Cable de EE UU que hace un recuento del incidente diplomático originado por la escala técnica de Moratinos en Damasco
El entonces ministro español, de regreso de un viaje a Afganistán y Pakistán, realizó una parada en Siria
ID: | 56480 |
Date: | 2006-03-14 15:38:00 |
Origin: | 06STATE40904 |
Source: | Secretary of State |
Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
Dunno: | 06MADRID568 |
Destination: | VZCZCXRO8346 OO RUEHLA DE RUEHC #0904/01 0731540 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 141538Z MAR 06 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1232 INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2366 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0232 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3636 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 1562 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0894 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 040904 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SP, SY, LE, IS, FR, UN SUBJECT: DISCOURAGING MORATINOS' SYRIAN STRATEGY REF: A. MADRID 568 B. ZEYA-BALL EMAILS 3/10/06 Classified By: EUR A/S KURT VOLKER, ACTING, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (U) This is an action request. See Para 5. 2. (C) Summary: Spanish FM Moratinos' unannounced March 7 trip to Damascus to meet with Syrian FM Muallim is at variance with US and EU policy on avoiding high-level visits to Damascus. This policy gives concrete form to the international isolation of the Syrian regime expressed in UNSCRs 1559, 1595, 1636, and 1644. Post is asked to convey strong USG concerns to Moratinos about his visit and discourage him from making further visits to Damascus or accepting SARG visits to Madrid, using the points in para 5. U/S Burns made these points to Ambassador Westendorp in their meeting on March 13. End Summary. 3. (C) Background: FM Moratinos made a brief "technical stop" in Damascus on his return trip from Pakistan and Afghanistan on March 7. During the unannounced stop, he met briefly with FM Muallim. In a March 2 meeting with Ambassador Aguirre, Moratinos had previewed his plan to travel to Damascus in April in an effort to "pull Syria out of Iran's orbit" by working with "moderate" members of the regime. He asked for USG input, but did not mention any plan to visit Damascus before April (Ref A). Moratinos said that he had briefed the French on his intentions and that they had not raised any objections. On March 3 Embassy Paris raised the issue with French MFA Middle East advisor Christophe Guilhou, who was not aware of a possible Moratinos visit to Damascus and said that the GoF would oppose such a visit, given its policy of discouraging EU ministerial or Head of State visits to or from Damascus. On March 9 Guilhou told Embassy Paris that FM Douste-Blazy would raise the issue with Moratinos on the margins of the March 13 de Villepin-Zapatero meeting in Madrid and stress to him that the only official interlocutor with the SARG should be UN Special Envoy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1559 Terje Roed-Larsen. (Ref B) 4. (C) When Embassy Madrid learned of Moratinos' stopover in Damascus, it attempted to contact Moratinos through the Spanish MFA, which responded that the trip was a technical stopover and that the meeting between Moratinos and Muallim would be brief. When Ambassador Aguirre was finally able to speak with Moratinos, after the meeting had taken place, Moratinos insisted that he had not strayed from the international consensus on Syria and would share the details of his visit with the Ambassador upon his return to Madrid. 5. (C//REL to Spain) Post is requested to deliver the following talking points to FM Moratinos. The points should be delivered verbally; they are not to be left with him or hand-delivered: -- You are the first EU foreign minister to visit Damascus since the assassination of former Lebanese PM Hariri and twenty others, an assassination the UN determined likely involved Syrian security officials. -- We understand your desire to effect positive change within the Syrian regime and your desire to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. However, we believe that unilateral measures, such as your unannounced stop in Damascus, are inconsistent with our joint message to the Syrian regime and risk undermining our unity. UN Special Envoy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1559 Terje Roed-Larsen continues to meet with SARG officials and communicate the international community's message to the SARG. -- Now - almost exactly one year after the assassination of former PM Hariri - is not the time to open new diplomatic channels with the SARG. To do so represents a weakening of the policy of isolation and, as such, rewards the regime for its lack of cooperation with the international community. -- Since the Hariri assassination, there have been 13 other bombings and assassinations in Beirut, targeting anti-Syrian journalists and politicians. -- In early February, the Syrian regime manipulated and STATE 00040904 002 OF 002 directed crowds that burned the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Embassies in Damascus. Syrian involvement is also suspected in the violent demonstrations in Beirut that attacked western embassies. -- On March 1, Syrian authorities closed the European Commission-funded Civil Society Training Center, only nine days after its widely-covered opening on February 21. We understand the European Commission is protesting the shutdown to SARG authorities. -- The Syrian regime continues to imprison and harass civil society activists such as Riad Seif and Kamal Labbowani. -- The international community has taken a number of steps designed to force Syria to behave in accordance with international norms. Despite these efforts, the Asad regime is still bellicose, confrontational, and repressive one year after Hariri's death. It also remains confident that it can thumb its nose at the international community. It has failed to provide full and unconditional cooperation to the UNIIIC investigation. In Lebanon, the regime and its agents have stoked chaos and uncertainty with overt interference and economic pressure. Within Syria, the regime continues to repress its people. It has conducted no substantive political reform, and it has not moved on the limited economic reforms that it has repeatedly promised. The regime also continues to provide refuge, financial support, and political encouragement to Palestinian terrorist groups, and President Asad has called on Hamas not to recognize Israel. -- The international community has spoken clearly on what it expects of Syria with the adoption of UNSCRs 1559, 1595, 1636, and 1644. Syria must end its interference in Lebanon, including facilitation of arms trafficking to militias in Lebanon; close the offices of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus, stem the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, halt repression of Syrian civil society, and cooperate fully with the investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. -- The United States coordinates closely with France, the UK, EU, and Germany on its policy towards Syria, Iran, and Lebanon. The EU position to date, supported by the US, has been to discourage ministerial or Head of State visits to and from Damascus. -- Official visits to Damascus send the wrong message at this juncture by providing the Syrian regime with an opportunity to exploit perceived differences in the international community. We are in full agreement with the French on this point. -- Although your expertise on Middle East issues in general and Syria in particular is of great value at this juncture, we urge Spain to coordinate its actions closely with the U.S. and the EU and to avoid unilateral measures. We can work together effectively on this important issue only if we are all working from the same precepts. If raised: -- During Russian FM Lavrov's recent trip to Washington, the Secretary emphasized our deep concerns about continued SARG SIPDIS misbehavior, including arms trafficking and lack of cooperation with the UN investigation. She also emphasized the need to continue isolation of the Syrian regime and to avoid minister-level visits to Damascus. RICE RICE |
Traducción automática. Puede que el texto traducido no sea fiel al original
Tu suscripción se está usando en otro dispositivo
¿Quieres añadir otro usuario a tu suscripción?
Si continúas leyendo en este dispositivo, no se podrá leer en el otro.
FlechaTu suscripción se está usando en otro dispositivo y solo puedes acceder a EL PAÍS desde un dispositivo a la vez.
Si quieres compartir tu cuenta, cambia tu suscripción a la modalidad Premium, así podrás añadir otro usuario. Cada uno accederá con su propia cuenta de email, lo que os permitirá personalizar vuestra experiencia en EL PAÍS.
En el caso de no saber quién está usando tu cuenta, te recomendamos cambiar tu contraseña aquí.
Si decides continuar compartiendo tu cuenta, este mensaje se mostrará en tu dispositivo y en el de la otra persona que está usando tu cuenta de forma indefinida, afectando a tu experiencia de lectura. Puedes consultar aquí los términos y condiciones de la suscripción digital.