Irán y sus vecinos
Cable sobre el estilo de los iraníes negociando
En vísperas de la cuarta ronda de contactos entre los embajadores de Irán y EE UU en Irak, el embajador británico en Irán les informa sobre las tácticas de negociación de Irán
| ID: | 132234 |
| Date: | 2007-11-30 10:39:00 |
| Origin: | 07BAGHDAD3895 |
| Source: | Embassy Baghdad |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO1775 PP RUEHDIR DE RUEHGB #3895/01 3341039 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 301039Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4580 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003895 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON PLEASE PASS TO GAYLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2027 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, IR, IQ SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI NEGOTIATING STYLE, TACTICS BAGHDAD 00003895 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(C) UK Ambassador to Tehran Geoffrey Adams, in a series of meetings with U.S. Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I officials, outlined his recommendations on how to negotiate with Iranians. Ambassador Adams thought that Iran had several goals from talks with the U.S., both superficial and substantive. In negotiations, he advised being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking to engage and draw attention to mutual interests. He outlined Iran,s preconceptions and its obsession with and mistrust of the West, which, he said, can blind it to its interests. He warned that the Iranian participants would likely have very strict instructions what they could say and that it would be difficult to get them off script, though the element of surprise could work. Adams added that the Iranians would be very nervous of negative repercussions if they made a misstep, and they would likely report on each other. Answers to questions and proposals would more likely only come at follow-on meetings, and decision-making in Iran is slowed by the need for consensus, so patience is needed. That said, it was important to rid the Iranians of their standard notion that time was on their side. End summary 2.(C) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams offered advice in negotiating strategies with Iran in a series of meetings with U.S. officials and military officers in Baghdad November 24-25. The following is an amalgamation of three meetings, held in advance of the fourth round of Iran-Iraq-U.S. trilateral discussions on Iraq. Adams, who has served in Tehran for almost two years, said his observations were borne of much experience, to include a &master class8 when Iran captured at gunpoint 15 British Navy personnel in March 2007. British Ambassador to Kuwait Stuart Laing also joined the discussions, as well as British First Secretary in Tehran Alex Pinfield. Among those present on the U.S. side at various briefings were Ambassador Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries, MG Kevin Bergner, Special Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO Director Jillian Burns. The British ambassador,s views of Iran,s strategic interests and the internal political situation to be reported septel. 3.(C) Iranians, goal, in Adams, view, is to institutionalize talks with the U.S. and keep open the possibility of broadening the agenda. While he heard that the Iranians were disappointed in the &lack of substance8 in previous bilateral talks with the U.S, they felt they derived good publicity from participating. Adams predicted the Iranians will seek to keep them going both to engender their prestige and to keep tabs on what the USG is thinking. He also thought the talks had triggered a useful internal debate in how to make the best use of the talks and their strategic interests. Adams added that he believed there is a significant lobby in Iran against holding talks with the U.S. Assumptions --------------- 4.(C) In talks with Iranians, Ambassador Adams recommended being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking to engage. He stressed that Iranians are obsessed with the West and this obsession at times blinds them to their interests. In this light, the US side should be aware of the following preconceptions on the Iranian side: -- the USG seeks to remove the current regime and replace it with a pro-Western one. -- USG policymakers spend an inordinate amount of time and energy thinking about (and plotting against) Iran. As such, Iranians assume that everything we do or say has meaning and has been carefully thought out and coordinated, both internally and with the UK; there are no accidents. -- The current U.S. administration is politically very weak, facing major internal opposition, and as such, the threat of US military action against Iran is not realistic. -- Iran sees the U.S. as a tough, determined adversary that can be manipulated and wounded. Mistrust ---------- BAGHDAD 00003895 002.4 OF 003 5.(C) The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, when the international community was either silent or sided with Saddam (even when he used WMD against Iranians) must be kept in mind. Iranians mistrust the outside world, to include the very same Western powers and Sunni Arab states that are now seeking to ensure that pro-Iranian Shias do not dominate power in Iraq. Short Leash -------------- 6.