Georgia
Cable en el que EE UU sopesa su relación militar con Georgia
En junio de 2009, el Departamento de Estado estadounidense teme que un mayor compromiso con Tbilisi dañe la nueva relación con Rusia
| ID: | 212799 |
| Date: | 2009-06-18 12:01:00 |
| Origin: | 09TBILISI1123 |
| Source: | Embassy Tbilisi |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 09MOSCOW1591 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO2123 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHSI #1123/01 1691201 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181201Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1755 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0246 RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4866 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 001123 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, EUR WHSR PLEASE PASS TO OVP E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, PBTS, RS, GG SUBJECT: IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 1591 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary. The June 22 kickoff of the U.S.-Georgia Charter Commission will raise the question of the future of our military cooperation. Embassy Moscow's recent cable (reftel) has highlighted Russian views and the potential impact on our attempt to reset our relations with Moscow. There are, however, strong arguments in favor of providing Georgia a modest, transparent defensive capability. We provide our views in this cable. In our assessment, the Russians are effectively using propaganda based in falsehoods regarding the current state of the Georgian military to ratchet up tensions, while simultaneously impressing upon the U.S. that any efforts to provide military assistance to Georgia will pose potential roadblocks to improving the U.S.-Russia relationship. Accepting Russian objections, however, contradicts stated U.S. policies such as rejecting the notion of spheres of influence; refusing a third party veto over NATO membership; and maintaining equal commitment to relations with both Russia and Georgia. It gives Russian disinformation an undeserved voice in U.S. policy formation. 2. (C) Summary, continued: Embassy Tbilisi believes that increased transparent military cooperation could help stabilize the situation in Georgia, as Georgia seeks to develop its defensive capacity -- and even decrease the size of its standing army. Retreating from our commitments would send a profoundly mixed signal to our partners in the region and in western Europe, especially to those who are considering opening up their society, increasing transparency, and seeking increased partnership with the west. Russia will undoubtedly object to increased military cooperation, but the answer is not to validate their concern, but to set the record straight in an organized, aggressive private and public diplomacy campaign with both Russia and our broader partners. To do otherwise would be to reward Russia's aggression in Georgia, as well as its violation of international law and commitments; encourage a similar stance in Ukraine; and deal a body blow to our credibility in Georgia, other Eurasian states, our western partners -- and ultimately Russia itself. End summary. THE GEORGIAN ARMY HAS NOT RE-ARMED 3. (C) Russian claims that Georgia has more military capability now than in August 2008,or that it has been steadily re-arming its forces, are false. During the August 2008 conflict, Georgia lost extensive capabilities, including 30 percent of its armored vehicles, 40 percent of U.S.-produced AR-15 rifles, and at least 60 percent of its air defense capability. These have not been replaced. We are aware of only two deliveries of lethal military equipment since the war: Ejder armored personnel carriers from a Turkish firm, based on a pre-war contract; and 16 armored HMMWVs for the Special Forces Brigade under a program begun in 2007. The latter were purchased using Coalition Support Funds, the case was processed before the August war, and the vehicles would be used in such coalition operations as those in Afghanistan. The U.S. and other NATO partners have moved cautiously since the war. Bilateral military-to-military events between NATO partners and Georgia have been reduced, Qevents between NATO partners and Georgia have been reduced, suspended, even terminated. The U.S. in particular has yet to renew a capacity-building program begun months ago, and we have not executed a single kinetic event since August, despite Georgian desires for more tactical training. The NATO PfP Lancer/Longbow exercises, publicly used by Russia against the Alliance and Georgia, were planned more than a year in advance with full Russian knowledge and possibility for participation. JOINING THE AFGHANISTAN COALITION 4. (C) Secretary Gates' approach on security cooperation of "brains before brawn" (B3) focuses on the intellectual development of the Georgian armed forces and is non-kinetic in nature. The U.S. has now told Georgia we accepted their offer to deploy a battalion for two years in RC-South, one of the most dangerous areas of Afghanistan. While it is not yet known how much training and equipping will be needed to bring Georgia effectively into the coalition, it is in both U.S. and Russian interests to widen the coalition in Afghanistan. Some lethal training will undoubtedly be involved, and we should not allow Russia to twist any such cooperation in TBILISI 00001123 002 OF 004 Afghanistan, one of the Administration's top priorities, into a phantom threat. MINIMAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR SURVIVAL 5. (C) Georgia also wants to rebuild its native defensive capacity, which is currently insufficient to control its own airspace or hinder an invasion from any of its neighbors. Current Georgian operational thinking is that if they can defend Tbilisi from occupation for 72 hours, then international pressure will force the advance to pause. To achieve this extremely limited goal, Georgia needs sufficient anti-armor and air defense capability to stall a ground advance, which it currently lacks. The development of this capacity is not solely equipment-based, but it will require the acquisition of new lethal defensive systems. If Georgia does not procure the equipment from the U.S., it will almost surely seek to procure it elsewhere, as it has done in the past. U.S. involvement would help ensure the transparency of the procurement process itself, as well as increase our control over the amount, type and location of the equipment. 