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Cable sobre el grupo terrorista Lashkar-e-Tayba

La Secretaría de Estado envía un telegrama a la Embajada en Islamabad con los motivos por los que Lashkar-e-Tayba sigue siendo un grupo terrorista según la resolución 1267 de la ONU

ID: 220186
Date: 2009-08-10 23:56:00
Origin: 09STATE83026
Source: Secretary of State
Classification: SECRET
Dunno: 09STATE65044
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3026 2230014
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 102356Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC 0000

S E C R E T STATE 083026

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO PAKISTAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS: EFIN, KTFN, PREL, PTER, UNSC
SUBJECT: UN 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN) SANCTIONS: USG
OPPOSITION TO FOCAL POINT DE-LISTING REQUEST FOR JUD AND
HAFIZ SAEED

REF: STATE 65044

Classified By: IO Assistant Secretary Esther Brimmer
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-6.

----------------------
SUMMARY AND OBJECTIVES
----------------------
2. (SBU) In May 2009, legal representatives for 1267-listed
entity Jamaat-ud-Dawah (identified by the UN 1267 Committee
as an alias for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, permanent reference number
QE.L.118.05) and its leader, Muhammad Saeed (permanent
reference number QI.S.263.08) petitioned on their clients
behalf for delisting via the UN focal point. The focal
point, which was established in the UN Secretariat pursuant
to UNSCR 1730 to allow listed individuals/entities (or their
representatives) to petition directly for de-listing,
forwarded the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Saeed
for review to the USG (designating state) and to the
Government of Pakistan (state of
citizenship/residence/incorporation). The USG and GOP have
had three months to review the de-listing petition. We have
completed our review and plan to notify the UN focal point on
August 25 of our opposition to de-listing. Before doing so,
we would like to take this opportunity to:
-- share the results of our review of the de-listing petition
for JUD and Muhammad Saeed with Pakistani officials;
-- seek GOP views on the request;
-- underscore our ongoing concern over the threat posed by
LeT/JUD and Saeed;
-- ask Pakistani officials to update us on actions taken to
impose UN 1267 sanctions on LeT/JUD and Saeed.

----------
BACKGROUND
----------
3. (S) On December 10, 2008, the UN 1267 Committee took
several actions related to the terrorist group
Lashkar-e-Tayibba (LeT), including its listing of
Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD) as an alias for LeT, as well as the
listing of JUD's leader, Muhammad Saeed. The Committee in
2005 added LeT to its Consolidated List citing its
affiliation with al-Qaida. The addition of the JUD alias, as
well as the listing of Saeed, followed closely on the heels
of the LeT-perpetrated attacks in Mumbai, India, in November
2008. Prior to the attacks, our request to list JUD and Saeed
were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan. In
spite of Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December
2008, we continue to see reporting indicating that JUD is
still operating in multiple locations in Pakistan, and that
the group continues to openly raise funds. It is unclear
what, if any, steps the GOP has taken to freeze JUD's assets
or otherwise implement UN 1267 sanctions, which include an
asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
4. (SBU) USUN is requested to inform the focal point on
August 25, after both USUN and Islamabad have had a chance to
inform Pakistani officials of our views, of our opposition to
the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Muhammad Saeed.
In its communication to the focal point, USUN should refute
the assertion in Saeed's and his legal representatives claim
in the focal point de-listing petition that "there are no
grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated List
and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless" and
note that we stand by the information included in the
statements of case we submitted (co-sponsored by the UK and
France) to the UN 1267 Committee to add JUD and Saeed to the
Consolidated List. USUN should further state that we have
seen no evidence of a change in circumstance warranting
de-listing of JUD or Saeed.

5. (SBU) USUN and Embassy Islamabad should inform Pakistani
officials in New York and Islamabad, respectively, of our
opposition to the de-listing petition for JUD and Saeed.
Action addressees may wish to draw upon the following points:

-- We have reviewed the de-listing petition from attorneys on
behalf of Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed and
will soon inform the UN 1267 Committee, via the UN focal
point, of our opposition to de-listing.

-- We first wanted to share our views with Pakistani
officials, and to seek Pakistan's view on the de-listing
petition.

