Cable sobre el papel de la élite empresarial como motor del cambio en Siria
La Embajada en Damasco duda de la capacidad de la oposición para llevar el cambio al país.
| ID: | 210261 |
| Date: | 2009-06-04 17:30:00 |
| Origin: | 09DAMASCUS390 |
| Source: | Embassy Damascus |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 09DAMASCUS335 09DAMASCUS342 09DAMASCUS377 |
| Destination: | O 041730Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6442 INFO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0171 NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY |
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000390 NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR MITCHELL; NEA FOR FELTMAN; NEA/ELA FOR MONZ AND SHAMPAINE; NSC FOR SHAPIRO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 TAGS: PREL, PTER, KWBG, MOPS, IS, IZ, LE, SY SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL TO DAMASCUS REF: A. DAMASCUS 342 B. DAMASCUS 335 C. DAMASCUS 377 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1.(S/NF) SUMMARY: Special Envoy Mitchell, Embassy Damascus is looking forward to your prospective visit. In your initial meeting, it is unlikely that the Syrians will put forward any new ideas. They will rely on your team to present ideas that they can consider and possibly negotiate. Asad and his FM Walid al-Muallim will undoubtedly recount that Syria and Israel were "words away" from a deal in late December. The details of the story often change, however, in the retelling. In the wake of President Obama's speech, the Syrians will be testing you to see if the USG is sincere in its position against Israeli settlement growth. 2.(S/NF) Successive generations of Syrians have been raised around the core principal that Syria is threatened by Israel. There is endemic skepticism in Syria that a return of the Golan will ever be possible. There is little objective discussion of what peace would entail. A failure to prepare the public for possible concessions could prove a vulnerability on the Syrian side. The security establishment which keeps Asad in power presently could conceivably be threatened by the absence of war. 3.(S/NF) The Arab street continues to view Asad as the only Arab leader to oppose Israel's actions and support the resistance in an unambiguous way. Asad's credentials on this point were strengthened immeasurably by Israel's operation in Gaza. Iran has played Syria well in this regard, and it may be too late to extract Syria from the Iran-Hizbollah defense relationship. On Palestine, SARG officials have not demonstrated a significant understanding of the ins and outs of PA-PLO relations. Asad and Muallim will tout Hamas's electoral credentials and will criticize Abu Mazen as a weak leader, for example, but will be unable to engage in a detailed discussion on why Hamas ought to join the PLO (a notion which they support). It appears less likely now that the SARG can expel Hamas, particularly as Hamas enjoys warm relations with key Syrian allies Iran, Turkey and Qatar. 4.(S/NF) State-owned and controlled Syrian media will give your visit maximum play, billing it as confirmation of Syria's importance as a regional player, as recognition of Syria's indispensable role in any future peace settlement, and as the final nail in the coffin of the isolation imposed on Asad by the former U.S. Administration. Syria media may try to contrast your visit with that of FPOTUS Carter, who departs Syria on June 12. They could portray your visit as USG "official" outreach, and Carter's visit -- which is likely to include a meeting with Hamas leader Meshaal -- as USG "unofficial" outreach. 5.(S/NF) Syrians have been hit by the global economic slowdown, SARG cuts in fuel and other subsidies, and soaring inflation. The general negative state of the Syrian economy translates into more pressure on the SARG to address the issue of U.S. sanctions. Asad is desperate to increase foreign direct investment, and this goal is hampered by the stigmatization that accompanies U.S. sanctions policy. Syria's private banking sector -- which is growing in both size and importance -- is harmed when foreign banks decline correspondent banking relationships for fear of running afoul of U.S. law. Syrian civil aviation has been severely impacted by provisions of the Syria Accountability Act. With the Syrian Air fleet atrophied from 16 to just four aircraft, SARG officials are desperate to obtain U.S.-made spare parts for their aging planes. END SUMMARY. -------------- What to expect -------------- 6.(S/NF) After just three months of re-engagement efforts between the U.S. and Syria, the SARG decided they were unhappy with the level and scope of our engagement. Perhaps stung that the steps they hoped for from us (return of a U.S. ambassador, your visit, high level contacts) appeared to be delayed until after Lebanon's June 7 elections, the SARG conveyed its unhappiness during the May 7 visit of A A/S Feltman and NSC Director Shapiro (refs A, B) and then even more explicitly during the May 28 visit of CODEL Kaufman. "The U.S. approach and methodology are wrong," Syrian President Bashar Asad told Senator Kaufman (ref C). Asad went on to make a veiled pitch that you represent the U.S. side in our bilateral re-engagement efforts as well as on comprehensive peace efforts. The Syrians will want to talk to you about the "political umbrella" for potential bilateral cooperation as well as a "road map" (their term) that lays out a formal understanding and sequencing of forward movement on the U.S.