Desconfianza de EE UU hacia los políticos hondureños
Cable en el que EE UU habla de los titubeos de Zelaya
El embajador en Tegucigalpa lamenta que el entonces presidente de Honduras no siga al pie de la letra sus indicaciones, a pesar de que sí "cambió su ministro de Exteriores" por indicación de Estados Unidos
| ID: | 56893 |
| Date: | 2006-03-16 20:23:00 |
| Origin: | 06TEGUCIGALPA526 |
| Source: | Embassy Tegucigalpa |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Dunno: | 05TEGUCIGALPA2418 05TEGUCIGALPA2419 05TEGUCIGALPA2420 05TEGUCIGALPA2492 06TEGUCIGALPA100 06TEGUCIGALPA161 06TEGUCIGALPA193 06TEGUCIGALPA214 06TEGUCIGALPA344 06TEGUCIGALPA355 06TEGUCIGALPA433 06TEGUCIGALPA482 06TEGUCIGALPA505 06TEGUCIGALPA521 |
| Destination: | VZCZCXRO2962 OO RUEHC DE RUEHTG #0526/01 0752023 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 162023Z MAR 06 ZDK RE YOUR SVC FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1485 INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0125 RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH PRIORITY RUEPWJF/HQ BICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY 0363 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0172 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//CINC/POLAD// PRIORITY RUEAHND/CDRJTFB SOTO CANO HO PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 TEGUCIGALPA 000526 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S, D, P, E, AND R STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, WHA/EPSC, AND WHA/CEN STATE FOR EB, INL/LP, PM, PRM, DRL, CA, AND DS STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAM NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR DDOUGLASS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2036 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ETRD, MOPS, SMIG, PINR, KCRM, HO SUBJECT: ZELAYA ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST 45 DAYS - PRO-U.S. ZELAYA OFTEN TORN IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS BY ADVISORS REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 521 (FUEL) B. TEGUCIGALPA 505 (FUEL) C. TEGUCIGALPA 482 (FUEL) D. TEGUCIGALPA 355 (PRC/TAIWAN) E. TEGUCIGALPA 344 (AGRICULTURE) F. TEGUCIGALPA 214 (PRC/TAIWAN) G. 092106Z MAR 06 USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO (MOD) H. TEGUCIGALPA 433 (CRIME) I. TEGUCIGALPA 193(ZELAYA/GONZALES BILAT) J. TEGUCIGALPA 161 (ZELAYA BRIEFINGS) K. TEGUCIGALPA 100 (ZELAYA/FORD BILAT) L. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2492 (POL ASSESSMENT) TEGUCIGALP 00000526 001.2 OF 007 M. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2420 (ECON ASSESSMENT) N. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2419 (ECON ASSESSMENT) O. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 2418 (ECON ASSESSMENT) Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: Honduran President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya and his Administration have now been in office approximately 45 days. While Zelaya is clearly a friend of the USG, as Post predicted his personality, administration, and policy decisions are making working with him a challenge. On the plus side, Zelaya has moved with resolve to conclude CAFTA for an April 1 implementation, supports USG efforts on counter-narcotics, has cooperated on deportation issues, and has accepted U.S. DOD assistance in drafting a Honduran National Security Strategy, with a workshop for his Administration planned for May 5-7. However, there have been delays in reforming Immigration, crime appears to have worsened, and economic policy is a mixed bag, with fuel being a particularly controversial issue. Post is also concerned by the attention being paid to the more ideological voices within the Zelaya administration. Some in the Zelaya Administration may be showing their true colors -- some populist or radical, other merely concerned with protecting their business interests. Zelaya strikes us as a pro-U.S. political pragmatist, but one somewhat beholden to the competing forces within his party. Ambassador and Zelaya had a lengthy discussion March 14 (hosted by Former President Carlos Flores) to try to clear the air and improve bilateral communication. While communication will hopefully improve, Zelaya must take a more active leadership role if he seeks to establish rational policymaking in his Administration. End Summary. Pressure From Different Camps in Liberal Party --------------------------------------------- - 2. (C) The Ambassador and the Country Team have established a close working relationship with President Zelaya and his cabinet. As President-elect, Zelaya and three of his advisors met on January 20 with the Country Team at the Embassy for a one-hour country briefing followed by a half-hour session dedicated specifically to CAFTA (ref J). This meeting came after a January 11 Country Team briefing of several of Zelaya's designated ministers, and a January 13 luncheon meeting between the Ambassador, DCM, and the President-elect and his private secretary, Raul Valladares (ref K). President Zelaya has also held meetings with the Ambassador several times at the Ambassador's residence, both before and after his inauguration. From day one, Zelaya has relished the idea of meeting President Bush (a TEGUCIGALP 00000526 002.2 OF 007 meeting is tentatively set for June) and he literally made the Central American presidents and Mexican President Vicente Fox wait outside while he made Attorney General Gonzales the first official meeting of his presidency (ref I). Even before that, with one day's notice he brought his most senior leadership to San Pedro Sula to see R U/S Hughes and WHA Assistant Secretary Shannon, and he changed his Foreign Minister-designee at the Ambassador's request. There has been a consistent thread