La cumbre del G-20
Cable de EE UU en el que se estudia la participación de España en la cumbre del G-20 de abril de 2009
El documento norteamericano señala que Zapatero había convertido en "una cuestión de orgullo nacional" su presencia
| ID: | 195395 |
| Date: | 2009-03-05 11:43:00 |
| Origin: | 09MADRID240 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 08MADRID1080 08MADRID1257 08MADRID707 09MADRID111 09MADRID207 09SECSTATE17502 |
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MADRID 000240 SIPDIS STATE/EEB/OMA ALEX WHITTINGTON, EUR/WE, TREASURY/IMB BILL MURDEN, WILBUR MONROE, AND MARY BEASLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019 TAGS: ECON, EFIN, SP, PREL SUBJECT: INFORMATION IN ADVANCE OF THE G-20 MEETINGS: SPAIN REF: A. SECSTATE 17502 B. 09 MADRID 207 C. 09 MADRID 111 D. 08 MADRID 707 E. 08 MADRID 1257 F. 08 MADRID 01080 MADRID 00000240 001.2 OF 006 Classified By: A/DCM William Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (SBU) Summary. Per ref A request, the responses below provide detailed economic and policy information regarding Spain in advance of the April 2 London Summit. President Zapatero has made it a matter of national pride to be included in the G-20 financial discussions, and has spoken often of the importance of coordinated EU -US action in facing the financial crisis. Spain has the world's eighth largest economy, is the second largest international tourism destination, and is the eighth largest auto manufacturer. The past 15 years have been characterized by rapid economic growth, which came to an end starting in late 2007 with Spain's domestic property crash. The credit crisis and economic slowdown aggravated this downturn, but Spain's financial institutions have managed to fare somewhat better than their European counterparts, posting profits in 2008. The GOS's number one concern is unemployment, which at 14.4 percent (and growing), is the highest in the EU. End Summary. 2. (U) The comments below are keyed to the questions in paragraph 5 of ref A. --------------------- SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES --------------------- 3. (SBU) STIMULUS MEASURES: The GOS has implemented two major stimulus packages including a 18 billion euro tax rebate and relief package in April and an 11 billion euro infrastructure investment package in November. We are not aware of any other stimulus packages being considered, and in fact the GOS is constrained in its ability to propose additional stimulus packages due to its deteriorating public finance situation. The GOS ran a 3.8 percent budget deficit in 2008, and under current spending scenarios is expected to run a 5.8 percent deficit in 2009. Details on the two stimulus packages: -Tax Relief Stimulus package: Proposed in April 2008, 10 billion is for 2008, and 8 billion is for 2009. The 10 billion in 2008 includes household refunds of 400 euros per household (6 billion), business loans (2 billion), and financing for government protected housing (2 billion). The 8 billion for 2009 is for wealth tax reduction (2 billion) and VAT tax advances (6 billion). -Infrastructure Relief Stimulus package: 10.85 billion in total to be spent in 2009, 8 billion for municipal governments for new infrastructure projects, 2.85 billion for miscellaneous spending including auto sector loans and support, and environmental initiatives. 4. (SBU) FINANCIAL SECTOR/APPROACH TO BAD ASSETS: Spanish financial institutions were not exposed to U.S. subprime mortgage-related instruments, but they have been exposed to bad assets related to the domestic housing market downturn. On March 4, Standard & Poor's lowered the long-term counter party credit rating on several of Spain's most prominent financial institutions including Caja Madrid, Banco Sabadell, and Banco Popular. Standard & Poor's maintained its rating for Spain's largest banks, Santander and BBVA, but changed the 2-year perspective on those two banks from "stable" to "negative." Despite this, Spanish banks appear to be in better shape than their counterparts in other countries, and MADRID 00000240 002.2 OF 006 posted profits in 2008. In response to the freezing of international credit markets, the GOS has begun to purchase high quality mortgage-backed assets from banks (in segmented amounts that may eventually total 50 billion) and to guarantee up to 100 billion euros in new bank debt. The GOS also took steps to give the government the authority to inject capital into banks, though both the GOS and the banks insist this will not be necessary. 5. (SBU) REAL ECONOMY/SENSITIVE AND VULNERABLE SECTORS: Minister of Industry Miguel Sebastian has urged Spaniards to buy Spanish products, but despite these comments, protectionist actions have not been a factor during this crisis. Two of Spain's most vulnerable sectors are the residential construction sector, which represented 10 percent of GDP in 2006 and is now grinding to a halt, and the auto sector, which employs 70,000 directly and contributes 2-5 percent of GDP. Regarding the auto sector, the GOS has introduced measures to stimulate lending, including 1.2 billion euros in state credit for those wishing to replace older cars with new environmentally friendly cars, and 800 million euros for carmakers to implement "innovative" production upgrades. Additionally, car makers will be able to defer social security contributions in 2009, and are able to partake of state low-cost credit lines for small and medium-sized firms. 