-Syria relationship. Underlying these efforts is the SARG's lingering resentment over its treatment by the Bush Administration and its fears that the Obama Administration will ultimately mete out similar treatment. Although Asad often tells visitors that bilateral relationships are based on a calculation of interests and not trust, the SARG at present is looking for evidence it can trust the U.S. on both the big issues and the small ones. Your visit, for them, represents a significant step in restoring a normal relationship. Another important step is a U.S. decision to return an ambassador to Damascus; they will hope you come armed with good news on that issue. 7.(S/NF) The SARG's focus on the bilateral relationship is based on the regime's hunger for respect from the U.S. and an acknowledgment from the Obama Administration of the legitimacy of the regime. On a bilateral level, we have few national interests to pursue in Syria; it is Syria's centrality to regional issues that makes it necessary for us to deal constructively with the SARG. Sanctions, dating from 1979 and culminating in the 2004 Syria Accountability Act, enforce a highly restricted framework for trade and generally cast a pall over relations. During the Bush Administration, Syria kept its ambassador in Washington despite the lack of access to administration officials. The U.S. pulled out the American ambassador in 2005 after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri; the withdrawal of the ambassador sparked the Syrians into taking a series of measures harassing embassy operations. The alleged U.S. raid on Abu Kamal in October 2008 ultimately led to the late 2008 closing of the Damascus Community School, the Cultural Center, and the Language Center. Discussions of the bilateral relationship, therefore, generally revolve around sanctions and the Syrians' desire for some alleviation, and the operational constraints placed on Embassy Damascus. While SARG intentions remain murky, it seems likely the push for a "road map" is meant to raise the discussion to a higher level, but one that will inescapably involve issues related to Iraq, Lebanon, and Middle East Peace. ------------------ Arab Israeli Peace ------------------ 8.(S/NF) It is unlikely the SARG will put forward new ideas in your first meeting. For Asad, given his skepticism over Israeli intentions, the overriding significance of this initial meeting is recognition of Syria's regional importance and the implicit U.S. acknowledgment of regime legitimacy. Asad, his FM Walid al-Muallim and Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban will almost certainly rely on your team to present ideas they can then consider and react to. It seems increasingly certain they will assess interactions on the comprehensive peace effort within the context of their calculations on the U.S.-Syrian bilateral relationship, a development that may greatly complicate our efforts. They will want to hear in detail about our position vis-a-vis Israel (although they may not ask for it directly) so they can assess whether the Obama Administration is sincere in its apparent position against Israeli settlement growth. Even if they are satisfied on that point, they will complain that the USG approach is not strong enough. All problems in the region, in the Syrian view, stem from Israeli behavior and can only be resolved through changes in Israeli behavior. 9.(S/NF) President Asad has been in the waiting mode on the Syria-Israel track since October 2008, when the Israeli government entered into a protracted campaign/elections/government formation process. Except for late December, when the Turks unsuccessfully attempted to broker agreement on the broad outlines of a deal, Asad has been able to sit back and wait for the new Israeli government to develop a position. With GOI PM Netanyahu now in place and making statements, Asad claims he does not see an Israeli partner. Asad has taken no first steps, offered no initiatives, and has risked nothing since the indirect talks were suspended. Israel's Gaza operation at first threatened, then later strengthened Asad in his comfort zone. Initially embarrassed that he'd been negotiating, even indirectly, with Israel, Asad later turned waves of Arab outrage over the treatment of Palestinian civilians to his benefit. As the self-modeled Arab center of support for the "resistance," Asad found himself both responding to and shaping regional public opinion. The Arab street generally continues to view Asad as the only Arab leader to oppose Israel's actions and support the resistance in a vigorous, unambiguous way. 10.