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La amenaza terrorista en el Magreb

Cable en el que se reconoce que el Ejército de Malí está atacando a Al Qaeda

El embajador en Bamako, en una comunicación de junio de 2009, urge a Washington a apoyar a Malí. "Malí tiene ahora que poder contar con la ayuda de países amigos como EE UU", dice.

ID:212870
Date:2009-06-18 17:10:00
Origin:09BAMAKO401
Source:Embassy Bamako
Classification:SECRET
Dunno:09BAMAKO383 09BAMAKO387
Destination:VZCZCXRO2422
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0401/01 1691710
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181710Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0477
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0659
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000401

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2024
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ML
SUBJECT: ATT: "WE'RE ACTING ON AQIM - NOW WE NEED YOUR HELP"

REF: A. BAMAKO 387
B. BAMAKO 383

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, reasons. 1.4 (b) and
(d)

1. (S) Summary: Ambassador met with President Amadou
Toumani Toure (ATT) on June 18 at his request, following two
days of localized fighting between AQIM and Malian military
that resulted in deaths on both sides. ATT wished to brief
her on successes in Mali's offensive against AQIM in the
north, and reiterate requests for U.S. material support. He
stressed the importance of the recent murders of the British
hostage and a Malian army colonel in convincing Arab groups
previously neutral or commercially/logistically willing to
deal with AQIM to see the true dangerous nature of the
terrorist group and be motivated to take action against them.
He also spoke of emerging fissures among AQIM factions.
Mali's success has generated some interest from neighbors ATT
had previously (and despairingly) described as unhelpful.
ATT's central message was that Mali has made a resolute
commitment to action against AQIM and begun to implement it.
Mali must now rely on friends such as the United States for
help. His specific requests remain as previously stated
reftels - transportation/logistics, communications,
intelligence support, construction of small bases as rest
points for Malian soldiers posted in the desert and
rehabilitation of Tessalit air strip as a key point for
re-asserting control in the North. He also spoke of financial
help to sustain his troops during prolonged action. The
discussion touched on the possible value of information
campaigns to reinforce the falling out between northern
Malian Arabs and others and AQIM, and the importance of
quickly instituting development programs in the north to give
people alternatives and hope. End summary.

2. (C) Lamana's Death the Last Straw: A business-like ATT
cut greeting formalities short and launched directly into a
review of Mali's actions against AQIM in recent days.
Despite his preference for sub-regional coordinated action
and concerns about Mali's ability to unilaterally sustain an
offensive, absent support from his neighbors, Mali had been
preparing for possible action for some time and stepped it up
after the murder of the British hostage. The June 10 murder
of Lt. Colonel Lamana in Timbuktu last week had been a
tipping point. The act of AQIM killing one of their own --
and in his home-- had shocked Arab communities and the
region. The Army organized to support an action even as
ex-rebels and Arab youth came forward to join in combat,
initially intending to act alone until they were brought
under the military's wing. ATT particularly welcomed the Arab
participation, stating that they were more adept at desert
operations than even Tuareg populations. ATT also noted
that he focussed on bringing a number of Arab members of the
Malian armed forces to supplement those already in the North,
again because of their superior understanding of the terrain
and the environment in general.

3. (C) ATT said Mali does not plan to issue any public body
counts, but they believed 20-25 AQIM members died in the move
against an AQIM base near the Algerian border. He said the
army found several fresh graves with multiple bodies as well
as other remains; the dead had not yet all been identified.
Some Malian forces secured that base, and others continued to
pursue fleeing AQIM elements, whom he described as cornered.
The Malian side suffered five deaths and three injuries, one
severe, when a vehicle struck a landmine. Malian
reinforcements were arriving from other northern bases; ATT
believed AQIM was trying to reach elements in Kidal for
additional support.

