La amenaza terrorista en el Magreb

Cable en el que se reconoce que el Ejército de Malí está atacando a Al Qaeda

El embajador en Bamako, en una comunicación de junio de 2009, urge a Washington a apoyar a Malí. "Malí tiene ahora que poder contar con la ayuda de países amigos como EE UU", dice.

06 dic 2010 - 22:31CET

ID:	212870
Date:	2009-06-18 17:10:00
Origin:	09BAMAKO401
Source:	Embassy Bamako
Classification:	SECRET
Dunno:	09BAMAKO383 09BAMAKO387
Destination:	VZCZCXRO2422 OO RUEHPA DE RUEHBP #0401/01 1691710 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 181710Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0477 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0659 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000401 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2024 TAGS: PREL, PTER, ML SUBJECT: ATT: "WE'RE ACTING ON AQIM - NOW WE NEED YOUR HELP" REF: A. BAMAKO 387 B. BAMAKO 383 Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, reasons. 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S) Summary: Ambassador met with President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) on June 18 at his request, following two days of localized fighting between AQIM and Malian military that resulted in deaths on both sides. ATT wished to brief her on successes in Mali's offensive against AQIM in the north, and reiterate requests for U.S. material support. He stressed the importance of the recent murders of the British hostage and a Malian army colonel in convincing Arab groups previously neutral or commercially/logistically willing to deal with AQIM to see the true dangerous nature of the terrorist group and be motivated to take action against them. He also spoke of emerging fissures among AQIM factions. Mali's success has generated some interest from neighbors ATT had previously (and despairingly) described as unhelpful. ATT's central message was that Mali has made a resolute commitment to action against AQIM and begun to implement it. Mali must now rely on friends such as the United States for help. His specific requests remain as previously stated reftels - transportation/logistics, communications, intelligence support, construction of small bases as rest points for Malian soldiers posted in the desert and rehabilitation of Tessalit air strip as a key point for re-asserting control in the North. He also spoke of financial help to sustain his troops during prolonged action. The discussion touched on the possible value of information campaigns to reinforce the falling out between northern Malian Arabs and others and AQIM, and the importance of quickly instituting development programs in the north to give people alternatives and hope. End summary. 2. (C) Lamana's Death the Last Straw: A business-like ATT cut greeting formalities short and launched directly into a review of Mali's actions against AQIM in recent days. Despite his preference for sub-regional coordinated action and concerns about Mali's ability to unilaterally sustain an offensive, absent support from his neighbors, Mali had been preparing for possible action for some time and stepped it up after the murder of the British hostage. The June 10 murder of Lt. Colonel Lamana in Timbuktu last week had been a tipping point. The act of AQIM killing one of their own -- and in his home-- had shocked Arab communities and the region. The Army organized to support an action even as ex-rebels and Arab youth came forward to join in combat, initially intending to act alone until they were brought under the military's wing. ATT particularly welcomed the Arab participation, stating that they were more adept at desert operations than even Tuareg populations. ATT also noted that he focussed on bringing a number of Arab members of the Malian armed forces to supplement those already in the North, again because of their superior understanding of the terrain and the environment in general. 3. (C) ATT said Mali does not plan to issue any public body counts, but they believed 20-25 AQIM members died in the move against an AQIM base near the Algerian border. He said the army found several fresh graves with multiple bodies as well as other remains; the dead had not yet all been identified. Some Malian forces secured that base, and others continued to pursue fleeing AQIM elements, whom he described as cornered. The Malian side suffered five deaths and three injuries, one severe, when a vehicle struck a landmine. Malian reinforcements were arriving from other northern bases; ATT believed AQIM was trying to reach elements in Kidal for additional support. 4. (C) Neighbors Warming to the Cause?: ATT was hopeful about several of Mali's neighbors, who had begun showing interest in the offensive. ATT said Mali had approached Algeria to point out two possible near-term scenarios. Either fleeing AQIM elements would head for Algeria, or AQIM reinforcements would be sent from there. Referring to Mali's awareness of 5-7 AQIM vehicles camped on the Algerian border for the last week, he asked for and received a commitment for Algerian assistance in monitoring its border against these dangers. Algeria also offered to help with medevac of serious Malian military casualties, but otherwise had committed no assistance to the ongoing engagements. While disappointed, ATT also said on one level Mali had been happy to omit Algeria from the early strike planning, since he believed Algerian border forces were the sources of leaks to AQIM. He was, however, pleased that at last the Algerians were at least willing to talk to the Malians. He described Niger as "practical and responsive" to Mali's border concerns; he said a similar demarche had been made to BAMAKO 00000401 002 OF 002 Mauritania, but added "their mind is elsewhere." 5. (S) The Wish List: Having summarized the favorable direction the offensive was taking, ATT asked the Ambassador to so inform Washington, and to reiterate Mali's request for material support to their efforts. "Our northern bases have no protection," he said. He added that reinforcement of several camps, particularly the base at Tessalit, was needed; he even contemplates establishing a desert maneuver training center there. The needs he listed were largely as previously reported in past weeks and years: vehicles, some airlift capability, communications, strengthened intelligence capacity, and other resources to support the troops Mali had commited to the fight. Referring to Mali's Ukrainian-maintained helicopters (Mi-24D "Hind"), he added that they were investigating acquiring two more, because it is not helpful to know where the enemy is if they cannot be reached. He lamented the security difficulties that impinge on the delivery of the very development assistance needed to ensure longer-term stability, and asked for help to convince the UNDP to review the security ranking for northern Mali. Speaking with feeling he stressed that this window for action needs to be used. The UN wants to wait for total peace but total peace and security demand that there be some evidence of development to go along with security efforts. ATT intends to despatch Foreign Minister Ouane to see the UN Secretary General to make the case that now is precisely the time that development assistance needs to be delivered. 6. (C) The Ambassador said Mali could be proud of its achievements in the military effort to date, and expressed condolences for the GOM casualties. Picking up on ATT's observation about the local population's newly negative reaction to AQIM following the Dyer and Lamana deaths, she suggested that an information campaign -- which perhaps the US could work on with appropriate Malian counterparts-- to further sensitize residents about negative impact on their lives and on natural resource and other development might be useful. The goal would be to consolidate the anti-AQIM attitudes created by the convergence of recent events. ATT agreed that consolidating helpful views among the citizens in the North was important, adding that an information campaign would work only if development activities were also being undertaken -- words and deeds together. He expanded on Arab community reactions, saying that while there had been no question of ideological affiliation between local populations and AQIM, certainly recent events had woken up those who had seen no harm in commercial trading with the terrorists to the real dangers the group poses. 7. (C) ATT's final observation was about splintering of various AQIM elements over the decisions taken with the British hostage and Lamana. "The group against us is fracturing, with different patrons and enemies." Local communities are mobilized to act against the AQIM they used to tolerate in timidity and ignorance. Mali has committed itself to this battle, and now needs material support. 8. (C) Comment: Mali's overt offensive against AQIM is to be welcomed, even as we recognize the logistic difficulties that ATT also acknowledges will hamper his militia-assisted army as the offensive continues. As of today, Embassy sources place the Malian forces in the area of Tin-Adema, out of fuel and awaiting resupply; AQIM is hunkered down north-west of Tessalit. There does not appear to have been any geographical movement by either side since Tuesday, June 16. The resource-inspired standdown on the Malian side reinforces the crucial need for the support ATT is requesting. He has unleashed a credible offensive, and merits support from international partners and his neighbors. MILOVANOVIC