(S/NF) Though Asad may dream of being the leader who returns the Golan to Syria, there is endemic skepticism here that such a deal will ever be possible. The Syrians are generally negative in outlook on this point, and successive generations have been raised around the core principle that Syria is threatened by Israel. The ethos that binds the country together is essentially resistance to Israel. There is little objective discussion of what peace would entail, particularly in terms of potential concessions. There are fundamental contradictions for the Syrians in the pursuit of peace with Israel: a failure to prepare the Syrian public for the inevitability of concessions could ultimately threaten the acclaim Asad anticipates from the return of the Golan. Additionally, the vested interests of the Syrian security establishment would conceivably be the first to be threatened by the absence of a state of war; that same security establishment is what keeps Bashar in power now. 11.(S/NF) Asad and Muallim will want to tell the story again of how close they were to a deal in late December when Olmert was in Ankara and Muallim was on the phone, trying to reach consensus on the phrase dealing with the "terms of reference" or "issues related" to going to direct talks. The Syrians insisted that the June 4 line be the "terms of reference" while the GOI sought to avoid being pinned down. Even after telling the story so many times, however, there are still inconsistencies in the Syrian presentation. Sometimes they talk about six points, sometimes three. Sometimes there are six geographical coordinates or there are three geocoordinates and three narrative points of policy. The Syrians also claim to have deposited with the Turks narrative responses to six questions from the Israelis dealing with security arrangements. If the Syrian responses on Hamas and Hizbollah are similar to their routine presentations, those answers are not as constructive as the Syrians claim. ------------------------- Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran ------------------------- 12.(S/NF) The notion of resistance has been elevated in Syria from pragmatism to theology in the last year, with an enormous boost coming as a result of the Gaza operation. This trend strengthens the hands of Hamas and Hizbollah vis-a-vis the SARG, thanks in part to a Syrian propaganda effort that has glorified the resistance activities of two groups which are otherwise antithetical to the SARG's secular orientation. The SARG's relationship with Hizbollah has morphed from a patron-client relationship to one of near equals; the addition of Iran to their security alliance further constricts Bashar's flexibility in dealing with Hizbollah. SARG officials insist "Syria is not in the pocket of anyone, including Iran" and point to increasingly warm relations with Turkey as a counter-balance to the Iran relationship. SARG protestations notwithstanding, the degree of security cooperation among Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah has created a defense relationship from which Syria will not easily be able to extract itself. Hamas escaped any serious criticism from the SARG for its poor performance during the Gaza conflict and, despite rumors that Hamas chief Khalid Meshaal's high profile annoys Bashar, there has been no noticeable SARG effort to clip Meshaal's wings. The SARG is uneasy with Hamas's Muslim Brotherhood affiliations but claims its resistance mission takes priority. Hamas is probably proselytizing in Palestinian refugee camps here. Concerned about Fatah al-Islam and rogue Al-Qaeda (AQI) elements (not those AQI elements whom they have coopted as part of the foreign fighter network facilitation), the SARG may have insufficient resources to also keep Hamas under control. It appears less likely that the SARG can expel Hamas now, particularly as Hamas also enjoys warm relations with Syria's key allies Iran, Turkey, and Qatar. In fact, it seems the SARG is actually open to a reconciliation with its own Muslim Brotherhood movement -- a move that comes largely at the behest of Turkey. Hamas seems to be less of a card to play and more of a permanent guest. ----- Media ----- 13.(SBU) Syrian media coverage of the possibility of your visit has been muted and confined to private daily al-Watan and websites. Syrian media, which are largely state-owned and completely state-controlled, will give maximum play to an actual visit. They will bill it as confirmation of Syria's importance as a regional player, as recognition of Syria's indispensable role in any future peace settlement, and as the final nail in the coffin of the isolation imposed on Asad by the former U.S. Administration. As the visit comes on the heels of a June 10-12 FPOTUS Carter visit, Syrian media may seek to cast your visit as our official outreach to the SARG and Carter's visit (and his expected meeting with Hamas chief Meshaal) as our unofficial outreach. The SARG could also use Carter's visit to highlight and criticize our continued refusal to officially engage with Hamas. The tone of coverage is likely to be colored by the tenor of the meeting itself. We expect coverage to be positive, but judging from past practice, it may be accompanied by a subsequent public statement or interview by Asad on the importance of "resistance" to mollify the Iranians. --------- Sanctions --------- 14.