(C) Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) government negotiators arrive with precise and detailed instructions from which they do not deviate, out of fear of professional repercussions. They will go through all their talking points. The USG should not expect substantive responses to questions or initiatives in real time. This problem can be obviated to an extent by scheduling &lots of breaks,8 allowing IRIG officials time to confer amongst themselves and to seek guidance via telephone from Tehran. However, given the fear of a misstep on the IRI side, the USG should not expect real engagement from the IRI outside of their instructions. Answers to questions and responses to suggestions are likely to come at follow-on meetings, although some questions never get answered. Preparation -------------- 7.(C) IRIG officials will likely prepare in detail for the talks. They may consult with Iranians with extensive experience with Americans, such as academics who have participated in Track Two talks or worked in the U.S. He also mentioned that the head of Iran,s Chamber of Commerce Mohammad Nahavandian is also perceived as a U.S. expert and is likely consulted. Adams doubted that Iran would seek advice in negotiating with Americans from other countries. Adams repeatedly said, &Iranians are not stupid,8 meaning they follow all the issues closely, even if they at times misread the signals. Slow Process ---------------- 8.(C) In light of the short leash negotiators have, plus the collaborative and multi-polar nature of IRI decision-making and the extreme sensitivity of the topic of direct USG-IRIG talks, the USG should not expect immediate &big steps.8 Any progress will be slow and come only after much deliberation and discussion in Iran, with push-back from those circles opposing talks. If the IRIG concludes that a policy shift is in their interests, it can do it and find a way to justify it, but will first have to achieve internal consensus. Stay Calm ------------ 9.(C) It is important with the Iranians not to lose one,s temper or show that one is upset. Trading accusations allows the IRIG to rely on a familiar script; far better is to ask unexpected questions that will take them &off-script.8 When asked how to best broach continued IRIG support of JAM splinter groups despite IRIG assurances to the Government of Iraq to stop the flow of weapons, Adams recommended keeping the tone matter-of-fact and raising issues in question form, i.e. &given your assurances that you are seeking to help Iraqi forces re-establish peace and security, how can we explain the ongoing training of JAM-related illegal combatants in Iran?8 Agenda --------- 10.(C) Don,t offer an agenda beforehand, otherwise the agenda itself will become subject to ongoing negotiations. Establish Mutual Interests ------------------------------- 11.(C) Seek to show a commonality or intersection of national interests that will justify Iran taking actions suggested by the USG. Prove to them that &if we fail in Iraq, they fail too.8 Draw them out on their contradictory tactics in order to spark debate within the IRIG. Assess what the Iranians want out of the talks, beyond their publicly stated position of wanting a timetable for a withdrawal of foreign troops. BAGHDAD 00003895 003 OF 003 Clock Ticking ----------------- 12.(C) IRIG interlocutors assume that time is on their side and hence default towards inaction. Convince them that now is the time to act, and that not doing so will hurt their interests and that the situation could get worse. In a related vein, the IRI must be convinced that the USG is prepared to stop dialogue (although not necessarily close the channel) if there is no progress. At the same time, realize internally that the negotiators cannot take a bold move without consultation, a reasonable degree of patience is required, and progress may take time. Put the Ball in Their Court -------------------------------- 13.(C) Ask a lot of questions, always put the ball back in their court. Doing so will encourage internal discussion and debate in Tehran, as well as put pressure on them to deviate from their prepared script. Wrong foot them by saying something unexpected to try to take them off script. Focus on accountability, asking for clarifications of actions that contradict their stated commitments. Keep your message clear, including redlines, and do not be too subtle. Weaknesses -------------- 14.(C) Despite their rhetoric, Iranians understand their weaknesses include a lack of allies and foreign investment. Publicity ---------- 15.(C) Iran is very sensitive to press coverage that makes them look weak. At the same time, the IRIG has a &high threshold for embarrassment8 when they are accused of illicit activities. After the talks, the IRIG will seek to present the exchange as &businesslike,8 with the US and Iran on equal footing, where the IRIG &gave nothing away.8 BUTENIS |
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