Las caricaturas de Mahoma
Cable sobre las relaciones entre Gobierno sirio y el islam
La Embajada de EEUU cree que el régimen de Damasco "juega" con los asuntos religiosos para apuntalarse
| ID: | 61494 |
| Date: | 2006-04-24 10:21:00 |
| Origin: | 06DAMASCUS1848 |
| Source: | Embassy Damascus |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 06DAMASCUS1157 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO2270 OO RUEHAG DE RUEHDM #1848/01 1141021 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 241021Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8496 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0020 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0089 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001848 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV, KISL, SY SUBJECT: SARG CONTINUES TO PLAY WITH ISLAMIC FIRE REF: A. DAMASCUS 1157 B. DAMASCUS 0531 C. 05 DAMASCUS 1231 D. 05 DAMASCUS 1377 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 1. (C) Summary: The SARG continues to play with the issue of Islam -- in the wake of its February use of mob violence against several European embassies -- in ways designed to shore up support for the regime. In the past month there have been numerous reports about regime outreach to the Islamic community, including presidential approval of a Sharia law faculty at Aleppo University, the licensing of three Islamic banks, and allowing for the first time a prominent Islamic figure to lecture at the Higher Military Academy in Damascus. While there were also SARG efforts during this period that pointed towards stepped-up measures to counter rising Islamist influence, including restrictions on activities permitted at mosques (announced and then quickly walked back) , the basic thrust of the policy was to manipulate Islamic elements to shore up the regime, as well as prevent former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood leader Sadreddine Bayanouni from developing any traction in the Sunni community. Although some contacts believe the regime is playing with fire, they assess that it sees itself under threat and is willing to take serious risks. While alarmist scenarios about the rising tide of Islamism may be true, the SARG seems for the time being to be successfully manipulating this Islam issue. End Summary. 2. (C) After an initial appeal to Syrian nationalism in the period between the release of the two Mehlis reports, the SARG gradually shifted to Islamic themes to mobilize support for the regime and counter the pressure created by the UNIIIC investigation. The SARG's February decision to manipulate the Danish cartoons controversy by permitting large demonstrations in front of European embassies led to rioting crowds that heavily damaged four embassies. That result offered Syria the opportunity to portray itself, internally and regionally, as the leading defender of Islam's dignity. 3. (C) RECENT SARG ISLAMIC OUTREACH: In the past month there has been a spate of reports about regime activity that seems designed to follow up in a quieter manner on this effort. Asad in mid-April signed a decree permitting the establishment of a Sharia (Islamic law) faculty at Aleppo University, a step the SARG reportedly avoided in the past over fears about powerful (Sunni) Islamist influence in Aleppo. The government also announced a decision, the first of its kind, to license three private Islamic banks (ref A). 4. (C) Also in early April, in an unprecedented move, the regime allowed a sheikh, moderate Islamist MP Mohammed Habash, to address the officers at the Higher Military Academy in Damascus, with the attendance of the Minister of Defense, as well as the Grand Mufti and other religious figures. In Habash's widely publicized remarks, he stated that (secular) Arab nationalism and Islam are consistent and should be used to form a common front to face the challenges of defending the country and the Arab homeland. He also called for a new political parties law that would permit the formation of Islamic parties. In the run-up to the mid-April celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the SARG and its proxies re-decorated the city of Damascus with a new set of official-looking banners accentuating religious themes, the first time in recent memory that such an organized display has taken place on this holiday. According to contacts, SARG officials pressured businessman and shopkeepers to put up the banners, which were also displayed at mosques and government buildings. (Note: Two weeks later, the banners remain prominently on display in the city's central market.) 5. (C) ALSO SOME SARG REPRESSION: It should be noted that there were also SARG efforts during this period that pointed, at least to some degree, in the opposite direction, towards stepped-up SARG efforts to counter rising Islamist influence. In March, for example, the head of the Damascus section of the Ministry of the Islamic Endowments (Awqaaf) issued a list of ten restrictions on activities at mosques, limiting the hours of operation to times of prayer, preventing any unauthorized speakers or activities, including the collection of donations, and requiring the lowering of the volume of loudspeakers used in the calls to prayer at dawn and in the afternoon. Most of this list was reportedly cobbled together DAMASCUS 00001848 002 OF 003 from previous restrictions the SARG had issued over the years, through the Awqaaf Ministry, that had not been uniformly enforced. 6. (C) ISLAMIC LEADERS PROTEST: In reaction to this measure, the regime-tolerant Sunni Islamic establishment protested angrily to their friends inside the regime -- including senior officials in the security services -- at what they viewed as an unnecessary, clumsy effort to rein them in. Sheikh Salah Kuftaro, head of the influential Abu Noor Institute, told Polchief that he had protested against the newly issued restrictions, which he dubbed the "Ten Commandments," to the Damascus chief of Syrian Military Intelligence after the Minister of the Awqaaf indicated reluctance to rescind the directive. Kuftaro told Polchief he had received a commitment from his contacts in the intelligence services that the directive "had been frozen," but not rescinded. (Comment: Some conspiratorial-minded observers insist the regime deliberately had the Awqaaf put out the list of restrictions so that it could then show its good will towards the Islamic community by agreeing to disregard its own rules. The evidence, however, points to the somewhat messier process detailed above.) 