Cable de EE UU que asegura que a México le queda un largo camino hasta lograr un control eficaz de los inmigrantes
Esa vulnerabilidad permite a delincuentes en busca y captura huir a Estados Unidos con identidades de terceras personas, según la embajada
ID: | 207345 |
Date: | 2009-05-15 21:15:00 |
Origin: | 09MEXICO1344 |
Source: | Embassy Mexico |
Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
Dunno: | 09STATE32287 |
Destination: | VZCZCXRO5890 RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM DE RUEHME #1344/01 1352115 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 152115Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6504 INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0035 RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MEXICO 001344 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE; NCTC; DHS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: ASEC, CVIS, ECON, KVPR, MX, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER SUBJECT: RESPONSE UPDATE: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING REF: STATE 00032287 Classified By: Charles Barclay, Political Counselor for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (C) Below please find Post's updated responses regarding host government's policies toward and capabilities for collection of biographic and biometric data for terrorist screening purposes. The responses are keyed to the questions per reftel. All questions are included but only updated responses and additions are annotated. A. Watchlisting: -- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many records does the watchlist contain, and how many are terrorist-related? NO CHANGE -- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? NO CHANGE B. Traveler Information Collection: -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country? (ORIGINAL) THE MEXICAN NATIONAL IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE (INM) COLLECTS TRAVELER INFORMATION FROM TRAVELERS ARRIVING IN THE COUNTRY VIA AIR. ON ARRIVAL AT MAJOR AIRPORTS, INM SCANS INFORMATION FROM PASSPORTS AND COLLECTS DATA ON AIRLINE, FLIGHT NUMBERS, DATES OF ENTRY AND EXIT, DATE OF BIRTH, LAST NAME, TYPE OF TRAVEL DOCUMENT PRESENTED, PASSPORT NUMBER, AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. (UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) AT THIS TIME SIOM (SISTEMA INTEGRAL OPERACION MIGRATION) IS AVAILABLE AT 13 AIRPORTS AND 2 SEA PORTS. THROUGH THE MERIDA INITIATIVE ALL PORTS OF ENTRY WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH SIOM. THE SYSTEM IS SIMILAR TO USVISIT USED BY CVP AT ALL P.O.E. -- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry and for domestic flights? NO CHANGE -- Who collects traveler information? NO CHANGE -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that information with foreign governments? NO CHANGE -- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? NO CHANGE -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been effective at MEXICO 00001344 002 OF 006 detecting other national security threats, such as wanted criminals? NO CHANGE C. Border Control and Screening: -- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers of security interest? NO CHANGE -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host- country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits? (ORIGINAL) GOM TRACKS ALL INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVELERS ELECTRONICALLY, BUT NOT DOMESTIC AIR TRAVELERS. AIR TRAVELERS ARE TRACKED ELECTRONICALLY ONLY ON ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY, BUT TRAVEL DOCUMENTS ARE GENERALLY NOT VALIDATED ON EXIT. AS OPPOSED TO AIR TRAVEL, TRAVELERS ENTERING BY LAND OR SEA ARE NOT ACTUALLY SCREENED NOR RECORDED ELECTRONICALLY AND ARE FREQUENTLY "WAIVED THROUGH." THE PERCENTAGE OF NON-RECORDED CROSSINGS, ENTRIES AND EXITS IS NOT KNOWN. (UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) ALL THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS (TCN) NEED NEED TO REGISTER WITH INM -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc). NO CHANGE -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry? NO CHANGE -- How well does information sharing function within the host government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? NO CHANGE D. Biometric Collection: -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are the systems and models used? NO CHANGE -- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the host government target a specific population for collection (i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented against a database of known biometrics)? NO CHANGE -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to MEXICO 00001344 003 OF 006 defeat biometric checkpoints? NOT APPLICABLE. -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? NO CHANGE -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint system? NO CHANGE -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant? NOT APPLICABLE. -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency collects the fingerprints? NO CHANGE E. Passports: -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments? NO CHANGE -- Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? (UPDATE) REPLACEMENT PASSPORTS ARE ISSUED FOR FULL VALIDITY. PASSPORT VALIDITY IS ONE YEAR FOR CHILDREN 5 YEARS AND YOUNGER, THREE YEARS FOR 6-18 YEARS, SIX OR TEN YEARS BASED ON PAYMENT FOR 19 YEARS AND OLDER. -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen multiple times? NO CHANGE -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? NO CHANGE -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? NOT APPLICABLE -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? NO CHANGE -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified? NO CHANGE F. Fraud Detection - How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances MEXICO 00001344 004 OF 006 of fraud involving documents followed up? (ORIGINAL) MEXICAN FRAUD PREVENTION EFFORTS AT POINTS OF ENTRY ARE BELIEVED TO BE INCONSISTENT AND NOT TERRIBLY EFFECTIVE. MANY SPECIAL INTEREST ALIENS USE FRAUDULENT PASSPORTS FROM THIRD PARTY COUNTRIES. (UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) A NEW MEXICAN PASSPORT ANTI-FRAUD UNIT WITHIN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE (PGR) IS BEING CREATED TO INVESTIGATE PASSPORT FRAUD. THERE IS NO TIMETABLE OR INDICATION FROM PGR WHEN THIS UNIT WILL BE OPERATIONAL (UPDATE - ADDITIONAL) - CBP IN CONJUNCTION WITH FPU PROVIDE CONTINUED TRAINING TO INM/SSP AND PFP OFFICERS. -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use? (ORIGINAL) THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONFISCATED BY THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE (INM) DURING DETENTION. THE LEGITIMACY OF BIRTH CERTIFICATES, VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARDS, OR PROFESSIONAL LICENSES (CEDULAS PROFESIONALES) MAY BE CHECKED THROUGH MEXICAN CIVIL REGISTRIES OR ON-LINE DATA BASES. (ORIGINAL) WHILE THE MEXICAN PASSPORT ITSELF IS VERY SECURE, FPU AMBEMBASSY MEXICO CITY HAS A NUMBER OF CONCERNS REGARDING THE SECURITY OF THE APPLICATION PROCESS ITSELF. MEXICAN PASSPORTS ARE ISSUED BY 113 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, NON-MEXICANS HAVE ACQUIRED VALID MEXICAN PASSPORTS WITH FALSE DOCUMENTATION. FPU MEXICO CITY IS WORKING WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (SRE) TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND TO ESTABLISH A FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAM WITHIN SRE. (UPDATE -ADDITIONAL) GENUINE MEXICAN PASSPORTS ARE EASY TO OBTAIN WITH FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS WITH NO ADDITIONAL RIGOR FOR TCN G. Privacy and Data Security -- What are the country's policies on records related to the questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? How are those records stored, and for how long? NO CHANGE -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data? NO CHANGE -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records? NO CHANGE -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information? NO CHANGE -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them? NO CHANGE -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of MEXICO 00001344 005 OF 006 birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)? NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME. -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data? NO CHANGE H. Immigration Data Bases: -- What computerized immigration databases are used to track entries and exits? NO CHANGE -- Is the immigration database available at all ports of entry (POEs)? NO CHANGE -- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? NOT APPLICABLE. -- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? NO CHANGE -- How often are national immigration databases updated? NO CHANGE I. Watchlist and Information Sharing: -- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen travelers at POEs? NO CHANGE -- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants? NO CHANGE -- What international watchlists do the host government use for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.? NO CHANGE -- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between host government and its neighbors? NO CHANGE J. Biometrics: -- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install such a system? NO CHANGE -- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive the tool? MEXICO 00001344 006 OF 006 NOT APPLICABLE. -- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant? NOT APPLICABLE. -- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport containing biometric information? If e-Passports are issued, what biometric information is included on the document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric document in the future? When? NO CHANGE K. Identifying Appropriate Partners: Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether host government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing. Considerations include whether host government watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to terrorists), and whether host governments would share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc. -- Are there political realities which would preclude a country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the U.S? (UPDATED) WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE "MERIDA INITIATIVE" INFORMATION SHARING ACROSS AGENCIES INCLUDING THE MILITARY HAS OCCURRED AT UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS. AS PART OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE A PACKAGE OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING NAGOCIATED FOR OFFICIAL INFORMATION SHARING BUT NO TIMETABLE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED ON ROLLOUT. LACK OF THESE OFFICIAL AGREEMENTS HAS NOT RESTRICTED THE RECENTLY ENHANCED EFFORTS TO GATHER AND PROVIDE INFORMATION RECIPROCALLY. -- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of information? NO CHANGE -- How much information sharing does the host country do internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for example? If not, do different ministries share information amongst themselves? NO CHANGE -- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal statutes that do so? NO CHANGE Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BASSETT |
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