EE UU analiza a Xi Jinping
Cable sobre el relevo de Hu Jintao en China
El telegrama expresa, según los contactos de la embajada, que Xi Jinping será su sustituto
| ID: | 226464 |
| Date: | 2009-09-23 11:08:00 |
| Origin: | 09BEIJING2731 |
| Source: | Embassy Beijing |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 09BEIJING2533 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO2243 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #2731/01 2661108 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231108Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6194 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002731 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2034 TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, MARR, KDEM, CH SUBJECT: FOURTH PLENUM: XI NOT APPOINTED TO CMC; NO SIGNIFICANT REFORMS REF: BEIJING 2533 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 1. (C) Summary: Although contacts expressed surprise that Vice President Xi Jinping was not appointed Central Military Commission Vice Chairman at the four-day Fourth Plenum of the Seventeenth CCP Central Committee that concluded September 18, most cautioned against reading too much into the decision and all stressed that it did not imply significant discord within the Party. Several contacts noted that Party leadership dynamics and China's political situation have changed since 1999 when Hu Jintao was appointed to the CMC and it is not possible to extrapolate Xi's political trajectory from past practice. All contacts agreed that, despite not being appointed to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum, Xi Jinping is still the clear frontrunner to succeed Hu Jintao. Some attributed the deferral of Xi's appointment to leadership uncertainty that Xi's appointment was the right move at the right time. There was consensus among our contacts that, despite a communique touting "intra-Party democracy" and anti-corruption initiatives, the Plenum was essentially devoid of substantive reforms and will not result in any significant policy initiatives. Although the Plenum made no decisions on the future of Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan, contacts unanimously predicted his political career is "finished." End Summary Plenum Communique ----------------- 2. (C) The Fourth Plenum of the Seventeenth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee concluded September 18. In keeping with past practice, an official Xinhua news agency statement announced the release of a CCP communique outlining the conclusions of the Plenum. The Xinhua summary of the communique noted that the Plenum had approved a "Decision" calling for increased "intra-party democracy," party building and anti-corruption initiatives in the face of urgent domestic and international challenges. The communique included a reference to the importance of addressing ethnic policy, termed "nationalities work" (minzu gonzuo), and promoting "ethnic unity." The text of the Decision itself was not publicly released. The communique noted that President Hu Jintao had delivered an important speech to the Plenum outlining the challenges confronting the party. It highlighted the role of Xi Jinping, who delivered an "explanation" of the Decision to party members. Unlike the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 1999, there was no mention of personnel decisions in the communique following this plenum. The widely anticipated appointment of Xi Jinping as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) was not included in the document. Following the Plenum, the fourth plenary session of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection (CCDI) took place on September 19 and also took up the discussion of anti-corruption initiatives, specifically personal financial declarations for Party members. Lack of CMC Appointment Surprising but Not Significant --------------------------------------------- --------- 3. (C) Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Professor of Public Policy Dong Lisheng on September 21 told PolOff that he had been very surprised by the decision not to appoint Xi to the CMC. Dong noted that the Plenum was the sole venue for such personnel decisions and the outcome of this year's Plenum meant that Xi would not receive the CMC appointment in the near term. He discounted speculation, particularly among the Hong Kong press, that Xi's appointment would only be deferred until after the October 1 National Day celebrations noting that the Party would not use such unorthodox means to effect such an important personnel decision. Separately, on September 21 Guangming Ribao Senior Editor Dong Yuyu agreed that the issue of Xi's CMC appointment, if it had ever been a subject at the Plenum, had been deferred for the near term and would not be revived until 2011 at the earliest. 4. (C) Communist Party member, Renmin University Sociology Professor and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Education Hong Dayong on September 21 cautioned against overemphasizing the 1999 precedent and reading too much into the decision not to elevate Xi. The political dynamics of the Party had changed greatly, and past models of political transition were of little utility in the current environment. Guangming Ribao BEIJING 00002731 002 OF 004 editor Dong Yuyu emphasized that there was no established system dictating the content and pace of Plenum personnel decisions. Many had incorQctly surmised that because Hu Jintao had been appointed to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth Central Committee, Xi Jinping had to be appointed at the same juncture. However, perceptions of the importance of this perceived precedent were inaccurate. CASS's Dong Lisheng emphasized that a primary factor in deferring the appointment was likely Xi's short tenure as a member of the Politburo. Dong Lisheng noted that when Hu Jintao was appointed to the CMC in 1999 he had already been a Politburo member for seven years. In contrast, Xi had only been appointed to the Politburo two years earlier. Xi Still the Frontrunner ------------------------ 5. (C) Guangming Ribao's Dong Yuyu stressed that Xi Jinping was still the frontrunner to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012 and, in his own opinion, had a "sixty-percent chance" of succeeding Hu in the Party Chairmanship, Presidency and CMC Chairmanship. He noted that the decision to defer Xi's elevation to the CMC was likely made in order to provide him more time to develop as a Party leader. The Party was also looking to protect itself by affording Xi "less time to make mistakes" in that capacity before eventually taking the CMC Chairmanship. Fang Jinyu, recently retired Beijing bureau chief of the Nanfang Ribao Media Group, told PolOff September 14 that Xi remained the only feasible candidate by virtue of his political pedigree and backing by Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong and other retired cadres and that Li Keqiang was not a realistic competitor. No Discord within the Politburo ------------------------------- 6. (C) CASS's