed to accept the draft.

2. (C) Zelaya also spoke of the difficulty of dealing with
the ALBA presidents who visited or wanted to visit the
assembly. Zelaya said that President Daniel Ortega insisted
on speaking at the inaugural session of the assembly, which
the GOH controlled. Zelaya said, however, that, true to his
word to us (reftel), only OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel
Insulza and he spoke. He said that he offered Ortega instead
a press conference after the inaugural session, to which
Ortega eventually agreed. President Rafael Correa, who was
in Honduras for a bilateral visit before and during the
visit, also demanded a speaking role and decided not to
attend the assembly when Zelaya refused. Chavez also pressed
him for a speaking role, Zelaya said, and in the end did not
attend.

3. (C) Comment: Zelaya found himself trapped between his
desire to please both the U.S. and his ALBA friends at the
OAS. The need to produce a successful assembly won out,
however, and Zelaya successfully pressured ALBA to accept our
text. The Secretary's presence was important, as Zelaya
wants good relations with the new administration and wanted
her visit to be successful. Zelaya kept his word to us on
not allowing any of the ALBA presidents to speak at the
assembly, at some effort according to his version. We note,
however, that had he not issued them invitations, he would
not have had to fend of their speaking requests.
LLORENS