6. (C) In addition, Minister Sikharulidze recently approved an intermediate force structure change that would reduce the Georgian Armed Forces total personnel strength by 6,000 service members from the current 36,000. (Current actual personnel is approximately 31,000.) Without prejudging the ongoing Strategic Assessment process, the Minister has confided to us that the final Georgian force structure will be below 30,000. The Georgians have not publicized this proposed downsizing because they fear that a smaller Georgian Army could encourage Russian armed incursions. Furthermore, a recently proposed further 7 percent reduction in the defense budget will drop Georgia's total defense spending to less than half of 2008 levels. 7. (C) Georgia's military plan is defensive in nature. As EUR Assistant Secretary Gordon recently noted to Georgian Defense Minister Sikharulidze, every country has the right to defend itself - as described in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Russia may argue no weapon is only defensive in nature; anti-tank and air defense systems, however, would not give Georgia the capacity to launch an offensive attack. Russia may argue that Georgia is acquiring other, more offensive systems clandestinely at the same time. There is no evidence to support this assertion, and we would have a much greater degree of influence -- and be in a position to keep Russia well informed -- if we were involved in defensive system procurement. Finally, Russia will likely level allegations of increased Georgian offensive capacity regardless of facts, just as they have done in the Geneva process. Georgia, however, provides far more transparency on its military forces than virtually any country in the world, signing MOUs between the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and its Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs that give the observers unprecedented access to Georgian military and law enforcement installations. The EUMM, along with the OSCE, has repeatedly affirmed that Georgia has respected the limits established in those MOUs and has no offensive capability near Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia essentially ignores these statements and continues to level the same allegations, but that bluster Qand continues to level the same allegations, but that bluster does not change the fact of Georgia's continued restraint. As we seek to help Georgia develop its defensive capacity, we could pursue smilar public and/or written commitments from the Georgians on the exclusively defensive nature of the program. 8. (C) We believe that providing Georgia with enhanced defensive capabilities will stabilize the situation. While Russia, as well as the de facto regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, may argue otherwise, it is Russia and its proxy regimes that have dramatically increased the militarization of Georgia over the past year. Russia has introduced at least 3,700 troops into sovereign Georgian territory, as well as heavy military equipment, such as tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft systems, into the area immediately adjacent to the administrative boundaries -- in direct violation of the commitments President Medvedev made in the cease-fire agreement. It is Georgia that has lost 14 police officers since the war; kidnappings, cattle thefts, and detentions continue along the boundary, mostly on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides. Russian helicopters make regular flights along the boundaries, sometimes crossing them, and Russian forces move large numbers of troops and heavy equipment along the boundaries at will. Meanwhile, the EUMM, OSCE and UNOMIG TBILISI 00001123 003 OF 004 continue to confirm Georgia's cooperative and constructive approach. There is little to deter Russia from taking additional military action, except a legitimate defensive force opposing it. At the same time, such a force would not pose an offensive threat to the regions. 9. (C) Retreating from military cooperation would be a step back from commitments we have made to Georgia and other international partners. Not only will Georgia be disappointed in our diminished support, and hesitant to trust us again, but other partners will draw the same conclusions. The Russia-Georgia war has already led some countries, such as Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states, to question the extent of our commitment, even though we never committed to the direct military defense of Georgia. A step back from commitments we have made would remove any doubt in our unreliability and convince countries from Belarus to Kyrgyzstan, even as they try to recalibrate their own relationship with Russia, that the risks of continuing partnership with Russia are less than those of moving toward cooperation with the United States. One of our specific commitments has been to NATO membership for Georgia, politically at the Bucharest Summit, and at the operational level, with the Georgia-NATO Commission and the Annual National Plan. A key component of that process is the development of Georgia's homeland defense capacity. Since last August we have engaged with Georgia on elements of their preparation for Euro-Atlantic integration, but the military component cannot be deferred indefinitely. The longer we defer action, the clearer the message will be to Georgia and others that our commitment to membership has diminished. 