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Cable para trasmitir el informe 2009 sobre terrorismo

A pesar del discurso oficial que niega la amenaza terrorista, en la práctica, Brasil coopera con EE UU para evitar que su territorio se convierta en base de organizaciones dedicadas al terrorismo y al crimen transnacional

ID: 242234
Date: 2009-12-31 13:32:00
Origin: 09BRASILIA1540
Source: Embassy Brasilia
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1540/01 3651333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311332Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0233
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

UNCLAS BRASILIA 001540

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to cooperate in
countering terrorism and related activities that could contribute
to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere-to
include investigating potential terrorism financing, document
forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally,
elements of the Brazilian government responsible for combating
terrorism, such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian
Intelligence Agency, work effectively with their U.S. counterparts
most of the time and pursue investigative leads provided by U.S.
and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial
agencies regarding terrorist suspects.

2. (SBU)There are two separate discourses in the government of
Brazil on counterterrorism; politically, Brazil continues to deny
the presence and potential threat of terrorists and terrorism in
Brazil, while law enforcement and intelligence monitor and
cooperate to counter the threat. The head of the Brazilian Federal
Police (DPF) intelligence division in July went on record during a
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies hearing on terrorism and admitted
that an individual arrested in April was in fact linked to al Qaeda
(AQ). Despite the statement, most GOB officials continue to toe the
party line and deny any evidence that terrorists have, or would be,
interested in establishing a presence in Brazil.

3. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are
concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to
support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or
abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo,
the tri-borders areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil,
Peru, and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Other
branches of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of
External Relations, do not believe Brazil is vulnerable to
terrorism-related activities and instead focus more heavily on
threats from transnational crimes. In October 2009, the MRE did
admit, for the first time, that terrorists could become interested
in Brazil because of the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de
Janeiro. Brazilian law enforcement's recognition of the potential
threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian
Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that could raise the profile of the
issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department
level.

4. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work with
regional and international partners. Brazil participates in
regional counterterrorism fora, but is less committed to regional
groups in which the Unites States is involved. Brazil is actively
involved Mercosul's working group on terrorism and the sub-working
group on financial issues, the latter of which discusses terrorism
financing and money laundering among the Mercosul countries, but
has proven difficult to engage in 3+1 mechanism on security in the
Tri-Border Area (TBA), where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay share a
border.

5. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses
throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering,
detection of travel document fraud, container security, and
international organized crime. In 2009 the USG again hosted a Major
Crimes Conference that successfully brought together Brazil and
neighboring countries' federal and state law enforcement
communities and judges and prosecutors to share best practices and
receive practical training.

6. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups and
does not recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva has been critical of the FARC's use of violence and has
publicly called on the group to desist in the armed struggle
against the Colombian government.

7. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial
operations and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence
unit, the Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), to
identify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. Through
COAF, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and entities
on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not
found any assets, accounts or property in the names of persons or
entities on the UN terror-finance lists.

8. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its
capabilities to combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen
specialized money laundering courts have been established,

including two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who
receives specialized training in national money laundering
legislation. In addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil
established a working group with money laundering judges to share
best practices and training needs.

9. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was
formed aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by
creating complementary specialized federal police financial crimes
units in the same jurisdictions. In 2008, the federal police
established such units in the Federal District (Brasilia) and the
states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In addition, the Ministry
of Justice funded the creation of technology center to combat money
laundering in the federal district and Rio de Janeiro, the latter
of which received two such centers, one embedded with the Public
Ministry and one with the State Civil Police. In 2008, the Ministry
signed accords to establish additional centers in Bahia, Goiais,
and Rio Grande do Sul.

10. (SBU) The government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy
consists of deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory to
facilitate attacks or raise funds, along with monitoring and
suppressing transnational criminal activities that could support
terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through actions between its
law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United
States and other partners in the region. For example, in 2009
Brazilian authorities began in earnest to work with other concerned
nations (particularly the U.S.) in combating the significant and
largely unchecked document fraud problem in the country. During
the year, multiple regional and international joint operations with
U.S. authorities successfully disrupted a number of document
vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking
infrastructures. This included one of the largest visa fraud cases
of its type in U.S. law enforcement history.

11. (SBU) In 2009, the work on the U.S.-Brazil container security
initiative in Santos, Brazil was stalled after U.S. officials
traveling to Brazil for the program had difficulties getting
Brazilian visas. The container security initiative was created to
promote secure containerized cargo to the United States through the
establishment of a trade transparency unit to detect money
laundering through trade transactions. The Brazilian Ministry of
External Relations (MRE) was uncomfortable with the
counter-terrorism focus of the program, but has recently agreed to
issuing visas in support of the initiative.

12. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from
recent investment in border and law enforcement infrastructure that
were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of
goods-legal and illegal-through the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of
Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be
diverted to support terror groups. The inspection station at the
Friendship Bridge in the TBA that was completed by the Brazilian
customs agency (Receita Federal) in 2007 continued to take
effective action to reduce the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and
contraband goods along the border with Paraguay. According to
Receita Federal, from January to July 2009 the agency seized more
than USD 400 million in contraband goods, including drugs, weapons,
and munitions, an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result
of the effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling
operations now take place through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu
and some have migrated to other sections of the border, such as the
towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal Police has special
maritime police units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that patrol
the maritime border areas, but because of the scale and complexity
of the endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities
through the waterways, Brazil is considering using an unmanned
aerial vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the border,
a development that could further improve border security.

13. (SBU) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and
illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism
is undermined by the GOB's failure to strengthen its legal
counterterrorism framework significantly. Although terrorist
financing is an established predicate offense for money laundering,
Brazil lacks legislation criminalizing terrorism or its financing
as autonomous offenses. The 2005 National Strategy against Money
Laundering (ENCLA) created a working group (composed of
representatives of ministries involved in CFT, the judiciary, and
the federal prosecutor's office) charged with drafting legislation

to criminalize terrorism and its financing. The draft legislation
was never forwarded from the executive branch to the Brazilian
Congress. A long-delayed anti-money laundering bill is still
pending before the Brazilian Congress. The bill would facilitate
greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records
during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow
administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of
money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money
laundering and making it an autonomous offense.
KUBISKE