Irán y sus vecinos
Cable sobre la venta de bombas antibúnker
En 2009 funcionarios israelíes y estadounidenses acuerdan que la venta se haga sigilosamente para que no se acuse a EE UU de ayudar a Israel en su ataque a Irán
| ID: | 235359 |
| Date: | 2009-11-18 14:30:00 |
| Origin: | 09TELAVIV2500 |
| Source: | Embassy Tel Aviv |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Dunno: | |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO1498 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHTV #2500/01 3221430 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 181430Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4258 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002500 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, CH, IR, RU, SA, LE, TU, IS SUBJECT: 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE SESSION (PART 1 OF 4) Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (S) Summary: During the Executive Session of the 40th Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and Israeli counterparts continued discussion on the creation of four new Qualitative Military Edge (QME) working groups. GOI interlocutors continued to raise concerns regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed that continued pressure be applied to Iran, especially following the disclosure of the nuclear facility in Qom. GOI participants expressed concern regarding Chinese and Russian cooperation with respect to enhanced Iranian sanctions. The GOI also raised dual citizenship concerns with respect to access to sensitive technology, and noted from its perspective Turkey's disturbing change of course toward Syria and Iran -- and away from Israel. This is the first in four cables (septels) reporting on the JPMG. End summary. 2. (SBU) Israeli Participants: -- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director General -- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military Chief -- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense Attache to the United States -- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York -- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs -- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5 -- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau -- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General U.S. Participants: -- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs -- Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv -- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense -- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff -- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian Affairs, NSC -- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs -- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Qualitative Military Edge ------------------------- 3. (S) The Executive Session continued discussion from the September 30 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) meeting in Washington. Both sides presented their primary points of contact for the four newly proposed working groups focusing on previous agreements, mitigation measures for the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and intelligence/policy. Agreement was reached to begin working on the details of each working group's meeting schedule and timeline. 4. (S) The GOI continued to express concern over the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. U.S. participants noted that the USG is unable to provide more detailed information about the sale until Saudi Arabia officially sends a Letter of Request (LOR). The GOI expressed additional concerns about stationing these new aircraft at Tabuk airfield in the northwest corner of Saudi Arabia -- close to the Israeli border. U.S. participants stated the USG understanding that this should not be an issue, as the Saudis are considering stationing new Typhoon aircraft at Tabuk. The GOI also raised AMRAAM sales to Jordan; U.S. participants explained that the new C-7 AMRAAM is an export version with capabilities similar to the C-5 version -- and therefore provides little to no increase in capabilities. Iran, China and Russia ---------------------- 5. (S) Both sides expressed concern over the recent revelation regarding Iran's nuclear facility at Qom, and agreed that increased pressure should be applied directly and internationally against Iran in order to better determine Tehran's motives and next steps. Both sides agreed that the facility at Qom should be inspected immediately. One member of the Israeli delegation expressed the opinion that some consideration be given to "shutting Qom operations down completely" to prevent further progress on obtaining a nuclear weapon. That said, the GOI argued that the international community not become bogged down on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and Qom, thereby diverting focus from TEL AVIV 00002500 002 OF 002 the bigger issue of Iran's nuclear program. 6. (S) Several questions were raised about China's position on Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Both sides agreed that continued engagement with China and Russia is needed -- as well as building a consensus in Europe. The USG speculated, and the GOI concurred, that China will follow Moscow's lead. USG participants argued that China would seek to avoid an international confrontation over Iran. The GOI described 2010 as a critical year -- if the Iranians continue to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then discussed the upcoming delivery of GBU-28 bunker busting bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled quietly to avoid any allegations that the USG is helping Israel prepare for a strike against Iran. 7. (S) The GOI made the case for "crippling sanctions"; cooperation between the United States, Europe, Russia and China will be necessary in order for these sanctions to be effective. U.S. participants stressed the USG position that any discussions with Iran on this subject be finite; the USG will continue to monitor whether negotiations are making progress. The GOI stated that it is not convinced the Iranians will negotiate in good faith unless there are visible and clear threats. U.S. delegation members described eight lanes of sanctions, and outlined a plan to "pivot to apply appropriate pressure" on those points and tracks that have the most impact. U.S. participants concurred that 2010 is a critical year -- but the continued application of pressure is vital. 8. (S) Regarding Russia, the GOI was not confident that Moscow will be helpful in any Iranian sanctions effort -- GOI participants opined that Russia is considered a "mystery" with respect to their views on Iran. The GOI raised the Russian S-300 sale to Iran, noting that the transfer is still pending. GOI participants argued that Moscow seeks a return to superpower status, but there are contradictory trends regarding Russia's internal condition. Dual Citizenship Issues ----------------------- 9. (S) The GOI raised the issue of dual citizenship within the context of access to sensitive technology. U.S. participants acknowledged Israeli concerns, noting that the issue is being worked at the highest levels of the USG to reach consensus on how to proceed. The GOI recommended obtaining a waiver similar to the relationship from which Canada or Australia benefit. Turkey ------ 10. (S) The GOI raised the current direction the Government of Turkey has taken toward Syria and Iran -- and away from Israel. Israeli participants argued that Turkey has been supportive of Hamas in Gaza while pursuing a more "Islamic" direction with the goal of becoming a regional superpower. The GOI argued that the Turkish military is losing its ability to influence government decisions and strategic direction. After this past year, GOI participants said they have a "bad feeling" about Turkey. The GOI noted that the Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander in the past wanted to speak to the Turkish Air Force Commander, but his Turkish counterpart declined. 11. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable. CUNNINGHAM |
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