10. (C) Beyond our specific commitment to Georgia, we have made broader commitments not to allow Russia to impose its flawed zero-sum vision on our own strategic view of the world. The Secretary explicitly rejected Russia's notion of spheres of influence during her May 7 meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov. The Vice President rejected the same notion at the February Munich Security Conference. The President himself told President Medvedev the same thing in London. All three have likewise expressed unequivocal support for Georgia's NATO aspirations and territorial integrity. Any perceived or real retreat from these unambiguous statements -- and our special relationship with Georgia makes it a test case -- will raise questions about our leadership. LOOKING AHEAD 11. (C) A difficult, but crucial, element of our strategy for continuing engagement with Georgia while maintaining a good relationship with Russia will be an aggressive private, as well as public diplomacy campaign that is well coordinated with our western partners. Russia will try to spin any military cooperation as negatively as possible, but we must not allow Russian disinformation to go unchallenged. As noted above, we have already taken the first step in our engagement with the Georgian military: agreeing together on the B3 approach. We are currently exploring the best fit for a Georgian contribution to the effort in Afghanistan. Neither of these areas could be considered threatening. A further step, toward helping Georgia improve its defensive capacity, would not be inherently threatening, and could help Qcapacity, would not be inherently threatening, and could help stabilize the situation. We must resist efforts to cast it any other way. Russia will likely continue to portray NATO engagement as threatening. 12. (C) More fundamentally, Russia continues to characterize our differing agendas in the post-Soviet space as a zero-sum, new "Great Game". Unlike in the 19th century, when two empires vied to establish control over the intervening territory in the exclusive pursuit of their own narrow interests, U.S. policy seeks to enable independent countries to make their own choices. However real the perception may be among Russians that the United States is out to get them, we must resist all efforts to confuse that perception with our true intentions. Georgia is seeking to choose its own partners, defend its own country, establish a market-based economy free of corruption, and further develop its young democracy -- and we are helping it do so. Georgia poses no threat to Russia; it wants the political space to pursue its own path. To step back from our mission because Russia mitrusts our motives is to cede to Russia the terms of development in Eurasia for the foreseeable future. 13. (C) There are two practical steps that we might consider TBILISI 00001123 004 OF 004 pursuing to help both address the real danger of instability and blunt Russia's momentum in the public diplomacy sphere. First, we could encourage Georgia to make public and/or written commitments about the exclusively defensive nature of its new military programs. Second, we could encourage Georgia to offer to sign a non-use of force agreement with Russia. Russia has been pushing hard for such an agreement between Georgia and its own regions, which Georgia has understandably been unwilling to consider. If Georgia were to call Russia's bluff and offer to sign such an agreement with Russia itself, however, the burden would shift to Russia to demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to stability. It is unlikely that Russia, which still maintains the fiction that it is not a party to the conflict, would accept Georgia's offer, but it would be left on the defensive. Meanwhile Georgia could pursue its defensive development with a ready answer to any Russian claims of belligerence or provocation. (Note: Embassy Tbilisi has not explored either of these steps with Georgia, so they are only ideas at this point, but experience suggests Georgia would at least be willing to consider them. The steps Georgia has already taken to provide transparency on its military and law enforcement activities suggest they would be willing to take similar steps. In the months after the war, senior Georgian officials expressed their willingness to pursue a non-use of force agreement if Russia made certain concessions. End note.) COMMENT: BALANCING RISKS 14. (C) Embassy Tbilisi does not question the importance or difficulty of managing our relationship with Russia, especially if we proceed with further military cooperation with Georgia. No matter how loudly we insist on the true state of affairs, most Russians at this point will either not believe us or ignore us, as Embassy Moscow pointed out. There is indeed a risk that taking the next step with Georgia will jeopardize the improvement of our relationship with Russia. There is also a risk, however, that not taking that step will both foster further instability in Georgia and jeopardize our credibility in a much broader space. Furthermore, as past experience has shown, there is yet another risk: that improvements in relations with Russia, even if bought with compromises on other U.S. interests, will not pay off with any real dividends. Embassy Tbilisi would argue that sacrificing a relationship with a dedicated partner like Georgia is the greater risk, because it will only embolden Russia in the future, both to push for more concessions on our part and to reassert its perceived sphere of influence further. Up to this point, Russia has paid no concrete penalty whatsoever for invading and occupying a neighboring country; unilaterally recognizing two of its regions as independent states; violating CFE and cease-fire commitments by vastly increasing its military presence in those regions and not allowing humanitarian access; corrupting the original concept of the Geneva process into a forum to lend legitimacy to the regions; blocking a status-neutral effort by the international community, through the OSCE, to promote stability; and killing the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. Allowing Russia to dictate the pace of QMission in Georgia. Allowing Russia to dictate the pace of military engagement with Georgia will be seen as rewarding Russia for its behavior. It could only be a matter of time before it takes similar actions in Ukraine or elsewhere. TEFFT |
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