Cable en el que el Gobierno revela que Israel le ha pedido que investigue la conexión con Irán de algunas empresas españolas
| ID: | 189707 |
| Date: | 2009-01-30 16:23:00 |
| Origin: | 09MADRID108 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Dunno: | 08MADRID1227 08MADRID836 09MADRID87 09MADRID88 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO9447 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #0108/01 0301623 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 301623Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0148 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT COLLECTIVE RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0647 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2433 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3781 RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2740 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0632 RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH 0798 RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000108 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/MTR ALSO FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PRA, EEB/TFS, EEB/TFS, INR (JBELL), NEA, ISN/RA (RNEPHEW) TREASURY FOR DFERNANDEZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2034 TAGS: MTCRE, PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, TSPA, SP, IR, AINR SUBJECT: SPAIN: MFA REQUESTS USG REVIEW OF TWO IRAN-RELATED ISSUES REF: A. (A) MADRID 88 B. (B) MADRID 87 C. (C) 08 MADRID 1227 D. (D) 08 MADRID 836 MADRID 00000108 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: A/DCM William Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST -------------------------- 1. (S) This is an Action Request. See paragraph 8. 2. (S) On January 26, POLOFF and Deputy ECON Counselor met Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the MFA,s Directorate General for Strategic Affairs & Terrorism (See REFS A and B), who unexpectedly raised two Iran-related issues that the GOS would like the USG to investigate. He said the GOS wanted to flag these items for the USG's attention and said that the GOS would appreciate any information the USG could provide on either topic, which Torres termed "very sensitive matters." END SUMMARY. SCHMIDT-CLEMENS SPAIN --------------------- 3. (S) Torres broached the first issue by explaining that the German Minister of Commerce had called in the Spanish Ambassador to Berlin to discuss the issue of a Spanish affiliate of a German steel company that is manufacturing and exporting tubes to Iran. The company in question is Schmidt-Clemens Spain (hereafter S-CS), based in Spain's Navarra region. (COMMENT: S-CS's English language website is http://www.centracero.com. It is not clear to Embassy officials how Berlin learned of this issue or in what context or toward what end the German minister raised the issue with the Spanish Ambassador. END COMMENT.) Torres indicated that although these types of tubes are not on the GOS Chapter 1 list for restricted dual-use items, the GOS is very worried about this export to Iran. Specifically, the GOS has no objection to the beginning and the end of the tubes, but the GOS believes that the mid-section of the tube makes it a potential dual-use item. 4. (S) Torres said that, although there is a legal precedent in Spain for exporting the types of tubes that S-CS is selling, the GOS convened its inter-ministerial board that reviews export license requests for possible dual-use technology items. According to Torres, in that meeting the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce did not object to the export of these particular tubes to Iran, but both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence Center (CNI) did protest. The exports are at this point considered legal, however, the GOS is "blocking" further exports of these tubes to Iran by S-CS by conducting a lengthy bureaucratic review which essentially is freezing the process. 5. (S) Although he would not provide the Embassy officers a photocopy of documentation on the subject, Torres briefly showed them what they understood to be a copy of S-CS's application for an export license from the GOS. The documentation listed the export product (in English) as "catalyst tube assemblies" and included the specifications that the tubes were constructed of "material G4879," and included the following compositional breakdown: "Cr28%Ni48%W5%." (COMMENT: Embassy Madrid understands this to mean 28 percent chrome, 48 percent nickel and 5 percent tungsten, and acknowledges that the sum of these percentages does not equal 100 percent. END COMMENT.) The recipient and end user of S-CS's exported goods to Iran were listed as: Chaharmahal VA Bakhitiati Steel Complex Project KM 35 of Shahr E Kord - Broojen Road MADRID 00000108 002.2 OF 002 Bakhtiari, Iran 6. (S) Torres noted that Spanish exports to Iran are on the increase while German exports to Iran are decreasing. He also conveyed the impression to Embassy officers that the GOS was upset with German companies over this issue and felt used. Torres wondered if cases such as S-CS - in which the Spanish subsidiary of a German company skirts German regulatory oversight by manufacturing and exporting its products from Spain - might help to explain that export trend. POSSIBLY PROBLEMATIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ------------------------------------------- 7. (S) Turning to a separate but also Iran-related subject, Torres raised a second item. He said the Israeli government had called in the Spanish Ambassador to Tel Aviv to discuss the possibility that some Spanish banks may be involved in transactions that ultimately have an Iranian connection. Torres said he did not know the source of Israel's information but intimated that it was possible that Spanish banks may be unknowingly involved in these indirect transactions with Iran. He emphasized that this too is a sensitive matter for the GOS and pointed out that the GOS did not have authority from Spanish banks to share this information with the USG. Nevertheless, without offering any details, Torres cited a case in which Banco Santander of Spain may be involved in indirect transactions with Bank Melli of Iran. (NOTE: Banco Santander is Spain's biggest bank. On October 25, 2007, the USG designated Bank Melli, Iran's third-largest bank, as a vehicle controlled by the Iranian Government which provides banking services to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to terrorist organizations. Citing proliferation concerns, UNSCR 1803 specifically calls on states to exercise vigilance over their banks, activities with Bank Melli. END NOTE.) 8. (S) Action Request: Recognizing that the GOS has provided little concrete information to work with in the second case, Post would appreciate any information and insights Washington agencies may have on either matter raised by Torres, that we can share with the GOS. End Action Request. COMMENT ------- 9. (S) Last July, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain told visiting Treasury U/S Levey (REF D) that Banco Santander had ceased Iran-related activities. Spanish officials have told us subsequently (REF C) that Spanish banks, concerned about designations and sanctions, have sharply reduced interactions with Iranian financial institutions. We tend to share Torres,s opinion that if Santander or other Spanish banks recently participated in transactions with an indirect connection to Iran, they likely did so unknowingly. At the same time, the reported action in the inter-ministerial board on the S-CS application and the MFA,s willingness to share with us the information on S-CS and the financial transactions are signs that the GOS takes its responsibilities seriously and wants to work with us on Iran-related matters. END COMMENT. CHACON |
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