Cable sobre el giro de la cúpula militar paquistaní

En 2009, la embajadora en Islamabad informa de que el ejército paquistaní acaba de aprobar por segunda vez el despliegue de elementos de las operaciones especiales de EE UU para apoyar operaciones militares de Pakistán

ID:229065
Date:2009-10-09 07:25:00
Origin:09ISLAMABAD2449
Source:Embassy Islamabad
Classification:SECRET
Dunno:09ISLAMABAD2116
Destination:VZCZCXRO6340
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2449/01 2820725
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090725Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5243
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0970
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1467
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5555
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2344
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7946
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 6977
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2034
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS

REF: ISLAMABAD 2116

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)(c), and
(d)

1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second
time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements
to support Pakistani military operations. The first
deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the
Frontier Corps in Bajaur Agency, occurred in September
(reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership
adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations
personnel with their military forces. The developments of
the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in
their thinking. End Summary.

2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP
that it approved a request from the Army's 11 Corps
Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK
personnel to deploy to XXXXXXXXXXXX South Waziristan and XXXXXXXXXXXX
North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support
and general operational advice to the 11 Corps' XXXXXXXXXXXX
Divisions. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about
our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP
responded positively.

3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the
XXXXXXXXXXXX and would include a live downlink of unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK's
initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to
XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. In order to finalize our planning and
obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested
additional information on the timing and purpose of the 11
Corps' planned military operations from Brigadier General
Amjad Shabbir, the Army's Director General of Military
Operations (DGMO).

4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved
deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support
Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four
SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier
Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX, in Bajaur Agency in the FATA,
provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was
highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and
effective artillery strike on an enemy location.

5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for
a repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains
approval from GHQ.

6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in
Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a
training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously
adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations
Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their
operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly
with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General
Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to Bajaur and the
Waziristans appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani
thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is
the key factor that has brought us to this point. The
Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have
ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition,
the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have
recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF
personnel into the field with them for operational advice and
other support. In addition, the success of the initial
deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the follow-up
requests for new and repeat support.

7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly
politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among
the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to
allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on
Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related
matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media,
the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for
such assistance. End Comment.

ISLAMABAD 00002449 002 OF 002


PATTERSON
Traduce este documento »

Traducción automática. Puede que el texto traducido no sea fiel al original

Buscador de cables

Ver todos los documentos »
Más información
Únete ahora a EL PAÍS para seguir toda la actualidad y leer sin límites
Suscríbete aquí

Archivado En

Recomendaciones EL PAÍS
Recomendaciones EL PAÍS
Recomendaciones EL PAÍS
Logo elpais

Ya no dispones de más artículos gratis este mes

Suscríbete para seguir leyendo

Descubre las promociones disponibles

Suscríbete

Ya tengo una suscripción