6. (SBU) SOCIAL/LABOR IMPACT: With almost 3.5 million jobless workers according to the latest figures, Spain's unemployment rate of 14.4 percent in January is the highest in the European Union. Unemployment has become the GOS's number one concern, but President Zapatero has refused to consider increasing flexibility of hiring and firing. The level of unemployment benefits varies depending on prior salary of the laid-off worker, but benefits are usually provided for a period of up to two years. The GOS has introduced modest measures (100-400 million euros) to provide incentives for businesses to retrain and hire unemployed workers, as well as measures to assist some unemployed workers with mortgage payments. There have been sporadic strikes, especially on the part of auto and other manufacturing workers, but generally speaking, protest activity has not been high. Unemployment benefits are considered to be generous relative to other countries and often last up to two years. 7. (SBU) DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS: Spain's economy contracted in Q3 (-0.2) and Q4 (-1.0) of 2008, placing Spain officially in a recession. The GOS forecasts growth for 2009 at negative 1.6 percent and has begun to follow the lead of others in expressing concern about economic prospects for 2010. One prominent business association projects negative 2.8 percent growth for 2009. Spain's number one concern is unemployment, which the GOS estimates will be 15.9 percent by the end of 2009, but which independent analysts suggest will be closer to 20 percent. On the broader international arena, Spain is concerned about international issues of poverty and of food security, and has pledged a goal of providing 0.7 percent of its GDP as foreign assistance by 2012. During the Madrid food security conference in January 26-27, the GOS pledged new resources for food security including 1 billion euros over the next five years. Exposure of cross-border financial institutions, such as Santander and BBVA, is mainly in Latin American markets, although both have significant assets in the US. 8. (SBU) G-20 ROLE AND PERCEPTIONS: The GOS is extremely interested in obtaining permanent Spanish G-20 membership, and has indicated that it wants consultations with G-20 members about joining (ref C). President Zapatero has made it a matter of national pride to be included in the G-20 financial discussions, and has often spoken of the importance of coordinated EU-US action in facing the financial crisis. MADRID 00000240 003.2 OF 006 Perceptions of the G-20 process are generally neutral. However, Presidency economic advisor Javier Valles conveyed doubts in a January 27 meeting about the progress likely to be made by April on the reform agenda agreed to in November. --------------------------------------------- -- I. OBJECTIVES FOR LONDON SUMMIT (Questions A-D) --------------------------------------------- -- 9. (SBU) OBJECTIVES FOR LONDON SUMMIT (Questions A-D): Of significant importance to the GOS is that it be perceived both domestically and internationally as a "serious player" in these economic discussions, and that it ultimately gain permanent Spanish G-20 membership. Recent media reports indicate that Spain has an interest in addressing tax havens. Additionally, the media reported March 4 that the GOS had sent 10 proposals to London in preparation for the G-20 summit. Included were the following recommendations: -Increasing transparency of banking institutions and the markets -Establishing information requirements for high-risk funds and instituting measures to track transactions -Establishing counter-cyclical provisioning requirements -Improving international accounting standards -Increasing transparency rights for banking clients -Limiting the salaries of bank executives -Increasing payments to the IMF -Increasing role of IMF as a international financial supervisor -Provisions regarding an increased role of multilateral banks 10. The GOS is very keen to advocate banking regulation reforms consistent with its own Bank of Spain's strict rules. Spain's conservative banking regulations, including requiring higher reserve provisioning in good times and strict accounting rules, have contributed to the relative stability of Spain's financial institutions. It should be noted that Second Vice President and Minister of Economy/Finance Pedro Solbes was not invited to accompany Zapatero to the Summit although his counterparts from G-20 countries were invited. --------------------------------------------- -------- II. IMPACT OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Questions E-G) --------------------------------------------- -------- 11. (SBU) Although downplayed to the general public, one of the GOS's greatest concerns is the collapse of its housing market, which fueled approximately 10 percent of GDP as recently as 2006. Higher interest rates contributed to a collapse in demand for new homes in mid-2007 that in turn bankrupted many prominent real estate developers. The glut of unsold units on the market continues to grow with prices declining significantly. The global financial crisis aggravated this collapse in demand. The country's very high current account deficit means that Spain is dependent on scarce cross-border lending, and over the past year it has been more difficult for Spanish institutions to obtain and lend funds. The largest and most stable institutions have been able to obtain funds, though at relatively high spreads. 