Cable en el que se repasan las maniobras de Panamá para intentar que EE UU ayude en su programa de escuchas
Este telegrama resume los supuestos requerimientos y amenazas del Gobierno panameño para conseguir la colaboración de Washington
| ID: | 241664 |
| Date: | 2009-12-24 16:58:00 |
| Origin: | 09PANAMA905 |
| Source: | Embassy Panama |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 09PANAMA639 09PANAMA699 09PANAMA776 09PANAMA777 09PANAMA799 09PANAMA877 09PANAMA901 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXYZ0002 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHZP #0905/01 3581659 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 241658Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0235 INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0058 RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0056 RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC |
S E C R E T PANAMA 000905 NOFORN SIPDIS MEXICO AND EL SALVADOR FOR DEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/24 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SNAR, PINR, ASEC, KJUS, PM SUBJECT: Guidance Request: DEA Wiretap Program REF: PANAMA 639; PANAMA 699; PANAMA 777; PANAMA 776; PANAMA 799 PANAMA 877; PANAMA 901 CLASSIFIED BY: David Gilmour, DCM, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 1. (U) This is an action request, see para 8. 2. (S//NF) Since July 2009, Embassy Panama has grappled with President Martinelli's desire to involve the USG in his efforts to construct a wiretap program that would target his domestic political opponents. Refs A, B and C document the sequence of events in which the president and subordinates employed a variety of tactics ranging from straightforward requests to intimidating threats, in order to obtain USG assistance and/or political cover for his wiretap project. Ample additional reporting on this topic is available in other agency channels. 3. (S//NF) From the time of our very first discussion with the GOP on this subject in July until now, we have clearly and consistently told all senior GOP officials that the USG will only conduct limited law enforcement wiretap programs in cooperation with Panamanian law enforcement and judicial authorities, directed only against genuine law enforcement targets, in a process managed by a Panamanian prosecutor and approved by a Panamanian supreme court judge. 4. (S//NF) Since our decision in late September (Ref B) to remove the DEA Matador wiretap program from control of the GOP's Council for Public Security and National Defense (CSPDN), we have confronted a series of obstacles, including threats from the CSPDN director to expel the DEA from Panama (Ref C) and restrict payments to vetted units (Ref G), and generally weak support for the move from Martinelli and senior GOP leaders. Martinelli's distrust of Panama's attorney general (Ref D) has complicated the issue and he and his subordinates have repeatedly proposed alternative arrangements that would keep the Matador program within CSPDN, but would not fully maintain the "firewall" between law enforcement and intelligence activities. 5. (S//NF) We are still hopeful that we can complete the Matador move out of CSPDN early in the new year, but if we are unable to do so, we are faced with a difficult decision. If Matador remains in CSPDN, the GOP will continue its efforts to change procedures to weaken judicial controls over the program. CSPDN director Olmedo Alfaro has told Embassy officers that the GOP plans to introduce legislation that would create a special judge to approve GOP wiretap targets on short notice. With Panama's notoriously corrupt judicial system (rated 103 out of 133 by the World Economic Forum), we are not confident that the new judge will uphold the same standards and civil liberties protections that the Panama supreme court has exercised in its oversight of Matador to date. 6. (S//NF) All of this comes at a time when Panama's judicial institutions are under assault by the executive, with Martinelli's strong political pressure on the attorney general (Ref D) and the controversial appointment of two Martinelli political cronies to the supreme court (septel). For several weeks the Panamanian media has carried a steady stream of criticism of Martinelli's actions, and most observers believe that the country's already weak justice system is suffering serious body blows. 7. (S//NF) The Matador wiretap program is a valuable law enforcement tool, but we believe that the USG must not compromise democratic values in the employment of that tool. The United States itself has recently experienced a difficult debate over civil liberties and democratic principles being compromised in the name of security. We should not be a participant in questionable activities in Panama. The recent DAS scandal in Colombia illustrates the catastrophic consequences of politically motivated wiretaps, and such a scenario could easily unfold in Panama if the GOP continues its present course of action. If we cannot guarantee with a high level of confidence that the Matador program will not be misused for political purposes, then we prefer to suspend the program. 8. (SBU) Post requests Department coordinate with other stakeholder agencies to provide advice on a way forward. While we at post are in the strongest position to provide views on the operational impact of suspending the program, stakeholder agencies in Washington can best provide the perspective on the legal and policy factors against which the operational impact should be weighed. We will be pleased to provide extensive additional background material and technical details as requested. STEPHENSON |
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