7. (C) A COMPLICATED DYNAMIC: This push-pull dynamic, with the regime encouraging "moderate" Islamists on the one hand, while repressing what it perceives to be a threatening Islamist minority (and threatening Islamic aspects in general) on the other, is not new (refs B, C, and D). The Asad regime has practiced some version of it since the early 1980's -- after it violently suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood -- as a way to woo back the Sunni community, while preventing the development of any Islamist political competition. This dynamic has always been reflected in a messy process on the ground, with sometimes overzealous SARG officials repressing too much or in the wrong places, followed by push-back from the Islamic establishment, and an adjustment by the regime. According to astute regime observer Ayman Abdul Noor, a Ba'athist reformer, this has occurred at key junctures like the present moment, when senior regime figures "who are in the picture," know and understand the policy of manipulating and using the Islamists to shore up the regime, while the mass of lower-level officials continue with enforcing the standard policy of "reining in the Islamic crowd." 8. (C) REGIME PLAYING WITH FIRE: Overall, despite some contradictions, it seems evident that the regime is reaching out once again to the Sunni Islamic community with various initiatives and adopting some elements of an Islamic populism to shore up support. According to gadfly economist and former deputy minister of planning Riad Abrash, the regime has calculated now that Arab nationalist interests "are identical" with the Islamic population's desire, both in Syria and the region, to oppose the U.S. In his view, the regime "is getting closer to the view of people on the street" in order to retain its popularity. The regime recognizes the powerful hold that Islam has on the masses, said Abrash. He acknowledged that the regime "is playing with fire," but noted "they want to survive. They feel threatened, so it makes sense to take dangerous steps." 9. (C) ONLY WEAK FELLOW PLAYERS ALLOWED: Despite the willingness to take risks with Islam now, the regime wants to ensure that it controls the game and manipulates all the players, for its own interests. For that reason, the Asad regime is not willing to make any deal with the Muslim Brothers even if it might bring more Sunni support for the regime. "They want to play with the religious issue themselves. They don't want to cede it to potential competitors," explained Abrash. 10. (C) REGIME MOTIVATIONS: Other observers agree that international pressure on the regime over the past year has put it on the defensive. According to dissident Yassin Haj Saleh, the regime is "relatively relaxed" in the short term (prior to the June release of Brammertz's second report), but in the longer term, "sees itself in a life-threatening struggle with the U.S.," which makes it willing to ally itself closely with Iran, for example, and to curry favor with Islamists in Syria. The regime has made sure to champion the Palestinian cause (through its support of Hamas), as well as that of Hizballah, and has been sufficiently supportive of the insurgency in Iraq over the past few years, all to ensure, according to Abdul Noor, that DAMASCUS 00001848 003 OF 003 Islamists "have no political case to take to the street and attack the regime." The SARG also seems motivated by the desire to prevent former VP Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood leader Bayanouni, with their National Salvation Front, from developing any traction in the Sunni community. Finally, unidentified Ba'ath Party officials, echoing Habash's moderate Islamist view, have noted in the press recently that there is room for dialogue between secular Ba'athists and moderate Islamists, while such dialogue with Islamic radicals is impossible. 11. (C) WEAKNESSES OF THE APPROACH: Saleh and others identify several weaknesses in the SARG approach. According to Saleh, Syria needs a moderate Islamic political party, which would force the Islamists to deal responsibly with political issues. "It can't be avoided, but the regime wants to jump over this step." The regime prefers an Islamic establishment dependent on it for favors and subservient to its politics, rather than "a free-thinking, independent group." Consequently the SARG is willing to accept -- its policies in fact actually end up encouraging -- close-minded, very conservative Islamic institutions, as long as they are subservient to the regime. This phenomenon, however, causes some Islamic elements to become more radical and extreme in the longer term, as a way to attack the co-optation, insisted Saleh. 12. (C) In addition, the overall "street power" of Islam is increasing by the day in Syria, according to Damascus-based al-Hayat correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi. In his view, the regime's tactics already betray a nervousness and defensiveness in the way it addresses Islamic issues. According to Hamidi, the rising tide of Islamism in Syria is likely eventually to overwhelm the regime and its secular orientation. As an example of the rising tide of Islamic religious fervor which the regime is nervously observing and trying to control, he pointed to relatively new women's Islamic movement in Syria, the Qubasyat, with thousands of adherents (see septel). 13. (C) COMMENT: While alarmist scenarios about the future rising tide of Islamism may be true, the SARG seems for the time being to be successfully manipulating this Islam issue, occasionally blending in some populist aspects. The regime is well-positioned politically because of its championing of Islamic political causes such as those of Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran, and has adopted a sufficiently nuanced policy on Iraq to immunize it against criticism that it is helping suppress an Islamic insurgency. Nevertheless, some Sunni leaders tell us that the regime's attempts to manipulate the Islam issue are not credible and that people are not taken in by it. Where the SARG has been effective is in keeping Islamic leaders in Syria under its wing, supported and politically muzzled. The more populist touches seem designed to drown out the unwelcome noise coming from the Brammertz investigation and -- in tandem with appeals to Syrian nationalism -- to persuade Syrians that it is not the regime (and Asad family) under attack but the country and the Islamic nation. SECHE |
Traduce este documento »
Traducción automática. Puede que el texto traducido no sea fiel al original
Tu suscripción se está usando en otro dispositivo
¿Quieres añadir otro usuario a tu suscripción?
Si continúas leyendo en este dispositivo, no se podrá leer en el otro.
FlechaTu suscripción se está usando en otro dispositivo y solo puedes acceder a EL PAÍS desde un dispositivo a la vez.
Si quieres compartir tu cuenta, cambia tu suscripción a la modalidad Premium, así podrás añadir otro usuario. Cada uno accederá con su propia cuenta de email, lo que os permitirá personalizar vuestra experiencia en EL PAÍS.
En el caso de no saber quién está usando tu cuenta, te recomendamos cambiar tu contraseña aquí.
Si decides continuar compartiendo tu cuenta, este mensaje se mostrará en tu dispositivo y en el de la otra persona que está usando tu cuenta de forma indefinida, afectando a tu experiencia de lectura. Puedes consultar aquí los términos y condiciones de la suscripción digital.
