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Relaciones bilaterales con EE UU

Cable sobre la reacción española por la no celebración de la cumbre UE-EE UU en Madrid

Febero de 2010. La embajada reconoce que la decepción española es profunda, pero concluye que la relación bilateral "sobrevivirá intacta"

ID:247021
Date:2010-02-03 14:51:00
Origin:10MADRID133
Source:Embassy Madrid
Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:VZCZCXRO5250
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #0133/01 0341451
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031451Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1853
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4330
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000133

SIPDIS

FOR P - U/S BURNS, ALSO FOR EUR - A/S GORDON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020
TAGS: PREL, SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING U.S.-EU
SUMMIT

MADRID 00000133 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Alan D. Solomont, Reasons 1.4(b),(d).

1. (C) Summary. In the last 48 hours the Ambassador has
spoken with Spanish National Security Advisor Leon, FM
Moratinos, and President Zapatero regarding the announcement
that President Obama will not attend a U.S.-EU Summit in
Spain. Spanish disappointment -- both among senior
government officials and in the media -- is profound.
Nevertheless, the GOS is taking the high road, stressing the
health of the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Spanish relationships. We are
taking a similar approach privately and publicly,
aggressively reaching out to media to urge that they not read
into this decision some hidden and inaccurate message about
U.S. policy. The Spanish still hope for a Presidential
visit, and will probably raise that with Washington at every
opportunity. End summary.

2. (C) It is important we all continue to reiterate a
consistent message about what has and has not happened.
There was never U.S. agreement to a summit. The GOS was told
that on many occasions. The decision made this week has
everything to do with the President's very busy agenda and
nothing to do with the importance the U.S. attaches to Europe
and Spain. The U.S. has no more important relationship than
the one its enjoys with Europe, and Spain is an important and
valued ally. The President traveled to Europe six times last
year. He met twice with President Zapatero in recent months,
will see him again at the National Prayer Breakfast this
week, and will receive King Juan Carlos at the White House
February 17. The Spanish press is covering the story
heavily. Our message is being repeated in the media,
although commentary is running heavily towards characterizing
the decision as a slight to Europe and Spain.

3. (C) The Spanish reaction is colored by the hopes they had
pinned on this summit. The domestic economic news has been
uniformly bad for Zapatero for a long time. That is not
likely to change in the near future. Zapatero looked to the
EU presidency as a chance to burnish Spain's international
standing, especially as a leader within the EU. The summit
with the U.S. -- the first visit of a U.S. President in eight
years -- was to be the climax of Spain's presidency. Early
on Spain proposed late May as the date and began working to
convince U.S. officials of the value of a summit.
Regrettably, and despite being told repeatedly that no dates
were agreed, the GOS treated the summit as a fait accompli
when talking to the media.

4. (C) The Spanish did take seriously U.S. injunctions that a
summit needed concrete and worthwhile deliverables and began
working on an agenda that would be meaningful to the U.S. In
discussions with the Department of State and the NSC, the
Spanish stressed some worthwhile topics such as data
protection/information sharing, removing trade and regulatory
barriers, climate change, and -- most recently as described
to the Ambassador -- having Zapatero personally lead an
effort to persuade other EU countries to accept more
Guantanamo detainees. The Spanish did appear to have taken
seriously their role as a transitional EU presidency, trying
to find a balance with EU President Van Rompuy and High
Representative Ashton, dividing up meetings, and agreeing on
appropriate roles for both Van Rompuy and Zapatero in a
proposed U.S.-EU Summit in Spain.

5. (C) By the time the new U.S. Ambassador arrived January 9,
the GOS was clearly becoming nervous about the summit. In
his first days, senior GOS officials raised the issue with
the Ambassador, including Moratinos, Leon, Zapatero, and the
King. In each instance, the Ambassador made clear that the
USG had not yet agreed to a summit. His Spanish
interlocutors made it equally clear that they placed great
importance on having a summit.

6. (C) At this point, the Spanish do not feel betrayed, but
they are deeply disappointed. Naturally they regret, as does
everyone, that the bad news first appeared in the press.
Despite that, the GOS is trying to put the best face on this
situation. The Ambassador has explained personally to Leon,
Moratinos and Zapatero that Spain remains an important and
valued ally. In a February 2 conversation, Zapatero told the
Ambassador he understands President Obama has a complicated
agenda and that he traveled several times to Europe in the
past year. Zapatero assured the Ambassador he understands
the decision has nothing to do with U.S. feelings towards
Spain or Europe. He said he hopes President Obama will find
a convenient moment to visit Spain and suggested he would
tell the President that when he sees him at the National
Prayer Breakfast.

MADRID 00000133 002.2 OF 002



7. (C) Comment: Zapatero has taken a serious political blow
at a time when he can ill afford it. Nevertheless, bilateral
relations will survive intact. We expect Spain to follow
through on its commitments to send more troops to
Afghanistan, accept five Guantanamo detainees, and be helpful
on Iran sanctions. The Spanish are still hopeful for a
Presidential visit this year, perhaps in conjunction with the
President's visit to Lisbon in November. In that regard, we
have advised the Spanish not to create false expectations.
We do believe such a visit would be useful in terms of
strengthening relations with an important ally who has
demonstrated an increasing willingness to support U.S.
priorities. The use of Spanish military bases by our Navy
and Air Force has long been of great value to us as is
Spain's commitment in Afghanistan and its cooperation on CT,
law enforcement, etc. Although Spanish leaders may voice
their desire for a visit to senior USG officials, they should
avoid making the same mistake twice of speaking publicly
about a visit that has not been committed to. End comment.
SOLOMONT
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