-- As you are no doubt aware, we are deeply concerned about
the threat posed by LeT/JUD, and reject Saeed's and his legal
representatives claim in the focal point de-listing petition
that "there are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the
Consolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect
and baseless."

-- In fact, LeT and JUD stem from the same original
organization, Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI). When LeT was
declared a terrorist organization in Pakistan in 2002, MDI
publicly divested itself of LeT at that time and renamed
itself JUD. LeT transferred most of its assets and personnel
to the newly formed JUD, ensuring its survival.

-- We believe that LeT uses JUD facilities as a public front
for its activities and shares offices, phone numbers,
personnel and bank accounts. LeT's old offices merely
changed the name on the door.

-- JUD's budget, using funds from both witting and unwitting
donors, is dedicated to social services and/or humanitarian
relief but some is used to finance LeT operations.

-- We are also aware that LeT and JUD share many senior
leaders, including Hafiz Saeed, who according to information
available to the USG, as of 2009 continued to control LeT and
issue guidance to LeT members.

-- We would like here your views on the status of LeT/JUD and
Saeed, and would particularly appreciate an update on steps
Pakistan has taken or will take to implement UN 1267
sanctions on them.

6. (S/REL to Pakistan) Embassy Islamabad is also requested to
share a non-paper, included below in paragraph 7, prepared by
our intelligence community in February 2009 assessing JUD's
links to LeT. This non-paper, which was previously passed by
former S/CT Coordinator Dell Daily to Pakistani Ambassador to
the United States Husain Haqqani, provides more detailed
information on our concerns about LeT/JUD and Saeed that
underpin our view that their listing by the UN 1267 Committee
was and remains appropriate.


7. (S/REL to Pakistan) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER

(U//FOUO) Assessing Jamaat-ud-Dawa's Links to
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

SUMMARY

(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT, a Pakistan-based
terrorist group, uses the JUD name as an alias. JUD is a
religious, educational, and humanitarian organization that
the Community assesses provides cover and protection for LT's
militant activities in Pakistan. LT and JUD share many senior
leaders; LT falls under the authority of JUD leader Hafiz
Muhammad Saeed; and JUD supports and facilitates LT's violent
activities.
- LT and JUD stem from the same original
organization*Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI)*that was
founded around 1986 and for which LT served as its armed,
militant wing. MDI was renamed JUD in December 2001.
- LT was declared a terrorist organization in January 2002,
and MDI publicly divested itself of the LT at that time. LT
transferred most of its assets and personnel under the newly
formed JUD.

(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD relies heavily on
private donations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
madrassas, and businesses spread throughout South Asia, the
Middle East, and Europe. Some of the money to finance LT
operations is obtained by fraudulently redirecting donations
intended for humanitarian work.

(S//REL) JUD and LT have branch offices with different names
and have adopted a number of aliases as a denial and
deception tactic.

END SUMMARY

(C//REL) Various Names and Aliases

(S//REL) The Intelligence Community assesses that
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are part of
the same organization, originally called
Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI), that was founded by Hafiz
Muhammed Saeed and other faculty at the University of
Engineering and Technology in Lahore in 1986. MDI was
established with funding from donors in the Middle East and
set up camps to prepare its personnel to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan.

MDI reorganized after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
in 1989, creating LT as its paramilitary wing to fight in the
Indian-controlled districts of Jammu and Kashmir while MDI
focused on religious and humanitarian activity. Saeed led
both MDI and LT during the 1990s.

When the US declared LT a terrorist organization in December
2001, MDI reorganized*changing its name to JUD to draw a
distinction between its charitable and educational work and
LT's militant activities*in an effort by MDI leaders to
shield their fundraising and other activities from sanctions.
Saeed publicly resigned from LT, telling the media that he
had assumed the leadership of JUD. In mid-January 2002, LT
was banned.

Islamabad "watchlisted" JUD in 2003, but the government has
resisted pressure to take action against the group,
particularly after JUD,s popular earthquake relief efforts
in 2005 and 2006 in response to the October 2005 earthquake
in Pakistan.