in Zelaya Administration, whether from Zelaya himself, his VP, or his ministers, and it has been pro-U.S. 3. (C) What appears to be causing some confusion in Zelaya's policies are competing camps in the Liberal Party seeking to influence Zelaya's decisions. Liberal Party President Patricia Rodas and two prominent cabinet ministers, Minister of Government and Justice Jorge Arturo Reina and Minister of Foreign Affairs Milton Jimenez, have a strong left-leaning backgrounds. (However it is critical to note that these same advisors go out of their way to make clear they value the bilateral relationship with the U.S.) In a possible indication of more ideological influence from these advisors, and in a possible contradiction to then-head of transition and now Minister of Finance Hugo Noe Pino's December 2005 statements to PolChief that a Zelaya government projects no change in relation with Taiwan or China, Honduras appears to be toying with closer relations to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) at the potential expense of Taiwan. This is despite the fact that Zelaya plans to visit Taiwan soon. While the GOH may just be seeking an expanded commercial relationship with the PRC, an understandable goal, and not want to break relations with Taiwan, its repeated discussion of the issue leads Post to wonder what the GOH's intentions are. (See refs D and F for details.) On Cuba, as Noe Pino told PolChief prior to the inauguration and FM Jimenez has reiterated publicly, Zelaya intends to send an Ambassador to Cuba, probably in 2007. Bilateral relations were reestablished by the Flores Administration and maintained by the Maduro Administration. There has been a Charge d'Affaires but not yet an Ambassador. 4. (C) The different camps in the Liberal Party, led by Rodas/Jimenez, Reina, San Pedro Sula business tycoon Jaime Rosenthal (father of Minister of the Presidency Yani Rosenthal), former President Carlos Flores (who appears to be seeking to bolster Vice President Elvin Santos' standing), and others, leaves a Zelaya Administration torn in different directions. While some of this may be healthy, in that he is receiving competing views, much of it is counterproductive as different factions fight for power and influence. Contacts in the National Party have voiced their interest in this intra-party fight. Zelaya has chosen to appoint six of his seven easily vanquished presidential primary opponents to cabinet-level positions, and appointed the seventh's son (Yani Rosenthal) also to the cabinet. This despite the fact that congressmen who ran on Zelaya's ticket in the primaries constitute 46 of the 63 Liberal Party congressmen, including President of Congress Roberto Micheletti - seen as a Flores ally, giving Zelaya what should be fairly strong loyalty from 74 percent of Liberal Party congressmen. 5. (C) It appears to Post that when Zelaya does choose a policy direction, such as on fuel (reftels A-C), the TEGUCIGALP 00000526 003.2 OF 007 President may have different goals than that of his advisors/ministers. Santos has clashed with Rodas ever since he was chosen as Zelaya's running mate, and in February Santos told the Ambassador he was considering resigning, but during Zelaya's recent trip to Panama and Chile Santos appears to have hit his stride. He is acting like a confident VP not worried about threats to his influence from within the party. Post would like to see Zelaya do the same and take the lead on what is best for Honduras, with the USG being a countervailing power to help Zelaya turn aside self-interested/corrupt groups within his party (and Honduran society) and conduct responsible political and economic reform. However it often seems that the fight is between an entrenched establishment, those seeking more radical change, and the great mass of Hondurans who need to feel tangible benefits to regain faith and democracy and free markets, with Zelaya's policies not yet showing a consistent thread. 6. (C) Former President Flores hosted a meeting the evening of March 14 between the Ambassador and President Zelaya, with Flores and FM Jimenez participating in most of the meeting, in an attempt to help enhance bilateral relations and clarify any recent communication problems, such as during the ongoing fuel issue (reftels A-C). Before the meeting began Flores told the Ambassador privately that Zelaya does not seem to understand the consequences of his public statements. Zelaya, after telling the Ambassador that he makes some key decisions (such as fuel) on his own, told the Ambassador to stay in close contact with FM Jimenez, despite the fact that it was clear to the Ambassador that on crucial issues it will be necessary to go straight to Zelaya. Flores emphasized to Zelaya that aside from political considerations in his party, the only people a Honduran President needed to consult with were Roman Catholic Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez and the American Ambassador. Regional Security a Highlight ----------------------------- 7. (C) Zelaya strongly supports USG efforts on counter-narcotics, and has accepted U.S. DOD assistance in drafting a Honduran National Security Strategy, with a workshop for his Administration planned for May 5-7. Combined training events are proceeding as planned, and a SOUTHCOM 15-person team recently visited to assess the operational capabilities of the Honduran military. Minister of Defense Aristedes Mejia's decision to keep intact the military leadership (with some changes recently) has strengthened a strong relationship built during his tenure as President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal when the military was one of the few nonpartisan institutions that actually worked in the contested election. The Honduran military has also been at