Colombia y las FARC
Cable sobre contactos entre el Gobierno colombiano y las FARC
El comisionado colombiano para la paz explica que ha entablado contactos con la guerrilla para preparar 'hojas de ruta' que faciliten un futuro diálogo
| ID: | 242765 |
| Date: | 2010-01-07 13:44:00 |
| Origin: | 10BOGOTA13 |
| Source: | Embassy Bogota |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Dunno: | 09BOGOTA3281 |
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S E C R E T BOGOTA 000013 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, SNAR, PARM, ECON, CO SUBJECT: Peace Commissioner Lays Out Way Ahead on FARC, ELN REF: 09 BOGOTA 3281 CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) Summary ------- 1. (S/NF) Colombian High Commissioner for Peace Frank Pearl told the Ambassador January 5 that his office is preparing "roadmaps" for the next Administration on how best to pursue peace agreements with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). Pearl acknowledged that the GOC had communicated with both groups in order to develop the road maps and build confidence. Both groups have expressed minimum conditions for a peace process that is supported by the GOC, the military, the private sector, and the international community. In the short term, Pearl plans to focus on the humanitarian release of FARC hostages and a secret meeting between the GOC and ELN with an aim to revitalizing the stalled peace talks. Wild cards include President Uribe's possible reelection, support from Venezuelan President Chavez, and the FARC's acquisition of "game-changing" weaponry such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). End summary. Roadmaps for Peace ------------------ 2. (S/NF) At a breakfast hosted by the Ambassador on January 5, Peace Commissioner Frank Pearl disclosed that when he took office in February last year, he assessed that there was not enough time left in the Uribe Administration (which ends August 7, 2010) for either the FARC or ELN to conclude a peace agreement with the GOC. He said his office had instead been focused on developing communication channels and building confidence with both terrorist organizations. Responses from these contacts, he continued, had informed the development of "roadmaps" that define both a desired end-state and the process to get there. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), supported by USAID, was drafting many of the documents. Pearl planned to present these fleshed out plans to the president-elect (or to President Uribe if he is reelected) in June to help guide the next Administration. 3. (S/NF) From the FARC, Pearl had seen little interest in initiating peace talks. FARC Supreme Leader Alfonso Cano was still consolidating his authority and proving his mettle as a military commander. It would have been impossible for Cano, he surmised, to have broached peace talks so soon after taking the reins of the FARC in May 2008. Still, Pearl noted that the deaths of three Secretariat members in 2008 had resulted in replacements that were more educated, intellectual, and aware of the international context of the conflict. This, coupled with an analysis of recent FARC communiques, suggested that the organization was open to a political solution to the conflict. He said other sources had signaled that the FARC's preferred end-state is the transition to a series of social networks (presumably comprised of demobilized fronts) that interface with a political party. Pearl admitted that such a solution was years away, but that having a notion of the other side's goals and objectives at the outset was important. 4. (S/NF) In the short term, Pearl said the GOC would continue to pursue the humanitarian release of two military hostages and the remains of a third held by the FARC. He said FARC interlocutor Piedad Cordoba told him December 24 that release was imminent but on December 29 reported that the FARC had rejected a facilitation role by Brazil and had counter-offered with Argentina or Sweden. The Ambassador counseled that the GOC cultivate the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic Church as interlocutors for the humanitarian release rather than depend solely on the Chavez-linked Senator Cordoba. 5. (S/NF) Pearl contrasted the FARC's situation with that of the ELN, which had developed a comprehensive basic framework agreement during talks that stalled in early 2008. He said the ELN's Central Command (COCE) had indicated interest in reviving those talks under appropriate conditions (ref). Pearl commented that the ELN process had been facilitated initially by Cuban government officials expert in peace talks, resulting in a substantive but incomplete peace proposal. The Commissioner confided that he had offered the COCE a secret, one- or two-day meeting as a confidence-building exercise. He said the COCE is considering the offer but is stuck on the meeting location: Colombia (difficult for the ELN), Venezuela (difficult for the GOC), or Norway (a logistical nightmare but still a possibility). If successful, Pearl contemplated having two or three such meetings before the end of the current Uribe Administration. The Ambassador reminded Pearl that the Embassy had contracted a U.S.-based academic familiar with the process to consult on ways for the USG to be supportive of GOC efforts with the ELN. Pearl was grateful for USAID assistance in drafting white papers that outlined the ELN negotiating positions. Common Ground ------------- 6. (S/NF) Pearl said that both guerrilla groups had responded through sensitive channels with the same four minimum conditions for a peace agreement. First, the GOC must be willing to give its unambiguous and unanimous support for the agreement. Signing a peace agreement, Pearl emphasized, was just the beginning of the process and the terrorist groups have, because of historical precedent, a deep distrust of the GOC's good faith. Second, the military must be included in the process, a reminder that the Colombian Army opposed and worked against civilian-led peace talks in the 1980s and 1990s. Third, both groups seek participation by the private sector, which they view as the true power behind Colombian politics. Fourth, the ELN and FARC want some form of international accompaniment for the process. Pearl foresees a positive role for the international community once the process has reached a sufficient level of maturity. International well-wishers coming in too early, he stressed, could aggravate the delicate process. Regarding a U.S. role, he said that both groups were interested in an agreement with the United States over illegal drug cultivation, which they viewed as a social problem. Wild Cards: Reelection and Venezuela ------------------------------------- 7. (S/NF) Pearl said there were two schools of thought about the impact of an Uribe third term on negotiations. Some believed that the third term would only exacerbate the tensions between Uribe and Chavez, which could play to the FARC's advantage. Others thought that the reelection would cause the FARC to despair at four more years of Uribe's Democratic Security policy and to consider negotiations. Ambassador Brownfield added that Venezuela's political and material support to the FARC could be a game-changer, especially if Venezuela were to give the FARC portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS). Pearl agreed that such weapons could upset the strategic balance of the conflict. COMMENT ------- 8. (S/NF) Pearl's presentation was structured, logical, and rehearsed. He clearly wanted to control our expectations over what could be accomplished in the short run. That said, it is a realistic plan given that Colombians will be seized with choosing (or reelecting) a president for much of 2010. We should continue our support of the GOC as it develops these initiatives, being careful not to get too far out in front. End comment. BROWNFIELD |
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