(C) Five years of U.S. sanctions have hurt the Syrian economy, although they have not hurt the average Syrian's standard of living. The sanctions' greatest overall impact is the deterrent effect they have had on foreign direct investment (FDI), coming at a time when Syria is less able to meet its own needs. U.S. trade sanctions implemented under the Syria Accountability Act (SAA) have severely restricted the national air carrier's ability to obtain spare parts and have prevented it from purchasing new aircraft. Sanctions have atrophied Syrian Air's fleet from 16 to just four aircraft, have grounded the SARG's VIP aircraft, and have hampered Asad's cousin's (Specially Designated National Rami Makhlouf) attempts to launch a private airline. The U.S. Treasury Department sanction against the Commercial Bank of Syria has stigmatized Syria's entire financial sector, to include the nascent private banks, as most U.S. and European financial institutions have cut off correspondent relationships with all Syrian banks. Reformers and businessmen argue U.S. sanctions have actually retarded the SARG's liberalization of the economy ) and (they claim) the political liberalization that would eventually follow ) while strengthening regime hard-liners who use sanctions as ammunition against greater engagement with the U.S. 15.(C) The Syrians find the Administration's decision last month to renew sanctions under the SAA as problematic and ill-timed. Syrian Ambassador in Washington Imad Moustapha told media the renewal was proof the USG can still be "captive to Israeli interests." In meetings with previous Congressional and other VIP delegations, the SARG had refrained from raising the SAA and sanctions issues, generally. However, in Asad's most recent meeting with Senator Kaufman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Asad raised the issue directly, asking (rhetorically) whether the U.S. was interested in working with the Syrians to remove sanctions "obstacles" from the bilateral relationship (ref C). The Department's report on Syria's progress in meeting the conditions contained in the SAA is due to Congress on June 12 -- coinciding with your visit. ------------------------ Syria's changing economy ------------------------ 16.(C) Asad has presided over significant changes in economic policy that were primarily driven by Syria's diminishing oil reserves -- long the regime's primary source of revenue -- and its decreasing influence over the Lebanese economy. The most significant reforms so far include liberalizing Syria's trade regime to authorize the direct import of most consumer goods, re-introducing private banking into the financial sector, and cutting government subsidies on refined petroleum products. The reform program has exposed political fissures between the generally pro-Western, pro-reform private sector and the Ba'ath Party, who fear the reforms threaten the system of patronage and corruption that has sustained their dominant socio-economic position and might lead to irreversible political freedoms that could bring down the regime. While Bashar manages to remain above the fray of day-to-day economic debates, his supporters say he is simply pursuing the "China model" of economic development while maintaining firm political control. 17.(C) While unlikely to threaten regime stability in the short-term, Syria's most acute economic problems must eventually be addressed to maintain the state's long-term viability. Syria's burgeoning population suffers from an estimated 25-30% unemployment rate, with some 35% of the workforce employed by the public sector. Inflation is rampant in Syria; even upper-middle class Syrians are having trouble putting food on the table and paying rising utility and fuel bills. The true rate of inflation, which we estimated at over 30 percent in 2008, is never acknowledged by the Syrian government. According to the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdallah al-Dardari, however, the average Syrian is spending 42 percent of his income on food. 18.(C) Increasing demand for energy, water and transportation is straining Syria's antiquated infrastructure, and Syrians have grown accustomed to year-round water rationing and seasonal power rationing. The SARG is counting on FDI to make up for decreasing oil revenues (which dropped by 8.7 percent in 2007, according to the SARG) and to develop critical infrastructure, although Syria's endemic corruption ) as well as U.S. sanctions ) act as a deterrent to FDI. The regime believes Syria can leverage its geographical location to reap economic benefits from increased trade between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Europe, particularly by exporting Iraqi oil and gas through Syria to the European market. The SARG hopes to leverage its relations with Turkey and Iran to improve its water, natural gas and electrical supplies by physically connecting the necessary pipelines and grid networks. (Note: Though not contiguous with Iran, the SARG is working with Iran and Turkey on possible construction of a pumping station to bring water from the Tigris to Turkey, Syria and Iraq. End note.) 19.