the forefront of the Zelaya Administration's nascent efforts to protect natural resources, specifically to try to prevent illegal logging. The Embassy has found the Ministry of Defense to be a bright spot in the infant Zelaya Administration, helped by the fact that MOD Mejia is close to President Zelaya (see ref G). Immigration Reform Stalled -------------------------- TEGUCIGALP 00000526 004.6 OF 007 8. (SBU) The Zelaya Administration has continued GOH cooperation on deportation issues, including being the first Central American country to conduct video interviews of Hondurans awaiting deportation, with planes coming in daily, including permission for Saturday flights. In addition, GOH approval for use of San Pedro Sula for deportation flights continues, although the lack of promised resources from the USG means that San Pedro Sula has not yet been prepped for the intake of thousands of deportees. 9. (SBU) The GOH has not yet made discernible progress in reforming Honduran Immigration. Despite President Zelaya telling the Ambassador that he would move the immigration function from the Ministry of Government and Justice to the Foreign Ministry, it has not been moved. Indeed, the Director of Immigration told ConGen on March 7 that he had resigned after the Presidential Palace pressed his office to violate procedures to issue the President's children diplomatic passports. (This resignation is not yet public as it will be accepted by the MinGov March 16.) A scandal broke, also in early March, when citizens of Albania, Lebanon, and Bosnia were admitted in apparent violation of Honduran immigration law. The scandal has the hallmarks of all Honduran scandals, i.e. several days of outraged newspaper articles, with intimations of private interests at stake, followed by grandstanding by law enforcement officials and, finally, no meaningful action or change. The Ambassador raised this scandal with President Zelaya during their March 14 discussions, in an attempt to break away from the dysfunctional status quo on Immigration. President Zelaya told the Ambassador in that discussion that German Espinal, former executive director of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, would be named to lead Immigration out of the Ministry of Government and Justice, but left it unclear if Immigration would be an independent entity. Ambassador and EmbOffs met with MinGov Reina March 16 and he announced he would form a commission to identify procedures for finding a new Director of Immigration to begin the reform process. MinGov Reina left open the possibility that immigration would remain in his Ministry or be moved elsewhere. Ambassador told Reina that the Mission looked forward to working with and supporting his reform efforts. Further details of this conversation will be reported septel. Ministry of Public Security Adding Cops but Slow to Reform --------------------------------------------- ------------- 10. (SBU) There is a widespread perception that street crime has increased significantly since Zelaya took over. While the statistics are not authoritative, there is certainly more crime reported in the press. There is no doubt that more Mission members have been crime victims in recent weeks than before. These crimes have involved the use of firearms and have taken place in upscale residential neighborhoods. (See ref H for more details.) 11. (C) There are a disturbing number of indications that police personnel are involved in some crimes, though such allegations, and evidence, are not unique to this government. While both Zelaya and Minister of Public Security Alvaro Romero have stated support for the rehabilitation of criminals, especially past gang members, preferring a multi-disciplinary approach that utilizes TEGUCIGALP 00000526 005.4 OF 007 governmental programs as well as NGOs with rehabilitation projects, the message sent has been criticized by many. In fact, one hypothesis is that weak leadership in the Ministry of Public Security has allowed bad elements in the police to act with greater impunity than before. Romero, despite his bold statements about police being part of the problem, has yet to take any measures to shake up the corrupt ranks of the police. On a positive note and fulfilling a campaign promise, Zelaya has begun to increase the police force by incorporating hundreds of military policemen who have recently completed their military service into the police force. He has also kept the Maduro Administration's policy of boosting police patrols with military forces under "Honduras Segura." Economic Policy a Mixed Bag: Trade Good, Fuel Bad --------------------------------------------- ---- 12. (C) Trade: The GOH has worked diligently to vet all proposed CAFTA-required legislation and regulations with the USG, and submitted those proposals to the Honduran Congress, which passed them March 15. Minister of Trade and Industry Elizabeth Azcona said she believes the needed approvals will be enacted in time for an entry into force of CAFTA on April 1. Post finds it particularly significant that the Zelaya Administration, following directly from Zelaya's pro-free trade position, has accepted all key USG demands, and gotten congressional approval quickly over changes that will have significant impact on some key domestic interest groups. 13. (C) Energy: As discussed in refs A-C, the GOH has announced the nationalization of all fuel imports, and has threatened to also build its own storage facilities if existing facility owners do not agree to store the imported fuel at rates the GOH finds acceptable. If implemented, this action could constitute expropriation of a U.S. investment. 