Guantánamo
Cable en el que Kuwait sugiere que envíen a los presos de su país a Afganistán
La embajadora en Kuwait informa en 2009 de que el país no va a hacerse cargo de sus presos liberados de Guantánamo y recomienda que los envíen a una zona de guerra en Afganistán
| ID: | 190648 |
| Date: | 2009-02-05 16:36:00 |
| Origin: | 09KUWAIT110 |
| Source: | Embassy Kuwait |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 09KUWAIT95 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO3981 PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR DE RUEHKU #0110/01 0361636 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 051636Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000110 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2029 TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, KU, IR SUBJECT: THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMEDY FOR TERRORISTS: "LET THEM DIE." REF: KUWAIT 0095 Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: During a February 3 meeting in their ongoing dialog on US-Kuwait CT cooperation, Kuwaiti Minister of Interior Shaykh Jaber al-Khalid Al Sabah discussed with Ambassador US and Kuwaiti efforts to locate and apprehend terror financiers (including Mohammed Sultan Ibrahim Sultan Al-Ali, aka Jawad/Abu Umar), applauded improved liaison information exchange, expressed skepticism Kuwait would ever develop a rehabilitation center for former GTMO detainees and other extremists supporting jihad, and suggested the US should release current GTMO detainees back into Afghanistan, where they could be killed in combat. He sardonically questioned why US NAVCENT forces had gone to the trouble of rescuing foundering Iranian hashish smugglers two weeks earlier, saying "God meant to punish them with death and you saved them. Why?" Characterizing the previous Saturday's provincial elections as a "huge success," Shaykh Jaber expressed his belief that President Obama and the US had the tools necessary to successfully confront all challenges. END SUMMARY. 2. (S/NF) Ambassador called on Shaykh Jaber February 3 to review progress on our CT liaison relationship and to seek the Interior Minister's support for operational concepts aimed at intercepting individuals involved in the exploitation of traditional smuggling routes in the northern Gulf to move would-be jihadists and their financier/facilitators between Kuwait and Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Shaykh Jaber began the meeting by applauding the "huge success" of the provincial elections in Iraq and expressing his confidence in the ability of President Obama and the "super power" US to address current challenges. 3. (S/NF) Ambassador noted she'd met recently with VADM McCraven, now JSOC commander for this region, and that they'd discussed alternative approaches to staunching the flows of terror financing, given the constraints of Kuwait's current legal and political systems. Offering his support for these approaches ) and underscoring that he was as concerned about terrorist influences from Saudi Arabia as from Iran, given the loose border controls -- the Minister expressed his understanding of what he characterized (fairly) as improved information exchange between our services, while acknowledging the ongoing deficiencies in Kuwait's legal system that stymie effective prosecution and restraint of these individuals once captured. 4. (S/NF) Ambassador noted recent press reports that self-confessed jihadi recruiter and financier Mohammed al-Bathali had been released on a 500 dinar bond after being sentenced to three of a possible five years imprisonment for "inciting jihad against a friendly state." (Reftel) At the same time, Kuwait's Ambassador to the US, Shaykh Salem Al Sabah, had approached S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson to inquire after the status of Kuwait's four remaining GTMO detainees. Ambassador clarified that President Obama's announcement of our determination to close the detention center at Guantanamo did not mean we no longer had security concerns which would be factored into any release scenarios; the Kuwaiti detainees were nasty, unrepentant individuals and Kuwait's record had been tarnished by the example of former GTMO detainee al-Ajmi, who'd allegedly blown himself up in Mosul following his release to the Kuwaiti authorities. Ambassador asked the Interior Minister the status of the rehabilitation center Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed Al Sabah had mentioned in his September 18th conversation with then-Secretary Rice in Washington. Ambassador noted that we were aware of the stories of Saudis who'd gone through SAG rehabilitation centers only to re-emerge with Al Qaeda in Yemen; nonetheless, the GOK had to take steps to show its seriousness in changing and controlling the behaviors of extremists within its society. 5. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber replied with an anecdote: Following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm, General Schwarzkopf had raised the issue of "rehabilitating" Kuwaitis who'd been exposed to the brutality of war so that they could re-integrate into society. Shaykh (Ret,d General) Jaber had replied: "But you are thinking of the Vietnam model, where young war veterans came home to empty apartments or anonymous urban environments. That is not who we are. We are a small, close-knit society and everyone knows each other. No one will feel alienated: those who can heal will heal naturally with family; those who cannot heal in that environment will never heal." Relating this to the current topic, Shaykh KUWAIT 00000110 002 OF 002 Jaber told the Ambassador: "You know better than I that we cannot deal with these people (i.e. the GTMO detainees). I can't detain them. If I take their passports, they will sue to get them back (Note: as happened with Al-Ajmi. End note.) I can talk to you into next week about building a rehabilitation center, but it won't happen. We are not Saudi Arabia; we cannot isolate these people in desert camps or somewhere on an island. We cannot compel them to stay. If they are rotten, they are rotten and the best thing to do is get rid of them. You picked them up in Afghanistan; you should drop them off in Afghanistan, in the middle of the war zone." 6. (S/NF) Ambassador then raised with the Minister developing an SOP for dealing with incidents such as the recent rescue by US NAVCENT forces in the northern Gulf of seven Iranian smugglers whose boat was foundering while engaged in smuggling hashish. In the event, the Omanis had agreed to repatriate the Iranians but we nonetheless needed to think about dealing with similar episodes in future in expeditious fashion. The initial response of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard had been to refer the matter to the Minister of Interior, via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador noted our supposition that the Kuwaiti Coast Guard must have had similar experiences with Iranian smugglers who needed repatriation to Iran. Smiling broadly, the Interior Minister deflected the question, saying "God wished to punish them for smuggling drugs by drowning them, and then you saved them. So they're your problem! You should have let them drown." In any case, he added, the Kuwaitis generally sent the Iranians back to Iran in their own boats so there had not been a question of physically handing them over. 7. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador noted that the Minister had created the position of Special Advisor to Shaykh Jaber for Kuwait Security Services (our GRPO liaison counterpart) and assigned Shaykh Salman Sabah al-Salem al-Humoud Al Sabah to that role. Ambassador asked whether the Minister believed there was any appropriate liaison relationship between the Embassy and Shaykh Salman, to which the Minister replied in the negative. Finally, the Ambassador invited the Minister to join her in attending the US Ambassador's reception February 24 at the IDEX event in Abu Dhabi, as part of our efforts to boost the relationship. 8. (C) COMMENT: The Minister was as frank and pessimistic as ever when it came to the subject of apprehending and detaining terror financiers and facilitators under Kuwait's current legal and political framework. Ongoing tensions between parliament and the PM and his cabinet make any changes highly unlikely any time soon. The remaining GTMO detainees remain a particularly thorny issue for the leadership here, who privately recognize the downsides of taking custody and readily acknowledge their inability to manage them but who remain under strong domestic political pressure to "bring their boys home." Telling was the fact that press accounts of the Ambassador's February 3 meeting with the Minister (which was one-on-one with a notetaker) and her meeting two days earlier with the MFA U/S focused solely on the GTMO issue, although it was discussed only marginally. END COMMENT. ********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* JONES |
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