(C) The global financial crisis is affecting Syria indirectly, as Syria's large expatriate population sends decreased remittances, GCC investors -- who constitute the greatest contributors to Syria's FDI -- have put some projects on indefinite hold, and exporters of manufactured goods -- particularly textiles -- have seen demand for their products drop by 50 percent or more. The Office of the Prime Minister has commissioned a group of high-profile economists to analyze the effect of a prospective mass-repatriation of Syrian workers from abroad on the Syrian economy and social stability. (Note: The prospective repatriation would include both laborers and white-collar workers. End note.) ------------ Human Rights ------------ 20.(C/NF) The SARG continues to be deeply suspicious of human rights and civil society activists. All political parties that do not participate within the National Progressive Front, of which the Ba,ath Party is the leading member, are illegal. The SARG finds any dissent directed at the regime's legitimacy, including more general calls for "democratic reform," to be intolerable. The government has been swift to detain, prosecute, and imprison oppositionist leaders. Democratic reformers perceived to be colluding with foreign powers are subject to especially harsh reprisals, as in the case of the activist Kamal Labwani who, after an international tour that included meetings with Bush White House officials, was sentenced to 18 years in prison for plotting against the regime. (He remains incarcerated.) Human rights activists who are able to refrain from political attacks are generally given more leeway. Lawyers for human rights activists who do not engage in overt political criticism remain under serious SARG scrutiny and suffer harassment, but they are rarely incarcerated. 21.(C/NF) When addressing human rights and political detentions with CODELs and other visiting VIPs, President Asad has consistently maintained the following: (1) SARG actions are justified on the grounds of national security and/or the detained individuals criminality; (2) the issue is an internal one -- Syria does not meddle in other nations' internal affairs, nor should other nations meddle in Syria's; and (3) there can be no conversation about human rights without including the Israeli treatment of Palestinians, especially the recent military action in Gaza. ----------------- Refugee Situation ----------------- 22.(C) Syria has an interest in inflating the numbers of Iraqi refugees to gain additional assistance and credit for the burdens they are bearing, and occasionally raise this issue with visiting delegations. Though the SARG reports that Iraqi refugees number 1.2 million, diplomatic and intelligence sources suggest a number at most half this size. While the SARG might complain bitterly about the lack of support provided by the U.S. on this issue, in truth the U.S. has contributed approximately $200 million since FY07 (a mix of contributions to NGOs and to U.N. organizations) to support and assist Iraqis in Syria and the local impoverished Syrian population. Iraqi refugees are becoming increasingly vulnerable -- and more reliant on humanitarian aid -- as they deplete available resources and are unable to work legally. Syria also hosts some 400,000 Palestinian refugees, the descendants of Palestinians who fled Israel in 1948. UNRWA provides health, education, and social services. The Palestinians, in contrast to the Iraqi refugees, enjoy most of the rights of Syrian citizens. ------------------- Nuclear Aspirations ------------------- 23.(C) Concerns linger over Syria's presumed intent to establish a covert nuclear weapons program. Syria allowed an IAEA inspection team to examine the al-Kibar site in June 2008. The SARG claims that soil samples that yielded traces of enriched uranium were the result of Israeli bombs containing depleted uranium. The IAEA has sought follow-up visits to Damascus, to no end. Meanwhile, the Syrians have waged a somewhat successful campaign within the IAEA for preliminary assistance in establishing a civil nuclear program, securing a Board of Governor's (BOG) decision to move forward with technical cooperation. The Syrians read the BOG decision as a sign they can continue to evade IAEA requests for further inspections. We seek to convince them that cooperation with the IAEA offers a choice preferable to following the Iranian model of non-cooperation. CONNELLY NNNN End Cable Text |
Traduce este documento »
Traducción automática. Puede que el texto traducido no sea fiel al original
Tu suscripción se está usando en otro dispositivo
¿Quieres añadir otro usuario a tu suscripción?
Si continúas leyendo en este dispositivo, no se podrá leer en el otro.
FlechaTu suscripción se está usando en otro dispositivo y solo puedes acceder a EL PAÍS desde un dispositivo a la vez.
Si quieres compartir tu cuenta, cambia tu suscripción a la modalidad Premium, así podrás añadir otro usuario. Cada uno accederá con su propia cuenta de email, lo que os permitirá personalizar vuestra experiencia en EL PAÍS.
En el caso de no saber quién está usando tu cuenta, te recomendamos cambiar tu contraseña aquí.
Si decides continuar compartiendo tu cuenta, este mensaje se mostrará en tu dispositivo y en el de la otra persona que está usando tu cuenta de forma indefinida, afectando a tu experiencia de lectura. Puedes consultar aquí los términos y condiciones de la suscripción digital.