14. (C) Macroeconomic policy: The GOH continues to outperform International Monetary Fund targets. However, the GOH has privately asked the IMF to loosen certain targets, notably including public sector wages and overall fiscal deficit ceilings. There would be room in the program to do so and still attain minimum targets, but the IMF is concerned that the apparent flagging political will this early in the administration to make the difficult decisions bodes poorly for later years. 15. (C) Mining: In a February 10 meeting, Minister of Environment and Natural Resources (SERNA) Mayra Mejia told Ambassador that she understood the need to balance environmental protections and investor protections. She said she undertook to improve efficiency and transparency in her ministry. The following week, Mejia renewed the two-year old moratorium on new mining projects for another year, effectively blocking any new investment or significant expansion of existing investment. U.S. firm Mayan Gold, meanwhile, continues to suffer at the hands of illegal artesanal miners squatting on their gold-mining concession. To date, the company reports, neither SERNA nor the Public Ministry has taken any action to correct this illegal action. The mining legislation, pending since last summer, appears to be finally back on table for discussion. TEGUCIGALP 00000526 006.3 OF 007 16. (C) Agriculture: Based on the proposed sectoral budget for agriculture, the GOH appears to plan to shift significant resources (perhaps 60 percent of the overall sector budget) into supporting basic grains production (ref E). If enacted, this strikes Post as a significant step backwards, into an era of state-supported production of non-competitive commodities. It is also a rejection of the recent successes of projects demonstrating the economic benefits of producing non-traditional crops for export. 17. (C) Telecommunications: The GOH has thus far failed to pass pending telecommunications reform legislation, and reports indicate that efforts are underway in some quarters to gut the legislation, provide additional state support for failing parastatal Hondutel, and significantly weaken state telecommunications regulator Conatel. Post is cautiously optimistic that most of these negative changes will be reversed during the mark-up process, but laments the lack of GOH leadership seen thus far on the issue. 18. (C) Millennium Challenge Account (MCA): The Zelaya Administration has been willing to dedicate substantial efforts to launching the MCA program and as a result has received the first disbursement under the program. However, MCC staff are concerned that some selection of personnel has been based on personal relationships with the President and that competitive processes have been used to produce pre-determined results. In one case, this has resulted in MCC objecting to the appointment of the Director for FONADERS (a project implementation unit in the Ministry of Agriculture - see para. 20). MCC and other donors are also being lobbied by GOH officials to use concrete rather than asphalt in improvements to the major highway. While there may be legitimate reasons to use concrete, including problems with asphalt on stretches of the same road, Post is concerned that this may be motivated by Jaime Rosenthal, who owns a substantial portion of the production capacity for concrete in Honduras. 19. (C) Transparency: While the Zelaya Administration has announced that the private business interests of GOH ministers involved in the MCA process will not be able to bid on any MCA contracts, Post is increasingly concerned at the persistent GOH failure to grasp the essence of transparency in decision-making. The GOH has repeatedly shown that it considers inviting a wide group of participants to a meeting where the decision is presented as a fait accompli to be "transparent" - such as in the fuel issue. Another example is that FONADERS recently ran an open and competitive hiring process for its new director. President Zelaya overruled the review panel's choice and instead insisted on installing a person he thought highly of from his days in the Flores Administration but with no agricultural background in the position. Early Enough to Change Direction -------------------------------- 20. (C) Comment: It is early enough in Zelaya's presidency to make some key course corrections (especially on fuel), sideline some of his questionable advisors, and act decisively. He must both resist the temptation to act rashly to seek change for change's sake, but also realize TEGUCIGALP 00000526 007.3 OF 007 that his honeymoon will end and if he is unwilling to take tough decisions he will soon find himself in the situation that President Ricardo Maduro did after six months. Maduro established that he was successful on fiscal policy, seen as trying to be successful on crime, and was not really serious about implementing any other fundamental changes. This impression, and his low popularity, stuck with him the remainder of his presidency, aside from a few hills and valleys (notably his clashes with teachers unions). Post is hopeful that Zelaya can adapt and set a bolder course that will help reform Honduras without breaking it. 21. (C) Comment Continued. To do this Zelaya must rely on his sincere pro-U.S. attitude and get past his apparent resentment of Honduran dependency on the U.S., with some of his advisors grating at the obvious nature of U.S. political and economic power. As Flores advised Zelaya, he must realize he cannot "fool the Americans," and recognize his own inexperience and need for counsel. Post is guardedly optimistic that this early heart-to-heart between the Ambassador and President Zelaya will help prevent future disconnects and help Zelaya realize that his statements and actions will often have greater impact that his privately shared intentions. End Comment. Ford |
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