LT has used JUD facilities as a public front for its
activities and, shared offices, phone numbers, leaders, and
bank accounts. LT members identified themselves as JUD when
in Pakistan and as LT when in Kashmir.

LT/JUD purportedly raises funds for the Palestinian people in
response to Israel's attacks on Gaza. The Community judges
that as of January, JUD also may be operating under the alias
Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool. LT's political affairs coordinator
Khalid Waleed identified himself in late December as the
chief organizer for a conference for
Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, according to intelligence
reporting.
- On 6 February, the JUD held a Kashmir Solidarity Conference
at which JUD renamed itself Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir (TAK).
At JUD,s first public protest since December, supporters
used old JUD banners and chanted JUD slogans, but rallied
under the name TAK to avoid arrest.


BEGIN TEXT BOX

(U//FOUO) UN Links Jamaat-ud-Dawa to Terrorism

(S//REL) The United Nations (UN) banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD),
and on 10 December, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the 1267
Committee) approved the addition of JUD as a new LT alias for
targeted sanctions. This UN designation required all UN
member states to freeze any assets this entity may have under
the member states' jurisdiction, impose a travel ban, and
implement an arms embargo against them as set out in
paragraph 1 of UNSC Resolution 1822 of 2008.

(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT/JUD, in an attempt to
evade restrictions, has established branch offices with
different names and adopted a number of aliases. One branch,
Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, is a publicly acknowledged charitable
arm of JUD and has its own web page with photos of hospitals
and ambulances. Other aliases include Paasbaan-e-Ahle-Hadith,
Paasban-e-Kashmir, Al-Mansoorian, and Al-Nasaryeen. We assess
that LT and LT-associated militants will continue to use
aliases in order to circumvent restrictions on their movement
and operations.

END TEXT BOX

(U//FOUO) Financial Support

(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD fundraising has
relied heavily on private donations, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and businesses spread
throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of
JUD's budget, using funds raised both from witting donors and
by fraud, is dedicated to social services or humanitarian
relief projects, while some is used to finance LT operations.
- In December 2005, an official of Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq
forwarded JUD donation receipts to a probable LT front
company in Saudi Arabia where an LT finance official may have
been closely associated with the general manager*possibly
acting as a front for moving LT funds, according to
intelligence reporting.
- Makki in 2002 frequently visited the Middle East and
viewed it as a main source of funding. To demonstrate results
to donors, JUD would finance the cost of building a new
school or upgrading facilities at a madrassa, but would
inflate the cost to siphon money to LT.

(S//REL) The Community lacks sufficient intelligence to
determine if or how the November Mumbai attacks have affected
donations to JUD. Some donors may be dissuaded from
supporting JUD if they become aware that their funds may be
used for additional terrorist attacks, whereas other donors
may support LT's attacks. As public and government scrutiny
increases in the wake of the attacks and subsequent
designation of JUD as an alias of LT by the UN, we assess
that JUD will rely more on covert fundraising efforts.

(U//FOUO) Leadership

(S//REL) The Community assesses that Saeed is the leader of
LT and Lakvi is LT's operations commander*and they continue
to run the organization despite being detained for their role
in the November Mumbai attacks. We also judge that they have
planned, directed, and executed LT attacks throughout South
Asia and likely have used some funds collected in the name of
JUD's charitable activities to support multiple LT terrorist
operations, including the November Mumbai attacks. The
Community assesses that Saeed continues to lead both
organizations. However, the Community is unable to assess to
what extent senior JUD leaders such as Saeed are involved in
specific terrorist operations or the level of detail to which
they are knowledgeable about specific past and pending
attacks.
- As of mid-July Lakvi was responsible for the LT's military
operations budget of PKR 365 million (approximately US $5.2
million) per year. He reportedly used the money to purchase
all materials required for LT operations other than weapons
and ammunition, according to a source claiming direct and
ongoing access to LT leaders.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER

---------------------------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT
---------------------------------------
8. (U) Action addressees should report as soon as possible
but no later than August 19 results of their demarche to
Pakistani officials .

9. (U) Questions may be directed to IO/PSC (Erin Crowe,
202-736-7847).
CLINTON
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