Dong Lisheng said that, in his view, the decision was the result of the Party leadership's determination to "keep its options open" but did not imply intra-Party discord. Guangming's Dong Yuyu stressed that the failure to elevate Xi did not suggest power struggles within Party leadership. On the contrary, the leadership was united as never before around the principles of protecting its power and the individual vested interests of Party leaders. Deferring the appointment of Xi to the CMC was a function of the Party's more cautious attitude in general rather than any significant disagreements within the Politburo. CCP-PLA Issues -------------- 7. (C) Renmin University's Hong Dayong noted that the CCP leadership had to be "cautious in how it manages the military" and Xi Jinping still lacked the requisite experience at the highest levels of the Party leadership for this role. Huang Shan, Deputy International Editor of Caijing Magazine, on September 17 (during the Plenum) emphasized that the Party was conscious of its "lack of authority over the military," particularly in the wake of the much publicized confrontation between Premier Wen Jiabao and the PLA during reconstruction efforts after the Sichuan earthquake and that this issue would inform the outcome of the Plenum. Chen Jieren, News Director at Youth.cn, a news website operated by the Communist Youth League and the nephew of Politburo Standing Committee Member He Guoqiang, on September 9 told PolOff that conservative members of the PLA were among the leading critics of the response to the Xinjiang riots and of the policies of President Hu and Premier Wen; this was causing much introspection within the Party. Guangming's Dong Yuyu noted that this theme had been presaged in a speech by Hu Jintao during a July 24 Politburo study session at which he called for the development of "military-civilian integration" (junmin rongheshi fazhan). Dong speculated that this initiative could suggest that the Party was considering new options for the composition of the CMC, including a formulation whereby both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang could be jointly named as Vice Chairmen in the future. Plenum without Substance ------------------------ 8. (C) Guangming Ribao's Dong Yuyu noted that in other aspects the Plenum had developed exactly how he had expected, with no meaningful changes to the Party's fundamental approach to reform and ideology. Echoing references by other contacts (reftel) to Hu Jintao's statement that the Party BEIJING 00002731 003 OF 004 would "avoid distractions" (bu zheteng), Dong noted that the process of drafting the Plenum conclusions had been ongoing for the past year and the decision not to deviate from existing policies had been reached long before the Plenum convened. The one significant exception was the inclusion of the reference to "nationalities work" in the communique, Dong Yuyu said, which had been included recently in response to the unrest in Xinjiang. However, like the other purported reform initiatives, this would not translate into any substantive adjustments to ethnic policy. A loosening of policies in Xinjiang and Tibet would create a backlash against the Party by the Han majority and was therefore politically untenable. Party Leaders Lack Mandate for Reform ------------------------------------- 9. (C) Speaking to PolOff September 17 (during the Plenum), Caijing editor Huang Shan predicted that the significant dilution of the political authority of individual Chinese leaders would inform Plenum outcomes. The lack of a clear political mandate meant there could be no substantive political reforms at the Plenum or in the near term. The Party had adopted a "wait and see" approach to reform in general and was "absolutely unwilling" to consider any meaningful changes to party ideology or policy. Although the Party was aware that social unrest was a potential challenge to its legitimacy, it would address the issue exclusively through economic policy rather than political reform. 10. (C) CASS scholar Dong Lisheng echoed Huang Shan's comments, noting that that the need for consensus informed all major Party decisions and was the reason for the lack of any substantive policy initiatives during the Plenum. He noted, however, that the tenor of the Plenum reflected significant dichotomy within the Party's outlook. On the one hand, the Party remained confident that its policies had successfully guided China through the global financial crisis and had maintained economic growth and general political stability. Guangming's Dong Yuyu echoed these comments, stating that the Party had a confident (zihao) outlook and was touting international praise for the "Beijing model" of economic development as legitimizing its mandate. Both Dong Lisheng and Dong Yuyu individually noted, however that on the other hand the Party was obsessively preoccupied with perceived threats to its hold on power. In this context, the Party's overarching near-term goal was the preservation of the status quo, and it would therefore avoid any policy or reform initiatives that could potentially have "unforeseen consequences." 11. (C) CASS's Dong Lisheng discounted the communique's references to "intra-party democracy" as restatements of the general principles outlined during the Seventeenth Party Congress. He predicted that the anti-corruption measures discussed during the Plenum would also not result in any substantive measures to bring rampant graft under control. Dong Lisheng noted that, despite the renewed discussion of personal financial disclosure statements during the CCDI plenary session, disclosure regulations for high-level cadres had been on the books since 1995 but had not been enforced. Guangming's Dong Yuyu noted that the reason that financial disclosure statements had been discussed at the CCDI session instead of the full Plenum was because they were impossible to implement. Wang Lequan Finished -------------------- 12. (C) All contacts agreed that Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Party Secretary Wang Lequan would be replaced in the near term. CASS scholar Dong Lisheng noted that the unprecedented spectacle of ethnic Han Urumqi residents taking to the streets to demand Wang's resignation shortly after a visit to the XUAR by Hu Jintao could not go unanswered. Caijing Magazine's Huang Shan suggested that Wang would be reassigned to a semi-retirement position as a National People's Congress Committee Chairman around the beginning of the 2010. Politburo member nephew Chen Jieren noted that the frontrunners to replace Wang included Hunan Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian, Tibet Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, and Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu. Chen noted that the Party's decision on Wang's replacement would be an important indicator of how it planned to proceed in Xinjiang. The appointment of Zhang Qingli or Meng would suggest a more hardline, security-focused approach. BEIJING 00002731 004 OF 004 HUNTSMAN |
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