12. (SBU) Despite serious economic difficulties, Spain has not faced the same financial turmoil that other developed countries have seen, and many of its private banks posted profits in 2008. This is partly due to the Bank of Spain's cautious regulation, but is also because as a net capital importer (with a large current account deficit), few Spanish financial institutions invested in U.S. mortgage-based securities. MADRID 00000240 004.2 OF 006 13. (SBU) Although many banks have problem loans to troubled construction and real estate companies, there have been relatively few mortgage defaults so far, and no Spanish banks have gone under. That being said, delinquencies are increasing and Spanish financial institutions are beginning to show signs of a weakening position. On March 4, Standard & Poor's rating agency lowered the long-term counter party credit rating on several of Spain's most prominent financial institutions including Caja Madrid, Banco Sabadell, and Banco Popular. Standard & Poor's maintained its rating for Spain's two largest banks, Santander and BBVA, but changed the 2-year perspective on those financial institutions from "stable" to "negative." Moreover, there are expectations that many of the small savings banks, many of which were heavily exposed to the troubled construction and real estate companies, will experience difficulties and begin to merge. Two small savings banks in the Castilla La Mancha region (Caja Rural de Alabacete and Caja Rural de Toledo) announced January 8 that they would merge, and this has been followed by news of other potential mergers. 14. (SBU) Since September, the GOS has increased deposit insurance (reluctantly, as a result of other countries' increases) and announced plans to buy Spanish banks' high quality mortgaged-back assets (in segmented amounts that will total 50 billion euros), guarantee new debt (up to 100 billion euros), and inject capital if necessary. Banks' reactions have been mixed. Neither the GOS nor the banks say the new capital is needed. However, it appears that banks are actively seeking GOS guarantees for their new lending. The GOS has worked hard to promote new bank lending to small and medium-sized businesses. --------------------------------------------- --- III. THE BROADER ECONOMIC CRISIS (Questions H-K) --------------------------------------------- --- 15. (SBU) Over the past several months, consumption has stagnated and the Spanish economy has spiraled downwards. The National Statistics Institute (INE) confirmed February 12 that the Spanish economy had contracted by 1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008, marking the second consecutive quarter of negative growth and officially placing Spain in a recession for the first time since 1993. Unemployment spiked to 14.4 percent in December according to Eurostat, making Spain the country with the highest level of unemployment in the EU. 16. (SBU) Spain's trade deficit declined by 4.9 percent in 2008 due largely to falling consumption and imports that reflect the contracting economy. Exports have also declined as global demand shrinks, and workers in that field, particularly in the auto industry, have been especially affected. Spain is the world's eighth largest automobile producer, and 80 percent of vehicles produced are exported. The GOS has introduced measures to stimulate lending, including 1.2 billion euros in state credit for those wishing to replace older cars with new environmentally friendly cars, and 800 million euros for carmakers to implement "innovative" production upgrades. Additionally, car makers will be able to defer social security contributions in 2009, and are able to partake of state low-cost credit lines for small and medium-sized firms. 17. (SBU) The government continues to support international trade and to seek to attract foreign investment, and major Spanish companies continue to invest heavily overseas, especially in Latin America. The government and population, while increasingly concerned about immigration in the face of severe job losses, do not appear to be turning against international trade. However, the Minister of Industry, MADRID 00000240 005.2 OF 006 Tourism and Trade has on several recent occasions called on consumers to purchase domestically manufactured goods and services and to vacation in Spain rather than abroad as a way to boost the Spanish economy. That said, post is not aware of any new proposed tariff hikes or other trade restrictions or discrimination against foreign investors. Post does not believe the government is considering capital controls, nor does it appear to be easing investment restrictions. 