4. (C) Neighbors Warming to the Cause?: ATT was hopeful
about several of Mali's neighbors, who had begun showing
interest in the offensive. ATT said Mali had approached
Algeria to point out two possible near-term scenarios.
Either fleeing AQIM elements would head for Algeria, or AQIM
reinforcements would be sent from there. Referring to Mali's
awareness of 5-7 AQIM vehicles camped on the Algerian border
for the last week, he asked for and received a commitment for
Algerian assistance in monitoring its border against these
dangers. Algeria also offered to help with medevac of
serious Malian military casualties, but otherwise had
committed no assistance to the ongoing engagements. While
disappointed, ATT also said on one level Mali had been happy
to omit Algeria from the early strike planning, since he
believed Algerian border forces were the sources of leaks to
AQIM. He was, however, pleased that at last the Algerians
were at least willing to talk to the Malians. He described
Niger as "practical and responsive" to Mali's border
concerns; he said a similar demarche had been made to

BAMAKO 00000401 002 OF 002


Mauritania, but added "their mind is elsewhere."

5. (S) The Wish List: Having summarized the favorable
direction the offensive was taking, ATT asked the Ambassador
to so inform Washington, and to reiterate Mali's request for
material support to their efforts. "Our northern bases have
no protection," he said. He added that reinforcement of
several camps, particularly the base at Tessalit, was needed;
he even contemplates establishing a desert maneuver training
center there. The needs he listed were largely as previously
reported in past weeks and years: vehicles, some airlift
capability, communications, strengthened intelligence
capacity, and other resources to support the troops Mali had
commited to the fight. Referring to Mali's
Ukrainian-maintained helicopters (Mi-24D "Hind"), he added
that they were investigating acquiring two more, because it
is not helpful to know where the enemy is if they cannot be
reached. He lamented the security difficulties that impinge
on the delivery of the very development assistance needed to
ensure longer-term stability, and asked for help to convince
the UNDP to review the security ranking for northern Mali.
Speaking with feeling he stressed that this window for action
needs to be used. The UN wants to wait for total peace but
total peace and security demand that there be some evidence
of development to go along with security efforts. ATT
intends to despatch Foreign Minister Ouane to see the UN
Secretary General to make the case that now is precisely the
time that development assistance needs to be delivered.

6. (C) The Ambassador said Mali could be proud of its
achievements in the military effort to date, and expressed
condolences for the GOM casualties. Picking up on ATT's
observation about the local population's newly negative
reaction to AQIM following the Dyer and Lamana deaths, she
suggested that an information campaign -- which perhaps the
US could work on with appropriate Malian counterparts-- to
further sensitize residents about negative impact on their
lives and on natural resource and other development might be
useful. The goal would be to consolidate the anti-AQIM
attitudes created by the convergence of recent events. ATT
agreed that consolidating helpful views among the citizens in
the North was important, adding that an information campaign
would work only if development activities were also being
undertaken -- words and deeds together. He expanded on Arab
community reactions, saying that while there had been no
question of ideological affiliation between local populations
and AQIM, certainly recent events had woken up those who had
seen no harm in commercial trading with the terrorists to the
real dangers the group poses.

7. (C) ATT's final observation was about splintering of
various AQIM elements over the decisions taken with the
British hostage and Lamana. "The group against us is
fracturing, with different patrons and enemies." Local
communities are mobilized to act against the AQIM they used
to tolerate in timidity and ignorance. Mali has committed
itself to this battle, and now needs material support.

8. (C) Comment: Mali's overt offensive against AQIM is to
be welcomed, even as we recognize the logistic difficulties
that ATT also acknowledges will hamper his militia-assisted
army as the offensive continues. As of today, Embassy
sources place the Malian forces in the area of Tin-Adema, out
of fuel and awaiting resupply; AQIM is hunkered down
north-west of Tessalit. There does not appear to have been
any geographical movement by either side since Tuesday, June
16. The resource-inspired standdown on the Malian side
reinforces the crucial need for the support ATT is
requesting. He has unleashed a credible offensive, and
merits support from international partners and his neighbors.
MILOVANOVIC
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