Energía nuclear en España
Cable en el que España revisa la seguridad de las centrales nucleares
El pasado mes de febrero la Embajada en Madrid informa de los esfuerzos de España por proteger sus centrales de posibles ataques terroristas
| ID: | 249640 |
| Date: | 2010-02-19 14:18:00 |
| Origin: | 10MADRID192 |
| Source: | Embassy Madrid |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 09MADRID98 10MADRID125 10RABAT47 |
| Destination: | VZCZCMDI661 PP RUEHC GIPNC RUEHBY RUEHRB RUEHUL RUEHTC RUEHKO RUEHLA RHMCSUU RUEAIIA RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUEHBS RUEHGV RUEHNO RUEHUNV RUCNDT DE RUEHMD #0192/01 0501418 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 191418Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1976 INFO GIPNC/GLOBAL INITIATIVE PARTNER NATIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0898 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 6141 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0747 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 7344 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0765 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 4390 RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0008 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1612 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0171 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0552 |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000192 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE (MCKNIGHT, ZERDECKI), NEA/FO (CATALANO), ISN/RA (NEPHEW, ALLEN-CLOSE, MONGIELLO), ISN/WMD, EUR/ERA (DEAN), DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (RYU, MAGSAMEN, HOLGATE, CONNERY, SAMORE, BRADLEY) DEPARTMENT PASS TO DOE (GOREVICH) FOR USUNVIE/IAEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PARM, PREL, SP, KNNP, MO, KGIC, PTER SUBJECT: SPAIN: MFA DISCUSSES COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM REF: A. RABAT 47 B. MADRID 125 C. 09 MADRID 98 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY. Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament within the MFA's DG for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, on February 10 spoke with POLOFF and Deputy ECONCOUNS on a nascent MFA proposal regarding a year-long series of trilateral technical exercises with the USG and Morocco, the reaction among key allies to the USG's reforms to Terms of Reference for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and Spain's ongoing efforts to protect its domestic nuclear power plants from the terrorist threat. END SUMMARY. Proposed US-Spain-Morocco Technical Exercises on Nuclear Emergency Management 2. (C) Spanish wants to secure buy-in from the U.S. Department of State on a GOS proposal to conduct trilateral technical exercises on nuclear emergency management - to be held mainly in Morocco - throughout 2011, following extensive planning through 2010. Additional, compatible exercises could be held in the U.S. and Spain. He said Spain wants to cooperate with Morocco, its southern neighbor, on nuclear terrorism exercises to improve regional and global security, but cooperation between the two on security issues is a sensitive topic bilaterally. Torres highlighted that the majority of the 2004 Madrid train bombers were originally from Morocco and some officials in the Spanish Ministry of Interior (MOI) have expressed reservations about close cooperation with the Moroccans. A bilateral exercise - without U.S. participation - would be difficult, according to Torres. However, Spain knows that the USG has strong relations with Morocco and, with the Department of State's presence to coordinate and provide political weight, believes that all three nations would likely see the utility in conducting trilateral exercises, similar to the table-top exercises that Spain hosted for GICNT partners in Spring 2008. The Spanish MFA would like to involve the IAEA as well. Torres, who is known to Post as a reliable, straight-shooting interlocutor, told Embassy officials that Spain has a 100 million euro budget that it can apply to this proposal, which he said has the support of the both Moroccan and Spanish MFAs. He said he realizes the Department of State will need to evaluate this proposal and said he is available to discuss it. 3. (C) Torres outlined the genesis for this proposal by relating that while in Rabat in mid-January observing a U.S.-Morocco bilateral nuclear emergency management training exercise (Ref A), he was encouraged by the technical cooperation he witnessed between the U.S Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and its Moroccan counterpart. He said that his DOE/NSSA contacts were amenable to working with the Spanish, but the Moroccan technical experts, despite having invited him, were a bit arms-length. Torres suggested that what was missing from the events he attended was representation by the Department of State. He said that when he raised the issue at a GICNT event in Budapest a week later, his U.S. contacts were unaware the exercise in Rabat had taken place. He informed Embassy officials that Rabat would host a related event on March 22 and suggested it would be good for someone from the Department of State to attend. Arguing for Continuing a Strong U.S. Role in the GICNT 4. (C) Fleshing out misgivings originally conveyed to Post in Ref B, Torres also stated that the GOS is worried by the USG's proposed reforms to the GICNT's Terms of Reference, which Spain views as likely to put at risk the USG's political leadership of the GICNT. He argued that the international community needs the GICNT as a viable political forum on this issue and noted that the IAEA cannot play that role. Torres also conveyed Spain's concern about the proposed voting policy within the GICNT, which he thought could lead to the GICNT becoming politicized by certain members. He also fretted that the voting policy could cause problems with Russia, which he suggested was losing interest in the GICNT. Torres said that the Spanish delegation aired its concerns with US counterparts during the GICNT's January 19 event in Budapest and further stated that Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea share Spain's concerns on this matter. He remarked that the general feeling among these allies is that following the successful launch of a very interesting initiative, it is being abandoned. He added that each of these countries believes they are "maxed out" and cannot step up with further contributions. Reviewing Physical Security Measures at Spain's Nuclear Plants 5. (C) On the domestic front, Torres said that the MFA and the MOI continue to review the physical security of Spanish nuclear facilities. Pointing to a four-inch-thick binder dated 1987 which presumably addressed lessons learned, he stated that he had recently met officials at the MOI, where they had discussed the terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty's (ETA's) 1977-1982 armed campaign against the nuclear plant then under construction in Lemoniz (see Ref C). Torres described ETA's campaign as "fairly successful" and noted that terrorists managed to get fairly far into the facility. He described the current physical security measures at Spanish nuclear facilities as "good" but suggested they all face one weakness: as currently configured, they do not protect against an insider with clearances who might want to stage an attack inside one of Spain's nuclear facilities. The GOS is increasingly concerned about how to defend against this scenario, although Torres gave no indication that Spain has concrete information that either ETA or radical Islamists are planning an attack using such tactics is being planned. CHACON |
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