18. (SBU) Post is not aware of specific local preferences in the GOS stimulus measures, though Spanish companies often have the inside track on infrastructure construction projects and foreign companies have a hard time competing. Spain uses the euro and is not attempting to influence its value. --------------------------------------------- --- IV. NEAR TERM & POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS (Q: L-Q) --------------------------------------------- --- 19. (SBU) ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (QUESTION L): The GOS acknowledges that 2009 will be a difficult year, during which unemployment will continue to rise, and the recession will continue to endure, and has begun to express concern for 2010. With close to 3.5 million jobless workers, unemployment will continue to be the GOS's number one concern. Many analysts say that the GOS forecast that unemployment will reach 15.9 percent by year end is unrealistically low. Spain's fiscal position continues to weaken; the budget deficit was over 3 percent GDP in 2008 and will potentially reach 6 percent in 2009. This weakening fiscal position, along with other factors, prompted S&P to downgrade Spain's sovereign debt credit rating in January. Continued increases in unemployment and contractions in economic activity could lead to even tougher budget decisions for the government. 20. (SBU) POTENTIAL POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS (QUESTION M): Months of worse-than-predicted economic news have led to widespread criticism of President Zapatero and his economic policymakers for having downplayed the economic difficulties long after many others were saying Spain was in a crisis. Public skepticism has been aggravated by the failure of a series of GOS measures to noticeably affect the slowdown. However, two of the few factors in favor of President Zapatero and the Socialists are that: (1) national elections are more than three years away; and (2) popularity ratings for Zapatero and the Socialists, albeit low, are still somewhat higher than those for the scandal-mired opposition Partido Popular. However, Zapatero suffered his first serious political reverse since winning reelection in March 2008 when his party lost power in the March 1 elections in the region of Galicia. Immigrants have been disproportionately affected by the unemployment surge. The GOS has unveiled repatriation measures for unemployed immigrants wishing to return to their country of origin. This program has had mixed success, but calls attention to a growing social dilemma. 21. (SBU) CRITICISMS OF U.S. (QUESTION N): The GOS has played up the responsibility of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, and downplayed that of the domestic construction slump, for Spain's economic difficulties. Several months ago, President Zapatero was quoted as saying that the U.S. started the crisis and Europe will have to fix it. However, the Zapatero has not used that rhetoric recently, perhaps because of desire for closer relations with the U.S. administration. Instead, other PSOE officials continued to lay blame on the U.S. during campaigning in advance of the March 1 regional elections. 22. (C) EFFECT ON FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY (QUESTION O): The 2009 budget included decreases in the Ministry of Defense MADRID 00000240 006.2 OF 006 budget. This reduced budget means that acquisitions will likely be constrained to force protection and high-priority items, potentially limiting Spain's offensive interoperability. On domestic security measures, the budget situation has precluded the GOS from implementing port security measures that it had planned in the prior budget. Under last year's planning scenario, the GOS intended to purchase additional x-ray cargo scanners and subsidize the implementation of the Megaports radiation detection program at several of its high-volume ports. Those initiatives are now either being subsidized by other entities such as the port authorities, or being delayed. 23. (SBU) EFFECT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEVELS (Question P): On the broader international arena, Spain is concerned about international issues of poverty and of food security, and has pledged a goal of providing 0.7 percent of its GDP as foreign assistance by 2012. There are no indications that this commitment will be reduced, however, if Spain's GDP continues to contract, then its foreign assistance level will also contract. 24. (C) EFFECT ON NATO & GLOBAL PEACEKEEPING (Question Q): In Afghanistan, the reduced budget means that there is less leeway for costly projects like the Forward Operating Bases under construction or in negotiations in Bagdhis province. The economic crisis gives the GOS a viable excuse not to be more forward-leaning on support for military operations that the socialist Zapatero administration is already conflicted over. As an example, Spain opted out of the NATO Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS) System, pleading budget woes in addition to ideological differences. CHACON |
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